Horizontal Evaluation of the Great Lakes and St. Lawrence Seaway Marine Security Operations Centre
Royal Canadian Mounted Police
In consultation with:
- Canada Border Services Agency
- Department of Justice Canada
- Department of Fisheries and Oceans/Canadian Coast Guard
- Department of National Defence/Canadian Armed Forces
- Public Safety Canada
- Transport Canada
April 10, 2015
Table of Contents
- 1.0 Executive Summary
- 2.0 Background and Context
- 3.0 Findings
- 4.0 Conclusion
- 5.0 Management Responses and Action Plan
- 6.0 Appendices
Throughout the document ***** denotes where content was redacted as per the Access to Information Act (R.S.C., 1985, c. A-1).
- 24 hours a day, 7 days a week
- Assistant Deputy Minister
- Automatic Identification System
- Border Enforcement Security Team
- US Customs and Border Protection
- Canada Border Services Agency
- Canadian Coast Guard
- Coastal MSOCs
- East and West Coast Marine Security Operations Centres (led by DND)
- Concept of Operations
- Department of National Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces
- Department of Justice
- Federal and International Operations Directorate
- GL MSOC
- Great Lakes Marine Security Operations Centre
- Great Lakes and St. Lawrence Seaway
- Government Operations Centre
- Integrated Border Enforcement Teams
- US Immigration and Customs Enforcement
- Inter-Departmental Directors Committee
- Inter-Departmental Program Review Board
- Long-range Identification and Tracking
- Maritime Domain Awareness
- Marine Entities of Interest List
- Memorandum of Understanding
- Marine Security Enforcement Teams
- National Headquarters (Ottawa, Ontario)
- National Maritime Picture
- National Port Enforcement Teams
- National Representatives Working Group
- 2004 National Security Policy
- RCMP Division located in London, Ontario
- Public Safety Canada
- Royal Canadian Mounted Police
- Request for Information
- Senior Departmental Representatives (located at the GL MSOC)
- Standard Operating Procedures
- Treasury Board
- United States Coast Guard
1.0 Executive Summary
What We Examined:
The Great Lakes Marine Security Operations Centre (GL MSOC) is an intelligence centre located in Niagara-on-the-Lake that was established to develop awareness of the Great Lakes and Saint Lawrence Seaway (GL/SLS) marine environment. The core partners located at the GL MSOC include Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA), Canadian Coast Guard (CCG), Department of National Defence and Canadian Armed Forces (DND/CAF), Transport Canada (TC)and the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP). Public Safety Canada (PS) and the Department of Justice (DOJ) are partners that provide a support role to the GL MSOC but are not physically located with the other partners. Although not a core partner, the United States Coast Guard (USCG) has a representative physically located at the GL MSOC on a part-time basis.
Personnel located at the GL MSOC contribute to maritime domain awareness by combining the knowledge, information, intelligence and skills of the core partners in support of marine security. They collect, analyze and share information to assist in the detection, assessment and support of coordinated responses to marine security threats or incidents.
The evaluation of the GL MSOC was conducted by the RCMP's National Program Evaluation Services between December 2012 and October 2013. The objectives of the evaluation were to assess the relevance and performance of the Operations Centre. For the five-year period of 2008-09 to 2012-13, approximately $63.5 million in funding (O&M and Salaries) was allocated for all partners to implement the GL MSOC.
It is important to note that in 2010, funding for the construction of a GL MSOC permanent facility was approved. Currently, there are 35 representatives located at the GL MSOC in a non-classified interim facility. The permanent facility is projected to open in the fall of 2014 in close proximity to the current site. It provides the infrastructure (office space, technological infrastructure, etc.) for the core partners to increase their personnel capacity to 81 full time employees, operate on a 24/7 basis and in a classified environment.
Why it is important:
Canada's marine domain is large, complex, multi-jurisdictional and involves numerous government agencies with varying mandates and regulations. A collaborative effort is required by numerous departments to contribute to an understanding of the threats and impacts in the maritime environment.
Canada and the United States of America (United States) share the GL/SLS, "a waterway covering more than 3,700 kilometers and more than 50 ports". Footnote 1 The GL Basin has a population of approximately 34 million people. Footnote 2 "There are 5.4 million pleasure crafts on the GL and 400-500 commercial vessels that travel the waterways daily during the shipping season." Footnote 3 The GL/SLS is a key economic region and a high marine security priority for both Canada and the United States. Footnote 4
What We Found:
- There is a continued need for a strategic and collaborative approach to maritime security. Integration of efforts and collaboration with other security, border and maritime initiatives would strengthen the relevance of the program.
- The lack of authority to routinely share information between partners makes it difficult for the GL MSOC to develop collaborative products.
- Horizontal governance of the GL MSOC at the strategic level needs to be more effective, however operational level governance functions very well.
- Information and intelligence products are being developed at the GL MSOC. The use and value of these products is not being measured.
- More synergies need to be developed with other marine and border security initiatives operating in the GL/SLS region to ensure efficient use of both financial and human resources.
- Recommendation #1:
- Together, the RCMP, PS and partners of the GL MSOC should revisit what outcomes they would like to jointly achieve, taking into consideration the activities of other security, border and maritime initiatives so as to better support a whole-of-government approach to maritime security. Jointly, departments should conduct an assessment to determine the number of resources, both financial and human, that are required to achieve the GL MSOC's mandate and outcomes. They should also establish minimum service standards and their corresponding resource requirements.
