RCMP findings relating to the Office of the Comptroller General Horizontal Internal Audit of Information Technology (IT) Security

Vetted Report

February, 2016

This report has been reviewed in consideration of the Access to Information and Privacy Acts. The asterisks [***] appear where information has been removed; published information is UNCLASSIFIED.

Table of Contents

• Acronyms and Abbreviations
• Executive Summary
• Management's Response to the Audit
• 1.0 Background
• 2.0 Objectives, Scope and Methodology
  • 2.1 Objectives
  • 2.2 Scope
  • 2.3 Methodology
• 3.0 Audit Findings
  • 3.1 Governance at the Departmental Level
    • 3.1.1 IT Security Policy
    • 3.1.2 IT Security Governance
    • 3.1.3 Departmental Security Plan
    • 3.1.4 ***
    • 3.1.5 ***
  • 3.2 ***
• 4.0 ***
• 5.0 ***
• Appendix A: Audit Objectives and Criteria

Acronyms and Abbreviations

CIO

Chief Information Officer

CSEC

Communications Security Establishment Canada

DG

Director General

DSB

Departmental Security Branch

DSO

Departmental Security Officer

DSP

Departmental Security Plan

IA

Internal Audit

IM/IT PROGRAM

Information Management/Information Technology Program

IT

Information Technology

ITSC

IT Security Coordinator

MAP

Management Action Plan

MITS

Operational Security Standard: Management of IT Security

OCG

Office of the Comptroller General

***

RCMP

Royal Canadian Mounted Police

SSC

Shared Services Canada

TB

Treasury Board

TBS

Treasury Board Secretariat

***

Executive Summary

The Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) was one of twelve large departments and seven small departments selected by the Office of the Comptroller General (OCG) to participate in a Horizontal Internal Audit of Information Technology (IT) Security. The objectives of the audit were to determine whether governance frameworks over IT Security were in place within departments as well as across government; and whether selected control frameworks were in place in departments to mitigate IT Security risks. The scope of the audit included the governance and control frameworks over IT Security for unclassified government networks as at March 31, 2014. The planning phase of the audit, including development of the objective, scope and criteria, was completed by the OCG. RCMP Internal Audit (IA) was asked to complete the examination phase of the audit using a methodology developed by the OCG and to report findings and conclusions to the OCG for inclusion in a consolidated report.

***

This companion report provides additional RCMP-specific details and context with respect to the OCG's findings. The OCG's consolidated findings are consistent with the situation within the RCMP. While elements of the governance framework over IT security were in place ***

Management's Response to the Audit

The Departmental Security Branch (DSB) agrees with the findings reported in the OCG's "Horizontal Internal Audit of IT Security" report and the subsequent "RCMP Findings Relating to the OCG's Horizontal Audit of IT Security" report. They have highlighted *** in the following key areas: ***

• inter-departmental governance including policy updates; ***

The current operating environment is driving key responsibilities that must be well defined between the RCMP, Shared Services Canada (SSC), CSEC and Treasury Board. *** DSB in partnership with the IM/IT Program will assume the leadership roles needed internally to move forward on the recommendations. ***

Peter Henschel, Deputy Commissioner
Specialized Policing Services
Royal Canadian Mounted Police

1.0 Background

Information technology (IT) is as much an enabler of government operations as it is a source of risk to the confidentiality, integrity and availability of information on which the government depends to operate. *** The RCMP was one of twelve large and seven small departments selected by the OCG to participate in this horizontal internal audit. The objectives, established by the OCG, were to determine whether: governance frameworks over IT Security were in place within departments as well as across government; and selected control frameworks were in place in departments to mitigate IT Security risks related to unclassified networks.

IT Security refers to the safeguards that preserve the confidentiality, integrity, availability, intended use, and value of electronically stored, processed, or transmitted information. IT Security also includes the safeguards that are applied to the assets used to gather, process, receive, display, transmit, reconfigure, scan store, or destroy information electronically.^{Footnote 1}

Within the RCMP, IT security is a shared responsibility. The Departmental Security Branch (DSB) is the national policy centre for IT Security. The Information Management / Information Technology (IM/IT) Program delivers IT services across the RCMP, ***. External agencies also play a role, with Shared Services Canada (SSC) being the service provider for network infrastructure, acquisition and provision of hardware, software and related support.^{Footnote 2}

RCMP Internal Audit (IA) was asked to complete the examination phase of the horizontal audit using a methodology developed by the OCG, and based on OCG-determined criteria (see Appendix A). At the conclusion of the examination phase, RCMP IA provided findings and conclusions to the OCG for inclusion in a consolidated report. The consolidated report was tabled by the OCG at the Government of Canada Audit Committee in February 2016.

The OCG report includes three findings and associated recommendations: Governance at the Government-Wide Level; Governance at the Departmental Level; and Selected Departmental Control Frameworks. *** Accordingly, this report includes additional RCMP-specific details and context with respect to these findings ***. ***

2.0 Objectives, Scope and Methodology

2.1 Objectives

The objectives of the OCG horizontal internal audit were to determine whether:

1. Governance frameworks over IT Security were in place within departments as well as across government; and,
2. Selected control frameworks were in place in departments to mitigate IT Security risks.

The criteria used to assess the objectives relevant to the RCMP can be found in Appendix A.

The objective of this report is to provide additional context and detail related to those findings and recommendations relevant to the RCMP.

2.2 Scope

The scope of the audit included the governance and control frameworks over IT Security for unclassified government networks as at March 31, 2014. The audit focused on unclassified networks ***. ***

2.3 Methodology

The planning phase was completed by the OCG. The OCG also determined the methodology to be used by participating departments during the examination phase. Participating departments submitted their results, and the OCG reported on the consolidated findings.

During the examination phase, RCMP IA conducted interviews with key employees within the Departmental Security Branch (DSB), Information Management / Information Technology (IM/IT) Program ***. As well, documentation from these groups was collected and analyzed.

3.0 Audit Findings

3.1 Governance at the Departmental Level

The OCG report indicates that both large and small departments could improve their IT governance frameworks by: updating their IT Security policies in a timely manner ***.

3.1.1 IT Security Policy

The Treasury Board Secretariat (TBS) Operational Security Standard: Management of IT Security (MITS) requires every department to have a departmental IT security policy that is approved by senior management. The IT security policy must define roles and responsibilities and be communicated to stakeholders. To ensure the IT security policy remains relevant, it must also reflect the changing environment.

At the time of the audit, a departmental IT security policy was in place ***. ***

Consistent with MITS requirements, the RCMP's IT security policy defined roles and responsibilities related to IT security. ***

3.1.2 IT Security Governance

The Treasury Board (TB) Policy on Government Security requires that departments appoint a DSO, who is functionally responsible to the deputy head or to the departmental executive committee to manage the departmental security program. The TBS Directive on Departmental Security Management also requires departments to establish security governance mechanisms (committees, working groups) to ensure the coordination and integration of security activities, and facilitate decision making.

The RCMP's Director General (DG) DSB has been appointed to perform the function of DSO. In this capacity, the DSO is responsible for all IT systems under the control and stewardship of the RCMP. Additionally, the DSO is responsible for arranging the inspection of and consultations on RCMP computer facilities and for coordinating the implementation of any related recommendations. Reporting to the DSO, the Director, Information Technology Security Communications is the RCMP's IT Security Coordinator (ITSC). As the RCMP is one of Shared Services Canada's (SSC) partner organizations, SSC is also a stakeholder in the RCMP's IT security governance activities.