- Recommendation #2:
- RCMP, PS and GL MSOC partners should establish a clear terms of reference for governance committees and implement a sound structure to communicate, address challenges and most importantly, establish linkages with the Coastal MSOCs to ensure a whole-of-government approach to maritime security. As well, the RCMP and PS should work with GL MSOC partners to develop requisite program authorities to address information sharing challenges. This would include reviewing and analyzing the potential brought forward in any new legislation.
- Recommendation #3:
- In order to ensure that partners are satisfying GL MSOC clients' needs and producing value-added quality products and intelligence, RCMP, PS and partners will update the performance measurement strategy. As well, partners will conduct a needs analysis and establish a feedback mechanism through on-going monitoring and oversight.
- Recommendation #4:
- GL MSOC partners should work with operations centres, the Government Operations Centre, the different marine enforcement teams, and other complementary initiatives to support a whole of government approach to assessing and responding to maritime threats and incidents.
2.0 Background and Context
Canada and the United States share the GL/SLS, "a waterway covering more than 3,700 kilometers and more than 50 ports". Footnote 5 The GL Basin has a population of approximately 34 million people. Footnote 6 "There are 5.4 million pleasure crafts on the Great Lakes and 400-500 commercial vessels that travel the waterways daily during the shipping season." Footnote 7 The GL/SLS is a key economic region and a high marine security priority for both Canada and the United States. Footnote 8 This region is also unique because its jurisdiction is shared among federal, provincial, state and municipal authorities in Canada and United States. Footnote 9
2.1 Program Description
"As a result of the events of September 11, 2001, the Government of Canada recognized the need to address vulnerabilities in the nation's economy and infrastructure." Footnote 10 It was acknowledged that a "lack of coordination among security agencies" could increase the risk for "a similar occurrence to take place in Canada". Footnote 11 In 2004, the Government of Canada released its first national security policy, Securing an Open Society: Canada's National Security Policy (NSP). The NSP addressed vulnerabilities in the nation's economic structure, infrastructure, freedom of movement and the effective coordination among security agencies. One of the elements of the NSP was a plan to strengthen maritime security by enhancing capabilities and developing greater maritime security cooperation among government agencies.
The GL MSOC is an intelligence centre located in Niagara-on-the-Lake that was established to develop awareness of the GL/SLS marine environment. The key outcomes of the GL MSOC as identified in the program logic model (6.1 Appendix A: Logic Model) are:
- Intermediate Outcomes -
- Well coordinated inter-organizational response to marine security threats on the GL/SLS; and
- Stronger partnerships among GL MSOC partner departments and agencies.
- Final Outcome -
- Enhanced preparedness and security capabilities in the GL/SLS region to identify and address marine security threats.
The core partners located at the GL MSOC include Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA), Canadian Coast Guard (CCG), Department of National Defence and Canadian Armed Forces (DND/CAF), Transport Canada (TC) and the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP). Public Safety Canada (PS) and the Department of Justice (DOJ) provide a support role to the core partners, but are not physically located at the GL MSOC. Although not a core partner, the United States Coast Guard (USCG) has a representative physically located at the GL MSOC on a part-time basis.
Personnel located at the GL MSOC contribute to maritime domain awareness by combining the knowledge, information, intelligence and skills of core partners in support of marine security. They collect, analyze and share information to assist in the detection, assessment and support of coordinated responses to marine security-related threats or incidents.
As the lead agency, the RCMP is responsible for overseeing the functionality of the GL MSOC and exercising administrative functions for the GL MSOC facility and the Centre's management. Footnote 12 However, the lead organization for tasks, activities and projects conducted in the GL MSOC varies depending on the relevant departmental mandates.
GL MSOC personnel are physically located in the GL MSOC facility but continue to work for their respective departments/agencies. Each partner has access to their own organization's information such as information systems, reports, operations, etc. Information from the individual partners, and their various sources, is collected and analyzed at the GL MSOC to create marine security intelligence. The co-location of partners allows for the collaborative analysis of information which is essential to identify trends, anomalies and possible marine security threats. It also allows partners to share and exchange information that would not be as readily accessible otherwise.
Intelligence products from the GL MSOC are produced to increase the Government of Canada's Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA). MDA is defined as the effective understanding of anything associated with the maritime domain that could impact the security, safety, economy or environment of Canada. This includes maritime related activities, infrastructure, people, cargo, vessels, or other conveyances on, under, related to, adjacent to, or bordering a sea, ocean, or other navigable waterway. A key component of Canada's MDA is the National Maritime Picture (NMP). The NMP is an amalgamated national picture of vessel traffic and marine infrastructure that is shareable among the GL MSOC partners. Footnote 13
The core partners each have a role in creating the NMP. CCG, DND/CAF and TC contribute information such as vessel information and location to create the NMP. This information is compiled from a number of sources including RCMP-funded camera feeds and radar, as well as other information that already exists within each department. The CCG and DND/CAF work together to monitor the marine traffic and analyze the information from a marine security perspective. TC analyzes information provided to the GL MSOC from a regulatory perspective and to identify possible threats to the marine transportation system, in support of its organization's mandate. The RCMP and CBSA may contribute information to the NMP and may help set priorities for the CCG and DND/CAF to monitor or analyze depending on potential investigations or enforcement actions. The RCMP and CBSA also analyze information provided to the GL MSOC from a law enforcement perspective to create criminal intelligence and support their organization's operations.