*** IT security is discussed and decisions relative to IT security are made in committees in which the DSO and ITSC participate. ***

3.1.3 Departmental Security Plan

The TB Policy on Government Security requires that deputy heads approve a Departmental Security Plan (DSP) detailing decisions for managing security risks and outlining strategies, goals, objectives, priorities and timelines for improving departmental security. ***

At the time of the audit, the RCMP's DSP was being developed and was intended to reflect the security control objectives in the TBS Directive on Departmental Security Management. ***

A DSP *** should help better coordinate resources to proactively address IT security risks, manage risks more effectively, and respond more efficiently to IT security incidents. Following completion of the audit, in the summer of 2015, the RCMP completed its first DSP. ***

3.1.4 ***

Faced with a continuously evolving threat environment in the area of IT security, a systematic approach to understand, manage and communicate risk is important to ensure the best use of resources. In its lead security agency role, Communications Security Establishment Canada (CSEC) issued guidance (Overview of IT Security Risk Management: A Lifecycle Approach [ITSG-33], Annex 1) recommending a specific approach for managing IT security risks consistently.

At the time of the audit, ***

3.1.5 ***

The TB Policy on Government Security requires deputy heads to ensure that periodic reviews are conducted to assess the effectiveness of their departmental security program. MITS also requires an annual assessment of the IT security program and practices to monitor compliance with government and departmental security policies and standards. ***

3.2 ***

4.0 ***

5.0 ***

Appendix A – Audit Objectives and Criteria

The following objectives and criteria, of relevance to the RCMP, were determined by the OCG. The OCG audit report "Horizontal Internal Audit of IT Security" was finalized in February 2016.

Use of Public Safety Portal by the Canadian Firearms Program

1.0 Executive summary

The mission of the Canadian Firearms Program (CFP) is to enhance public safety by helping reduce risk of harm from firearms. The CFP is committed to firearms safety through licencing of all firearms owners, including several levels of security screening for firearms licence holders and applicants.

The CFP is a business line in the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) that is made up of accredited law enforcement agencies and provincial Public Safety institutions. Firearms licencing and authorizations in every province and territory are managed by Chief Firearms Officers (CFOs). CFOs and Firearms Officers (FOs) across the country carry out the same duties and responsibilities under Section 2(1) of the Firearms Act or Section 84(1) of the Criminal Code, regardless if their delegation of authority is issued from a provincial minister or the federal Minister of Public Safety.

The Director General of the Canadian Police Information Centre (CPI Centre) has approved the Application for Access to the Public Safety Portal (PSP) submitted by the CFP (See Appendix "A"). Access to PSP will assist CFOs, FOs and designated employees to fulfill their mandate to provide for the continuous eligibility of clients, screening of firearms licence holders and requestors, and for the safety of these public officers, and of the public, while performing field-related duties.

The CFP is authorized to access client information through PSP by virtue of the Privacy Act Section 8 (2)(a) which allows personal information under the control of government institution to be disclosed for the purpose for which the information was obtained or compiled by the institution or for a use consistent with that purpose, and under Sections 5 and 55 of the Firearms Act.

• In order to enforce the Firearms Act or Part III of the Criminal Code that gives CFP its mandate, the Program is authorized to and does appoint enforcement officers [Chief Firearms Officers (CFOs) and the Firearms Officers (FOs)] who are designated public officers under the Criminal Code. They are engaged in investigations within the full spectrum of enforcement activities dictated by their legislative mandate. The Act grants specific authority for the decision-making and administrative work related to licensing eligibility for minors between 12 and 17, as well as for adults, authorizations to transport and authorizations to carry, transfers of firearms by individuals and businesses, gun show sponsorship approvals, and the conduct of field investigations and inspections, but also implicitly grants authority to obtain information that is relevant to those activities and which form a consistent use of information between CFP and other enforcement agencies.

Training obtained from CFP, and internal practices relevant to investigation, privacy and security, and the reality of gathering evidence that can be used in court ensure that information obtained from PSP will be handled in accordance with the PSP Policy and Procedures, including validation of information with the originating agency and obtaining consent for disclosure from the originating agency.

The RCMP CFP has also updated its Program Policy Manual on the Collection and Use of the Personal Information which addresses the appropriate management of all information that is obtained from any operational police file, including through PSP, for the purpose of investigating Firearms Interest Police (FIP) incidents.