Below is a short description of the role of each partner:
Canada Border Services Agency
CBSA identifies and interdicts high-risk individuals and goods, works with other law enforcement agencies to maintain border integrity, and engages in criminal and regulatory enforcement activities, including seizures of goods, arrests, detentions, investigations, hearings and removals.
CBSA provides cross border information and related enforcement information on entities of interest that may pose a threat to National Security. CBSA resources at the GL MSOC focus on analyzing information and intelligence related to the Agency's involvement in marine security threat identification, assessment and response support activities.
Canadian Coast Guard
The CCG has a role at the GL MSOC because of the CCG's access to on-water resources and maritime information collection capacity. The CCG:
- uses maritime expertise and extensive vessel monitoring systems to enhance awareness of potential maritime security threats;
- supports on-water law enforcement and response;
- enhances collaboration with maritime security agencies;
- collects and analyzes vessel traffic information and other data; and
- provides systems and expertise for the detection, identification and monitoring of marine traffic in Canadian waters.
The information collected by CCG programs is accessible by the CCG personnel at the GL MSOC. CCG personnel work with the DND/CAF to collect and interpret maritime data and create the NMP. CCG information systems, radar and vessel tracking provide critical information for the NMP.
Department of National Defence/Canadian Armed Forces
The DND/CAF is responsible for maintaining the NMP. The NMP information is continuously verified by a staff of specially trained DND/CAF marine operators and is a key component supporting all partners at the GL MSOC in their efforts to identify high-risk maritime traffic.
The geographic area of responsibility for the GL MSOC is outside the routine authority and responsibility of DND/CAF. As a result, the majority of information analyzed and verified by DND/CAF staff is information that is collected by other partners.
The resulting analysis and situational awareness created by the GL MSOC helps the organization more effectively carry out its regulatory mandate, including identifying and acting on contraventions to the Marine Transportation Security Act and Regulations, conducting vessel and marine facility threat assessment, and support the regional transportation security inspectors in conducting threat-risk and impact analysis of the marine transportation system.
TC information contributes to the production of the NMP, through:
- Threat Assessments on a variety of areas such as:
- marine facilities and ports
- shipping entities
- The Pre-Arrival Information Report (PAIR) from vessels incoming to Canada
- Changes in the marine security threat level
- Information related to Ship Security Alert System activation
- Non-security information such as Port State Control, safety and environment protection information
Royal Canadian Mounted Police
RCMP resources interpret information provided by other partners from a law enforcement perspective. These resources also collect information from RCMP information systems and other programs and adds it to the information collected by other GL MSOC partners in order to create intelligence.
The RCMP and CBSA resources are focused upon addressing the small vessel threat to National Security in the GL. This includes a focus on terrorist groups, border related criminality and organized crime networks that may utilize Canada's seaports, coastlines, waterways and marine borders as a conduit for serious criminal activities. The RCMP works closely with other law enforcement partners (municipal, provincial, federal and international) to collect and share intelligence as appropriate, and where authorized by law. The RCMP is the lead agency responsible for overseeing the functionality of the GL MSOC and exercising administrative functions. Footnote 14
Public Safety and Department of Justice
Additional partners support the GL MSOC. PS supports, coordinates and oversees the overall implementation and direction of GL MSOC. Footnote 15 The DoJ provides advice on legal and legal policy matters that are relevant to the program. Personnel from PS and DoJ are not located at the GL MSOC and are not considered core partners from an operational perspective.
While the GL MSOC collects and analyzes information and distributes intelligence products, the partners within the GL MSOC are not responsible for operations such as responding to incidents or enforcement actions. The primary functions of the GL MSOC require collaboration among the partners to gather and analyze information related to marine security. GL MSOC functions fall within five main groups. Footnote 16
- 1. Surveillance.
- This includes the systematic observation of surface or subsurface areas, places, persons or things using visual, aural, electronic, photographic technology or other means. This builds the NMP by all core partners to resolve ambiguities, providing alerts about unusual activity, or detecting other situations that may require further attention.
- 2. Intelligence.
- The GL MSOC intelligence function creates the products that result from the processing of information concerning national security, organized crime and other criminal organizations and activities. This function creates and provides detailed analysis of the current situation and potential future situations. Information is obtained by each partner through information systems and through outreach.
- 3. Decision.
- The decision function determines whether the current situation warrants increased attention by specific core partners and/or external partners. This includes generating proposed courses of action and providing briefings and focused support to core partners' decision makers.
- 4. Coordination.
- This includes managing information/intelligence flows into and out of the GL MSOC. This function provides more specific information/intelligence to core partners as required.
- 5. Collaboration.
- The collaboration function enables the exchange and generation of data, information and services between and among the other four operational functions detailed above within existing legislation. This function brings together individual partners so that they can complete their mandated activities and tasks in an environment that allows for sharing of this information with other partners more easily.
Budget 2005 provided funding to establish an interim MSOC in the GL/SLS, specifically in Niagara-on-the-Lake. The interim facility opened in July 2005. It was recognized that the facility was limited in its capacity to support the growth of the program. In 2008, additional funding allowed for renovations to accommodate an increase in staff until the lease for the interim facility expired.
In 2010, funding for the construction of a GL MSOC permanent facility was approved. The permanent facility is projected to open in the fall of 2014 in close proximity to the current site. It provides the infrastructure (office space, technological infrastructure, etc.) for the core partners to increase their personnel capacity to 81 full time employees, operate on a 24/7 basis and operate in a classified environment.