All CFOs, FOs and their staff have been fingerprinted and cleared by the RCMP Forensic Identification Directorate and the Departmental Security Branch to the minimum level of Enhanced Reliability. In addition all CFOs, FOs, and their staff use a two factor Strong Identification and Authentication system to access applications via the standard RCMP Office Support System (ROSS) secure environment. CFOs' offices are secure zones with controlled access.

1.1 Summary of risks and mitigating mechanisms

The table below summarizes the privacy risks identified through the PIA process and categorizes levels of risk as low, moderate or high – defined by a factor of both impact and likelihood of occurrence.

The criteria for risk categorization are set as follows:

Low: There is a remote possibility that the risk will materialize or the impact of the risk is minor.

Moderate: The possibility of the risk materializing is low although the impact of such a risk is high, or the possibility of the risk materializing is high but the impact of such a risk is minor, or the impact and likelihood of the risk occurring are both determined to be moderate.

High: There is a near certainty that the risk will materialize if no corrective measures are taken or the impact of the risk on the project is severe.

Accès au Portail de la sécurité publique par le Programme canadien des armes à feu

1.0 Sommaire

Le Programme canadien des armes à feu (PCAF) a pour mission de renforcer la sécurité publique en réduisant le risque de dommages causés par des armes à feu. Il veille à la sécurité relative aux armes à feu par la délivrance de permis à tous les propriétaires d'armes à feu, qui comprend plusieurs niveaux d'enquête de sécurité à l'intention des détenteurs et des demandeurs de permis d'armes à feu.

Le PCAF fait partie d'un secteur d'activité à la Gendarmerie royale du Canada (GRC) composé d'organismes d'application de la loi accrédités et d'institutions provinciales chargées de la sécurité publique. Dans chaque province et territoire, la délivrance des permis d'armes à feu et des autorisations d'en posséder est administrée par les contrôleurs des armes à feu (CAF). Partout au pays, des CAF et des préposés aux armes à feu (PAF) s'acquittent des mêmes fonctions et responsabilités en application du paragraphe 2(1) de la Loi sur les armes à feu ou du paragraphe 84(1) du Code criminel, peu importe si leurs pouvoirs leur sont délégués par un ministre provincial ou par le ministre fédéral de la Sécurité publique.

Le directeur général du Centre d'information de la police canadienne (CIPC) a approuvé la demande d'accès au Portail de la sécurité publique (PSP) présentée par le PCAF (voir l'annexe A). L'accès au PSP aidera les CAF, les PAF et les employés désignés de remplir leur mandat, soit d'effectuer la vérification continue de l'admissibilité des clients, à vérifier les antécédents des détenteurs et des demandeurs de permis d'arme à feu, et à assurer leur sécurité et celle du public, tout en accomplissant des tâches relatives au travail sur le terrain.

Le PCAF a l'autorisation aux renseignements des clients par l'intermédiaire du PSP en vertu de l'alinéa 8(2)a) de la Loi sur la protection des renseignements personnels, qui permet la communication de renseignements personnels relevant d'une institution gouvernementale aux fins auxquelles ils ont été recueillis ou préparés par l'institution ou pour un usage qui correspond à ces fins, et en vertu des articles 5 et 55 de la Loi sur les armes à feu.

• Aux fins de l'application de la Loi sur les armes à feu ou de la partie III du Code criminel, qui confère au PCAF son mandat, le Programme est autorisé à nommer des agents d'exécution (les contrôleurs des armes à feu, ou CAF, et les préposés aux armes à feu, ou PAF). Ces derniers sont des fonctionnaires publics désignés au titre du Code criminel. Ils participent à des enquêtes dans l'éventail complet des activités d'application qui s'inscrivent dans leur mandat prescrit par la loi. La Loi accorde l'autorisation expresse liée à la prise de décisions et au travail administratif en ce qui a trait à l'admissibilité à un permis des mineurs âgés de 12 à 17 ans et des adultes, aux autorisations de transport et de port, aux cessions d'armes à feu par les particuliers et les entreprises et aux agréments d'expositions d'armes à feu. De plus, la Loi autorise le Programme à effectuer des enquêtes et des inspections sur le terrain, en plus de donner implicitement le pouvoir de recueillir des renseignements qui se rapportent à ces activités et qui sont systématiquement utilisés par le PCAF et d'autres organismes d'application de la loi.

La formation donnée par le PCAF et les pratiques internes liées aux enquêtes, à la vie privée et à la sécurité, ainsi que le fait de devoir recueillir des preuves qui peuvent être utilisées en cour, font en sorte que l'information obtenue par l'intermédiaire du PSP sera traitée conformément à la politique et aux procédures relatives au PSP, y compris la validation auprès du détenteur du dossier et l'obtention d'une autorisation de divulgation de la part du détenteur.

Le PCAF de la GRC a également mis à jour le chapitre de son Manuel de politiques qui porte sur la collecte et l'utilisation de renseignements personnels de façon à indiquer les méthodes appropriées de gestion des renseignements tirés des dossiers opérationnels de la police, y compris ceux obtenus par l'intermédiaire du PSP, aux fins des enquêtes sur les incidents impliquant des personnes d'intérêt relativement aux armes à feu (PIAF).

Tous les CAF, les PAF et leurs employés ont fourni leurs empreintes digitales et ont au moins fait l'objet d'un contrôle approfondi de la fiabilité par la Direction de l'identité judiciaire et la Sous-direction de la sécurité ministérielle de la GRC. En outre, tous les CAF, les PAF, et leurs employés utilisent un système solide d'identification et d'authentification à deux facteurs pour accéder aux applications par l'intermédiaire de l'environnement protégé du système standard de bureautique de la GRC (système ROSS). Les bureaux des CAF sont situés dans une zone de sécurité dont l'accès est contrôlé.

1.1 Résumé des risques et des mesures d'atténuation

Le tableau ci-dessous résume les risques d'entrave à la vie privée qui ont été relevés dans le cadre de l'EFVP et les classe selon les niveaux faible, modéré ou élevé. Le niveau est défini en fonction des répercussions que le risque peut avoir et des probabilités qu'il se concrétise.

Les critères pour la catégorisation des risques sont les suivants :

Faible : Il est peu probable que le risque se concrétise, et le cas échéant, les répercussions seraient mineures.

Modéré : Il est peu probable que le risque se concrétise, mais le cas échéant, les répercussions seraient importantes, ou il est très probable que le risque se concrétise, mais le cas échéant, les répercussions seraient mineures, ou encore la probabilité que le risque et ses répercussions se concrétisent est modérée.

Élevé : Il est presque certain que le risque se concrétisera si aucune mesure correctrice n'est prise, et les répercussions de ce risque sur le projet seront graves.

Mesures de changement de la GRC

RCMP Change Initiatives

The RCMP seeks your help in solving cases of missing Indigenous women

The Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) is looking for your help in solving outstanding cases of missing Indigenous women and girls.

This year we will be highlighting cases over a 10 week period on social media. The start of the campaign in October was chosen to coincide with the Sisters in Spirit Vigil held by the Native Women's Association of Canada each October 4th.

How the public can help

• Visit canadasmissing.ca to review the cases of missing women and to learn how to submit a tip
• "Like" the Royal Canadian Mounted Police on Facebook to see information about the cases and share them
• Follow @rcmpgrcpolice on Twitter to read about and retweet information on the cases
• Follow @rcmpgrcpolice on Instagram and share their stories to raise awareness about the cases

This initiative is an opportunity for communities across the country to be involved by sharing information that may generate tips for investigating officers. With the public's help we hope to bring these missing women and girls home, and seek justice and closure for families in unsolved homicide cases.

2022 campaign cases

• Jeannine Nicole Ermineskin
• Danita BigEagle
• Irma Murdock
• Monique Mattar
• Lisa Young
• Loretta Ann Frank
• Brandy Rene Wesaquate
• Desiree Oldwoman
• Mary Rose Keadjuk

La GRC sollicite votre aide pour résoudre les cas de femmes et des filles autochtones disparues

La Gendarmerie royale du Canada (GRC) sollicite votre aide pour résoudre les cas en suspens de femmes et de filles autochtones disparues.