For the five-year period of 2008-09 to 2012-13 Footnote 17, approximately $63.5 million in funding (O&M and Salaries) was allocated for partners to implement the GL MSOC. As of 2013-14 the program receives $16.9 million annually in ongoing funding. The following chart demonstrates the distribution of the $63.5 million:
Graph 1: GL MSOC Partner Funding Allocated 2008-09 to 2012-13
Description of graph in tabular format follows.
|Partners||Funding Proportion||Dollar Amount|
In addition to the GL MSOC there is an MSOC located on the West Coast and another on the East Coast (Coastal MSOCs) led by DND/CAF. The Coastal MSOCs have similar objectives to the GL MSOC but have different geographic areas of responsibility.
2.2 Purpose and Scope of the Evaluation
The evaluation objectives were to assess:
- The relevance of the GL MSOC to partners' strategic outcomes and Government of Canada's priorities.
- The performance of the GL MSOC in terms of:
- Efficiency - the extent to which expected outputs are produced with the least amount of input (human and financial resources).
- Economy - the extent to which costs of resources used are minimized, taking into account quality and quantity.
- Effectiveness - the extent to which the GL MSOC is achieving its expected outcomes.
The evaluation included Ontario (location of GL MSOC) and National Headquarters (Ottawa, Ontario). The evaluation covered the period beginning April 1, 2008 and ending December 31, 2012.
2.3 Methodology and Approach
The evaluation follows the Treasury Board Policy on Evaluation, the Directive on the Evaluation Function the Standard on Evaluation for the Government of Canada and the Guidance on Governance of Horizontal Initiatives. This evaluation used qualitative and quantitative information to develop findings and recommendations for the program. Evaluation questions can be found in 6.2 Appendix B: Evaluation Questions.
The following lines of evidence were used to assess the GL MSOC:
Document review included, but was not limited to: corporate documents, policy documents, program inception documents, Report on Plans and Priorities from all partners, legislative documents and program specific documents such as the Marine Emergency Response Plan.
Review of Performance and Financial Data
Performance data included an analysis of information provided from the GL MSOC in Niagara-on-the-Lake including files, products produced, threat assessments and requests for information. Data on human and financial resources from all partners was also reviewed.
Mapping of GL MSOC products
Two products created by the GL MSOC were tracked to identify how information is distributed and used by partners. The products tracked were a Request for Information (RFI) and the Quarterly Intelligence Reports for the different GLs. Both these products were randomly selected as being representative of the work carried out by partners at the centre.
In total 34 interviews were conducted as follows:
|Total by Partner||Program/ |
|Senior Management||Stakeholders Footnote 18|
|Department of Justice||2||2||0||0|
|Public Safety Canada||4||2||1||1|
|Total by Type||34||22||6||6|
2.4 Considerations, Strengths and Limitations
Maturity of the program
The evaluation assessed the program over the period of 2008-09 to 2012-13. After five years, the evaluation team expected that the program would have achieved its four immediate outcomes and two intermediate outcomes. However, 2010-11 was the first year that all core partners had personnel working in the GL MSOC. As a result, progress towards the achievement of the program's outcomes and tracking of performance information is limited prior to 2010-11. This has made it difficult to assess if the program achieved its desired outcomes.
Impact of RCMP internal re-structuring
Since 2010, the GL MSOC has a reporting relationship to "O" Division Criminal Intelligence and NHQ Marine and Ports. The dual-reporting relationship aligns the program with the most relevant units in the RCMP. The reporting structure also ensures that intelligence collected by the GL MSOC is shared through RCMP criminal intelligence databases. In 2013, the Federal Policing business line, including Criminal Intelligence and Marine and Ports units, was reorganized. This reorganization has had an impact on the reporting structure of the GL MSOC. At the time of the evaluation, new reporting structures were being implemented. These new reporting structures within the RCMP may have an impact on the governance of this program.
Impact of Interim Facility
The interim facility opened in July 2005. It was recognized that the facility was limited in its capacity to support the growth of the program and to allow partners to access classified databases. In 2008, additional funding allowed for renovations to accommodate an increase in staff until the lease for the interim facility expired. In 2010, funding for the construction of a GL MSOC permanent facility was approved. The permanent facility is projected to open in June 2014 in close proximity to the current site. It provides the infrastructure (office space, technological infrastructure, etc.) for the core partners to increase their personnel capacity to 81 full time employees, operate on a 24/7 basis and operate in a classified environment.
Finding 1: The mandate of the GL MSOC is aligned to government priorities and federal roles and responsibilities.
Canada's marine domain is large, complex, multi-jurisdictional and involves numerous government agencies with varying mandates and regulations. A collaborative effort is required by departments to contribute to an understanding of the threats and impacts in the maritime environment. In 2011, the Interdepartmental Marine Security Working Group (IMSWG) Footnote 19 established Canada's Maritime Strategic Framework 2020. This Framework confirms an interdepartmental approach to achieving comprehensive security across the maritime domain. It provides direction and guidance for interdepartmental coordination, planning and programs to support a whole-of-government approach and highlights the requirement for collaboration, sharing of information and integration of efforts so that current and emerging threats are addressed and security is strengthened.