Cette année, pendant une période de dix semaines, nous présenterons des cas dans les médias sociaux. La campagne est lancée pendant la semaine où a lieu le 4 octobre de chaque année la veille des Sœurs par l'esprit organisée par l'Association des femmes autochtones du Canada. (en anglais seulement)

Que peut faire le public?

• Consulter le site disparus-canada.ca pour lire les cas de femmes disparues et savoir comment communiquer de l'information sur ceux-ci.
• « Aimer » la Gendarmerie royale du Canada sur Facebook pour voir et partager de l'information sur ces affaires.
• Suivre @grcrcmppolice sur Twitter pour lire et transmettre de l'information sur les cas présentés.
• Suivez @grcrcmppolice sur Instagram et partagez leur Story pour faire connaître les cas.

Cette campagne est l'occasion pour les collectivités du pays de jouer un rôle actif en communiquant de l'information qui pourrait fournir des pistes aux enquêteurs. Grâce à l'aide du public, nous espérons retrouver ces femmes et ces filles disparues, obtenir justice pour elles et donner des réponses aux familles touchées dans les cas de meurtre non résolus.

Cas présentés dans la campagne 2022

• Jeannine Nicole Ermineskin
• Danita BigEagle
• Irma Murdock
• Monique Mattar
• Lisa Young
• Loretta Ann Frank
• Brandy Rene Wesaquate
• Desiree Oldwoman
• Mary Rose Keadjuk

Vidéo illustrant les dangers du fentanyl - Sous-titres

Transcription

Un appel a été fait; on demandait une intervention au centre-ville.

Arrivés sur les lieux, nous avons vu un homme probablement âgé de 20 ans, affaissé dans le siège du conducteur, derrière le volant.

On pouvait voir toutes sortes de drogues bien en évidence dans la console centrale.

Il y avait un sac de drogues transparent contenant de nombreuses pilules et différents articles.

J'ai arrêté l'homme pour possession d'une substance contrôlée et je l'ai mis dans ma voiture, je lui ai fait la lecture de ses droits, puis je suis retourné à son véhicule pour le fouiller.

J'ai constaté la présence d'une odeur d'origine chimique que je connaissais; c'est un agent masquant dégageant une odeur très parfumée, mais aussi une odeur de produit chimique.

J'ai commencé à me sentir un peu étourdi et à avoir la nausée; par conséquent, pour m'assurer ma sécurité et celle de l'homme, je lui ai demandé quelles drogues il consommait, et c'est alors qu'il m'a dit que c'était du fentanyl.

J'ai informé ma co-équipière au moyen de ma radio, en lui disant que je ne me sentais pas bien; ensuite, un employé municipal m'a amené à l'hôpital où on a évalué mon cas.

On a fait un ECG. Mon rythme cardiaque et ma tension artérielle étaient élevés; on a aussi fait une analyse d'urine et d'autres tests et on a relevé des traces d'opiacés.

Et je n'avais passé que 15 minutes dans un véhicule, exposé à ce qui n'était même pas du fentanyl pur.

Vous savez qu'une des tâches les plus dangereuses qui nous incombent au cours de notre carrière consiste à intervenir auprès de conducteurs, à cause du facteur inconnu qui entre en jeu.

Maintenant, il faut ajouter le fentanyl à la liste des dangers.

On arrête un conducteur, et on pense qu'il a de la drogue avec lui; on examine le produit et on se dit que c'est de la cocaïne ou de l'héroïne.

On ne sait tout simplement plus de quoi il s'agit.

Nous sommes bien conscients des dangers que présentent le fentanyl et les drogues additionnées de ce produit. Le fentanyl est l'une des drogues dont la manutention comporte le plus de dangers pour les forces de l'ordre : il peut être absorbé par la peau et risque d'être mortel à des petites doses.

Par conséquent, la manutention de ce produit exige une vigilance et une attention extrêmes.

Le fentanyl comporte des risques extrêmes pour les agents de police.

Toute quantité pure ou affaiblie risque d'être mortelle si on ne la manipule pas comme il se doit.