The GL MSOC's mandate is aligned to the Framework 2020 and specifically to the current priority of a whole-of-government approach to security, border and economic issues. On February 4, 2011, the Prime Minister of Canada and the President of the United States issued a joint action plan entitled: Beyond the Border: A Shared Vision for Perimeter Security and Economic Competitiveness. This action plan established a partnership between both countries that is based on a perimeter approach to security and ensuring the legitimate flow of people, goods and services. The GL MSOC mandate aligns with the current objectives identified in the Beyond the Borders Action Plan by being a multi-agency partnership that contributes to intelligence to support addressing threats early and cross-border law enforcement. Footnote 20
The GL MSOC objectives also align with the 2004 National Security Policy objective to promote "an integrated approach to security issues across government and provide a strategic framework and action plan designed to ensure that Canada is prepared for and has the capacity to respond to current and future threats." Footnote 21
The GL MSOC purpose and objectives are well aligned with the current government priority of having an integrated whole-of-government approach to security and economic competitiveness.
Finding 2: There is a continued need for a strategic and collaborative approach to maritime security. Enhanced integration of efforts and collaboration with other security, border and maritime initiatives would further strengthen maritime security.
A review of key strategic documents and the majority of the interviewees stated that there is a continued need for their organizations' involvement. The specific roles and mandates of the core partners differ and partners cannot achieve a comprehensive and accurate maritime picture individually. It is essential that the partners combine their expertise to collect, analyze and share maritime information and actionable intelligence for maritime security purposes. Footnote 22
In addition to each department's mandate, there are numerous other ongoing initiatives that involve federal partners and focus on national security, border security and marine security including:
- Marine Security Enforcement Teams (MSET) - In 2005 this marine program was initiated that combines the expertise of the RCMP and the CCG to further enhance national security and strengthen Canada's response to potential threats in the GL/SLS region.
- Integrated Border Enforcement Teams (IBET) - Created in 2001, this program enhances border integrity and security along the shared Canada/U.S. border, between designated ports of entry, by identifying, investigating and stopping persons, organizations and goods that threaten the national security of one or both countries or that are involved in organized criminal activity. It is a partnership between the RCMP, CBSA, US Customs and Border Protection, US Immigration and Customs Enforcement and the US Coast Guard.
- National Port Enforcement Teams (NPET) - An RCMP and CBSA collaborative program started in 2003 to disrupt the capacity of organized crime groups to utilize Canada's seaports. They are intelligence-led teams and are integrated with federal, provincial and municipal law-enforcement agencies.
- Beyond the Borders Action Plan - "Shiprider" Footnote 23 is a component of this action plan that is a collaborative cross-border law enforcement program initiated in 2011 between the USCG and the RCMP's maritime unit. It involves vessels that are crewed by specially trained Canadian and US law enforcement officers with a purpose of enabling cross-border enforcement and security operations, surveillance and interdiction.
All of these programs and others impact the GL/SLS and all contribute to intelligence gathering and enforcement actions, which include marine security. It is important to note that the GL MSOC is the only program focused on developing situational awareness and intelligence specifically for the GL/SLS and contributes to this portion of the NMP.
Given the GL MSOC's role in developing intelligence in this area, it is important that there be increased linkages, collaboration and communication between it and these other federal initiatives to better help support a whole-of-government approach to maritime security and other threats in the region. Better coordination and communication between the various marine-focused initiatives will help to identify and eliminate any duplication of roles and mandates that may have developed. Integrating and collaborating with other initiatives both internal and in partnership with other departments will result in better alignment with current federal security priorities and contribute to a seamless approach to domestic and bi-national security.
3.2 Performance - Efficiency and Economy
Finding 3: RCMP and CBSA have allocated a percentage of the GL MSOC budget to address other internal priorities. It is not fully known by partners if current financial and human resource levels are appropriate to achieve program outcomes.
Funding for the GL MSOC was designed to increase each year from 2008-09 to 2012-13. This was to reflect the gradual increase of the program's capacity to establish processes to collect, analyze, share information and intelligence as well as to conduct outreach.
To provide context, the original program design of the GL MSOC included operations 24 hours a day, 7 days a week (24/7) in a classified environment. CCG is currently the only partner which has 24/7 operations, therefore the GL MSOC is not operating at full capacity. It is in an interim facility where security clearances differ by partner, the facility is not rated for handling classified information (i.e. installation of classified databases) both of which prevents them from operating in a fully classified environment. As previously mentioned, the permanent facility for the GL MSOC is anticipated to open in Fall 2014. It will provide the infrastructure for the core partners to increase their personnel capacity, fully expand to 24/7 operations and to operate in a classified environment. The facility is being built to accommodate 81 full time employees. As of March 12, 2013 there are approximately 35 human resources representing the core partners in the GL MSOC.
The following presents an analysis of each partner's financial and human resources' picture:
The RCMP portion of the GL MSOC is operating with less than the originally planned budget and human resources and has been since 2010. Following the approval of this initiative in 2008, the economic climate changed significantly and the RCMP, along with other partners, went through a number of major expenditure reduction exercises - the 2008 Strategic Review, the Strategic Operating Review and more recently the Deficit Reduction Action Plan (DRAP). At the same time the RCMP was going through an internal funding reallocation exercise to address a number of long standing internal funding pressures.
The combination of these factors resulted in an overall decrease in the allocation of both financial and human resources to federal policing programs. The 2011 Status Report of the Office of the Auditor General (OAG) also highlighted that the RCMP has been reallocating funding from federal policing programs to national policing services where the RCMP was dealing with increased resource requirements.
To share the burden of this reduction exercise, an internal decision to allocate resources across Federal Policing programs was made. "In 2009-10, the RCMP reduced the initial budgets for all its programs by five percent with the exception of funds earmarked for the 2010 Vancouver Olympics and for contract policing". In 2010-11, there were further reductions of 10.4% overall. Federal and International Operations (FIO) Directorate at NHQ, under which the GL MSOC is located, was hit particularly hard with a reduction of 8.4 percent. Footnote 24
As a result of the expenditure reduction exercises and internal funding reallocation based on priorities, less financial resources were available to federal policing programs. This resulted in funding being allocated for the GL MSOC based on the current resource levels, rather than the levels that were initially considered when the program was launched. The Evaluation Team was advised that in the last few years the funding has been allocated to maintain its current footprint. This is reflected in the number of human resources located at the Centre. Initially, the RCMP forecasted for a gradual increase to 55 human resources by 2012-13 once the GL MSOC achieved full operational capacity. These resources would include 21 RCMP members that would be located in Niagara, at the Division-level in London and at National Headquarters in Ottawa. In addition, there would be 10 internal services resources (including information technology staff) and 6 resources for criminal intelligence. The remaining 18 resources would be comprised of secondments of members from other police forces and NHQ staff.
From 2009-10 until 2012-13, the GL MSOC had a secondment from the Ontario Provincial Police and another from the Niagara Regional Police Services co-located with partners in Niagara. The secondments were a vital source of information for the GL MSOC as they had access to their police forces' information systems in real time, had face-to-face communication with the RCMP analysts and facilitated information sharing between their police force and the GL MSOC.
Given the overall funding situation in FIO and the need to accommodate RCMP Regular Members impacted by DRAP cuts, it was decided that the secondments would not be renewed for 2013-14. It was noted during interviews that without secondments, the GL MSOC may lose access to information and encounter challenges when trying to build relationships with other local police forces.
As highlighted in Table 2, current funding allocations have been based on the current resource levels in the program compared to the levels that were initially considered when the program was designed. Given the issues mentioned above, including the fact that personnel have only been located at the Centre since 2010-2011, it is difficult to assess how efficient the program has been in progressing towards outcomes. Information and intelligence products are being produced, their production has increased over the years and information is being shared, however, it is difficult to assess efficiency without inferring that the number of financial and human resources allocated is the main reason for not achieving the outcomes. As previously mentioned, better integration and communication between the various marine focused initiatives followed by the identification of those critical activities needed to achieve the desired outcomes, will allow the RCMP to better assess resource requirements.
|Forecasted Footnote 25||Budget Footnote 26||Expenditures Footnote 27|
The total amount of planned funding for CBSA is depicted in Table 3 below (i.e. forecasted). Similar to the RCMP, the CBSA experienced a number of major expenditure reduction and internal funding reallocation exercises to address a number of long standing internal funding pressures. The impacts of these measures were not quantified into the CBSA's annual GL MSOC budgets. Additionally, we were advised that CBSA underwent a re-organization in 2010-11 and that the GL MSOC funding was rolled into A-base funding with expenditures no longer being tracked separately. As a result, CBSA indicated that they did not track GL MSOC-related actual expenditures in fiscal years 2011-12 and 2012-13.
CBSA had also planned on increasing its personnel at the GL MSOC gradually up to 11 resources in 2012-13. To date the organization has five resources funded by the program including regional intelligence officers that are not physically located in the GL MSOC. As of November 2012, there was one CBSA resource physically located in the GL MSOC. Footnote 28 The regional intelligence officers liaise with CBSA resources in the GL MSOC, but do not interact on a daily basis with the other core partners. ***** The majority of CBSA interviewees (4/5) agreed that one resource physically located in the GL MSOC is not sufficient to collect information, analyze products and work with the other core partners.
|Forecasted Footnote 29||Expenditures Footnote 30|
DND/CAF expenditures are approximately 50% of the funding originally planned, as outlined below in Table 4. This is largely due to the limited role and the six resources that DND currently has in the interim facility. Currently, the National Maritime Picture is unclassified. When the partners are relocated to the permanent facility, the NMP will be in a classified environment. This may result in an increased role for DND personnel's expertise in analyzing marine-based threats in this classified environment. As well, DND personnel will be able to liaise more often with the Coastal MSOCs to share classified information. While there is a role for the DND/CAF in the GL MSOC, interviewees did not indicate a need for more than six DND/CAF resources in the interim facility. DND interviewees identified that DND provides support to the GL MSOC but GL MSOC information is not used by the organization as it does not have a domestic law enforcement role.
|Forecasted Footnote 31||Expenditures Footnote 32|
Transport Canada and the CCG encountered challenges establishing their program and did not spend the majority of their budgets for 2008-09 and 2010-11. However, the unused funding was carried over from year to year. Since 2011-12 both partners are using their allocated budget. This was reflected as well in the number of human resources at the Centre as both did not staff all of its human resources from 2008-09 to 2010-11. Since 2011-12, CCG has a full complement of human resources, while TC has had 5 out of 9 of its positions staffed.
PS and DOJ have used GL MSOC financial and human resources to support the program and the core partners.
Even though the forecasted and budgeted amounts did not include funding for technology, significant investment has been made into the deployment and maintenance of technological solutions, such as camera feeds and radar (i.e. Accipiter Radar). This has become very important to operations and maximizes the human resources outlined above. For example, a partnership with Defence Research and Development Canada has allowed for the continued use of a radar system on the GL/SLS. That being said, the majority of interviewees (15/18) stated that an increase in resources is necessary for the GL MSOC to be able to conduct its current work and to be able to increase the amount of intelligence products created at the facility. There is a desire by all operational staff to deliver on the expectations and outcomes of the program as originally designed. As previously mentioned, better integration with various marine related initiatives will enable the GL MSOC to determine the optimal level of resources needed to achieve the desired outcomes.