Voici certains conseils à suivre quand on manipule des drogues illicites : évitez d'ouvrir les sacs ou les contenants où se trouvent des substances inconnues.

Si vous pensez qu'il peut y avoir du fentanyl dans un contenant, revêtez votre équipement de protection personnel, par exemple des gants, un masque de protection respiratoire et des lunettes de protection.

Placez les preuves à conviction dans un sac double et servez-vous d'un contenant à parois dures pour les transporter.

Rangez le contenant dans le coffre arrière le plus loin possible des occupants du véhicule.

Le fentanyl est un opioïde très puissant : 100 fois plus puissant que la morphine.

En tant que médicament le fentanyl est un analgésique à action rapide.

Sous sa forme illégale, le fentanyl est mélangé à des drogues de la rue comme l'héroïne et la cocaïne. Il se présente sous forme de poudre, de liquide ou de comprimé, et peut être produit sous l'apparence d'autres drogues comme l'Oxycontin.

Souvent, les consommateurs ne sont pas conscients d'en absorber parce qu'il peut être absorbé accidentellement par la peau ou par l'inhalation.

Chez l'adulte, une dose aussi minime que deux milligrammes, soit l'équivalent de quelques grains de sel, peut être mortel.

Nous avons reçu un appel nous demandant d'aller vérifier l'état d'un homme, personne d'autre n'était dans la pièce. Il était affalé sur une table.

Je suis entrée et j'ai dû le réveiller. Je lui ai demandé son nom, ce qui se passait et si tout allait bien.

Les questions habituelles. Il s'est levé et a obéi à mes demandes.

Il a vidé ses poches très soigneusement et a tout posé sur la table.

Un morceau de papier plié est tombé sous la table.

Je suis à peu près sûre que l'homme l'a échappé volontairement.

J'ai vu le papier, j'ai mis le pied dessus et l'ai tiré vers moi. Je me suis penchée pour le ramasser; quand je l'ai déplié, une poudre blanche s'en est échappée et je l'ai reçue au visage.

J'ai immédiatement ressenti les effets dus à la substance.

Je me suis sentie étourdie et j'ai eu la nausée. J'avais du mal à me tenir debout.

J'ai dû m'appuyer sur quelque chose. Je me sentais impuissante aussi, ce qui est très troublant pour un agent de police. J'ai pu me servir de ma radio et j'ai envoyé un message aux Services d'urgence santé pour moi. À ce moment-là les infirmiers m'ont offert du Narcan et je leur ai demandé ce que je pourrais faire ensuite, pourrais-je retourner au travail oui, sans problème. Ce n'était qu'une mesure de précaution.

Ils m'en ont administré et je me suis aussitôt sentie bien.

Les symptômes d'une exposition au fentanyl sont similaires à ceux d'autres opioïdes : somnolence, ralentissement du rythme cardiaque et respiration difficile.

On peut neutraliser les symptômes par l'administration de naloxone, un produit disponible auprès de plusieurs services médicaux d'urgence. En raison de l'offre croissante de ce genre d'opioïdes et des risques qu'ils posent pour le public et des premiers intervenants, la GRC travaille à la mise en place d'un traitement qui pourrait être transporté par tous les membres.

Aussi nous mettons en place des nouvelles procédures sur la façon de manipuler des substances inconnues en toute sécurité.

Je ne manipule plus les drogues comme avant, car je suis très consciente du danger.

Je les mets dans des sacs que je scelle ensuite.

Nous ne mesurons plus les quantités sur nos bureaux.

Nous le faisons dans un environnement contrôlé, car on ne sait désormais plus ce qu'elles contiennent.

Cette drogue dangereuse existe bel et bien, et il suffit d'une seconde pour y être exposé et d'une autre pour mourir. Nous voulons tous et toutes rentrer chez nous sains et saufs à la fin de notre quart de travail.

Fentanyl video - Captions

A call came in for downtown. Rolled up and there's a male, probably 20 years of age slumped over in the driver's seat behind the wheel.

There were a whole bunch of narcotics that were in plain view in the centre console.