Partners may be at risk of not being able to maximize the likelihood of the GL MSOC delivering on and achieving its outcomes. In addition, given the existence of other national security and border security initiatives (as referenced on page 12) in the GL MSOC's area of operations, there is a risk of duplicating financial and human efforts with other programs.
Together, the RCMP, PS and partners of the GL MSOC should revisit what outcomes they would like to jointly achieve taking into consideration the activities of other security, border and maritime initiatives so as to better support a whole-of-government approach to maritime security. Jointly, departments should conduct an assessment to determine the number of resources, both financial and human, that are required to achieve the GL MSOC's mandate and outcomes. They should also establish minimum service standards and their corresponding resource requirements.
Finding 4: The lack of authority to routinely share information between partners makes it difficult for the GL MSOC to meet its objectives.
As it has been articulated in the GL MSOC's core inception documents, the centre's purpose is to "detect and assess maritime related security threats or incidents, and support an integrated response by government organizations in relation to their respective mandate." Footnote 33 As previously mentioned, information sharing plays a vital role in achieving this objective. Information sharing amongst the core partners is governed by legislation including the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, the Access to Information, Privacy Act, Customs Act, Immigration and Refugee Protection Act and the Criminal Code.
Most interviewees (20/29) agreed that the current legal framework constrains the ability of partners to share information within the GL MSOC. Information sharing is particularly challenging between regulatory departments/agencies and law enforcement. In 2009, the Assistant Deputy Minister (ADM) Marine Security Committee recommended the development of standalone GL and Coastal MSOC legislation. Footnote 34
There is evidence of several processes and mechanisms that have been used by partners at the GL MSOC to regularize routine information sharing in the MSOCs within the existing legal framework. The GL MSOC Concept of Operations (CONOPS) signed December 2012 outlines legal constraints on collecting, storing, sharing and using personal information. There are also Standing Operating Procedures (SOP) that govern how information will be collected for day-to-day operations. More recently, representatives from partners located at National Headquarters have developed a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) for information sharing entitled "Respecting Information Sharing in the Marine Security Operation Centres." This MOU was approved in July 2013 by the ADM Marine Security Committee and applies to both the GL and the two Costal MSOCs. This MOU does not create any new authorities nor does it resolve specific barriers. Its purpose is to articulate the shared understanding among partners as to what information they will share among themselves in the MSOCs. It establishes the roles and responsibilities of all core partners with regards to the contribution of information to the MSOCs, the creation and sharing of information, and the dissemination of that information by partners. The MOU also includes a data element chart which serves as a reference guide for operational staff listing the type of information that can be routinely shared.
Information sharing is further hindered by the unsecured environment in which the GL MSOC is operating and the inconsistency of security clearances among partners. As an example, DND cannot play an increased role at the GL MOSC because they can only provide an unclassified version of the NMP. The move to the new classified facility will increase the ability to share information.
Collaboration is one of the main pillars that will contribute to the achievement of comprehensive security in the maritime domain. Footnote 35 Without addressing information sharing (i.e. through legislation) and security clearances, both of which have a direct impact on collaboration, it will be more difficult for the GL MSOC to achieve its outcomes.
Finding 5: The horizontal governance of the GL MSOC at the strategic level needs to be more effective. Operational level governance is adequate.
The GL MSOC is governed by a horizontal approach at both the operational and strategic levels. The existing approach requires consensus amongst the core partners for decision-making with provisions to allow each partner to manage their particular components of the program.
There are four working groups in place to support the governance of the GL MSOC, with one focusing specifically on operational activities. A committee of Senior Departmental Representatives (SDRs) guides the core partners' day-to-day activities and is responsible to set operational priorities. At the National Headquarters level there are two formally established Committees: the National Representatives Working Group (NRWG) and the Inter-Departmental Program Review Board (IPRB). The NRWG meet as required (minimally quarterly) and it is responsible for providing guidance, managing and overseeing the GL MSOC. Additionally, the NRWG identifies issues of concern for senior management to consider when making policy related decisions. The IPRB is composed of Director General level representatives from the core partners as well as representatives from PS and the Treasury Board Secretariat. This committee meets as required (minimally annually) and provides strategic guidance to the Coastal and GL MSOCs in order to address issues that may impact all MSOCs, and are inter-agency or policy related.
Interviews and document review of meeting minutes indicate that there is also an Interdepartmental Directors Committee (IDC) at the National Headquarters-level. This committee is not reflected in the governance documents but evidence indicates it has existed since 2011. This committee meets as required and reflects the layer between the NRWG and the IPRB. The following depicts the committee structure.
GL MSOC Committee Structure
Description of GL MSOC Committee Structure
The following depicts the structure of the four committees that support the GL MSOC governance.
At the top of the structure we have the Interdepartmental Program Review Board (IPRB) which is composed of Director General level representatives from the core partners as well as representatives from PS and the Treasury Board Secretariat.
Below this Committee we find the National Representatives Working Group (NRWG) with the Interdepartmental Director Committee (IDC) positioned between the two. At the bottom of the illustration we have the Senior Department Representative Committee (SDRC).