There was a little clear baggie with a bunch of pills and different items in it.

Arrested the male for possession of a controlled substance and brought him back to the car where he was chartered and warned, then I went back to search the vehicle.

Noticed there was a bit of a chemical smell, also what I am familiar with, like a masking agent which is very perfumy but also with a chemical smell.

Just started to feel a little light headed and dizzy at that time. I was feeling a little nauseous, so for my safety and his I asked him what drugs he was using and that's when he told me that he had been using fentanyl.

I notified my partner through our MDT and let her know that I wasn't feeling well and then one of the city members brought me to the hospital to be evaluated.

They did an EKG and my heart rate was elevated and blood pressure and they also did a urine test and all of that and there was trace opiates and that was just from a 15 min exposure in a vehicle and it not being pure fentanyl.

You know the traffic stop is one of the most dangerous things we will do in our career because of the unknown.

And now adding fentanyl to the mixture. You are stopping a vehicle, and you think its drugs and you are looking at it and you go oh wow that looks like cocaine or heroin – you just don't know anymore.

We are well aware of the hazards of dealing with fentanyl and fentanyl laced drugs.

Fentanyl is one of the most hazardous type of drugs to handle for any law enforcement members.

It has very specific hazards to it; it is skin permeable and potentially fatal in very, very small dosages.

So any amount of fentanyl has to be treated with a lot of respect and care when handling.

Fentanyl is an extreme risk to police officers.

Any amount in pure form or even in cut form can be potentially lethal if not handled appropriately.

Here are some tips when dealing with illicit drugs: avoid opening bags or containers where there's unknown substances.

If you suspect a substance may contain fentanyl, always wear personal protective equipment, such as gloves, respiratory protection and safety glasses. Double bag exhibits and use a hard sided container to secure items for transport in the trunk or furthest away from the occupants of the vehicle.

Fentanyl is a very powerful opioid - 100 times more potent than morphine.

Medically, it's a fast-acting painkiller.

In its illicit form, fentanyl is being mixed with street drugs like heroin and cocaine.

It can come in powder, liquid and tablet form, and may be produced to look like other drugs such as OxyContin.

Often, users are unaware they're even taking it. It can be absorbed through the skin or inhaled accidentally.

For an adult, as little as two milligrams of fentanyl can kill. That's no more than the size of a few grains of salt.

So we received a call for a check well-being of a male. He was sprawled out across a table top.

So I walked in and I had to wake him. I asked him what his name was, what's going on, are you okay?

The typical type of questions. He stood up and he was compliant. He emptied his pockets very carefully.

Laid everything out on the table. One piece of paper that was folded up, fell underneath the table.

Pretty sure he made it fall underneath. I saw it. So I put my boot on it, dragged it over to me.

Leaned over and picked it up and when I unfolded it, it unfolded and basically exploded white powder in my face. It was then that I felt the effects of whatever was in that paper immediately.

So I felt dizzy. I felt nauseous. I couldn't stand up very well, I had to lean over.

It was a feeling of helplessness too. Very unnerving for a police officer.

I was able to get on the radio and ask for EHS code. And at that time they offered me the NARCAN and I asked them, well, what would I be able to do, will I be able to go to work after? Yep, no problem.

Sure, it is just precautionary. They gave it to me – they administered it and I felt fine immediately.

Symptoms of exposure are similar to those of other opioids and can include sleepiness, a slowed heartbeat, and trouble breathing.

These symptoms can be reversed by the administration of Naloxone, which many emergency medical services carry.

Because of the dramatic rise in these types of opioids and the risks they pose to the public and first responders, the RCMP is working to quickly roll out a treatment that all members can carry, and developing new procedures on how to safely handle unknown substances.

I don't handle drugs the same way, very conscious. Very, you know... Put them in bags. Seal them up.

We don't measure them at our desk. We do it in a controlled environment because you never know what's in them anymore.

That unsafe drug is out there and it takes a second for you to be exposed. And another second for you to die.

And we all want to go home at the end of the night.

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Date de modification :

1969-12-31