The placement of the boxes represents the level at which each committee operates. The top level committee (IPRB) is concerned with strategic planning and policy-making, while the bottom level (SDRC) is tasked with defining operational priorities and day-to-day activities. The arrows point in both directions to demonstrate that information and communication flow between committees as opposed to top-down. The IDC is represented in the diagram without solid lines because it is not reflected in the governance documents and was developed to address the lack of harmonization/coordination envisioned between the IPRB and NRWG.
After five years of funding and operations (2008-2012), the evaluation team would have expected to see working groups that met consistently, had clearly articulated roles and responsibilities, established authorities and documented decision-making. As well, the evaluation team expected to see evidence of communication, oversight and reporting between the varying levels of committees with respect to both the operational and strategic priorities of the GL MSOC.
The SDR committee members meet regularly and evidence indicates they discuss administrative issues such as collaborate projects they may be working on (i.e. threat assessments, CONOPS, SOPs, etc.) and establish operational priorities based on their intelligence and information sharing with partners. This committee has developed strong working relationships within the Operations Centre. This committee is however, operating with limited direction from the NRWG which is supposed to provide guidance and oversight and identify issues and priorities for senior management. SDR Committee members are receiving direction from their individual departments. Concerns were raised through interviews that the direction received from departments may not address important challenges and function of the Operational Centre.
There was little evidence found that the NRWG meets on a regular basis and that it is a formal committee that identifies challenges and priorities for the senior Director General level committee (IPRB) regarding the GL MSOC. Although the Evaluation Team was informed that the IPRB met on numerous occasions, there was minimal evidence available with respect to the effectiveness of the strategic level IPRB. Documentation revealed that the intent of this Board is to provide strategic guidance to the Coastal and GL MSOCs, however there is minimal record of regular meetings, reporting from other levels of working groups, discussions, or decisions that could impact or create synergies amongst the various departments or MSOCs.
With respect to the IDC, anecdotal evidence suggests that it was initiated informally at the Director level to provide a forum to discuss both operational and strategic priorities and to identify and address constraints to achieving these priorities. Evidence indicates this committee meets and has established itself to address an absence of guidance and priority setting.
At the strategic level there is an absence of communication vertically and horizontally, ad-hoc meetings, minimal direction and oversight, and little collaboration or synergies with the other departments or the coastal MSOCs on priority setting and resolving challenges. As well, a risk is that the strategic priorities of marine security may not be fully adopted and implemented by the Operations Centre and this impacts the ability of the GL MSOC to deliver on the expected mandate and achieve its outcomes.
RCMP, PS and GL MSOC partners should establish a clear terms of reference for governance committees and implement a sound structure to communicate, address challenges and most importantly, establish linkages with the Coastal MSOCs to ensure a whole-of-government approach to maritime security. As well, the RCMP and PS should work with GL MSOC partners to develop requisite program authorities to address information sharing challenges. This would include reviewing and analyzing the potential brought forward in any new legislation.
3.2 Performance - Effectiveness
Finding 6: Information and intelligence products are being developed at the GL MSOC. The use and value of these products is not being measured.
RCMP, PS and GL MSOC's primary purpose is to produce actionable intelligence, focusing on national security, organized crime and other criminal activity to support operations. Part of that role is to communicate information to stakeholders, such as enforcement teams, in a timely manner. Currently, the GL MSOC supports operations through the development of a number of information products, including the Marine Entities of Interest List (MEIL), Footnote 36 RFI, Quarterly Intelligence Reports, and Marine Threat assessments, among others.
A number of information and intelligence products have been produced and distributed to internal and external stakeholders in the last 18 months. As previously mentioned, there were limited information or intelligence products being produced and shared prior to FY 2011-12. It was expected that the GL MSOC's outputs of information products would have been met earlier than they were as these are an integral part in achieving the immediate and intermediate outcomes. Delays were affected by:
- The lack of proper infrastructure (shared IT systems, 24/7 operations and classified environment) at the interim facility;
- Information sharing limitations;
- Delays with staffing the Centre; and
- Delays in establishing a solid and functioning governance structure.
The following paragraphs highlight the purpose and results of GL MSOC products:
A. For intelligence, the RCMP and CBSA use GL MSOC products for intelligence gathering. For the CBSA, GL MSOC information and intelligence is provided to regional intelligence officers in Ontario and shared by these officers as required. In 2010-11, 43 intelligence files were created on the CBSA intelligence database. The number of files created increased to 85 in 2012-13. GL MSOC intelligence is inserted into multiple intelligence databases so that it is available to other RCMP programs and to other law enforcement partners. Additionally, TC loads intelligence products into intelligence systems for availability to other intelligence partners.
B. For operations, the GL MSOC as an intelligence centre is not responsible for tactical operational responses. Enforcement actions fall under the mandate of other programs such as the IBETs, MSET, NPETs and "Shiprider." The GL MSOC supports operations through different means. Examples include notifying IBET, local law enforcement and CBSA of intelligence to aid operational responses and contribute to enforcement actions including arrests, seizures and human smuggling. In 2012, 31 of the 207 files for Niagara Regional Police Services were created through work in the GL MSOC.
Because the GL MSOC does not request feedback from users regarding the quality and usefulness of its products, it is difficult to determine how these contribute to the outcomes and objectives of the Program. Overall, interviewees had mixed reviews on the usefulness for operations of these information and intelligence products.
As an example, one interview with a MSET team member noted that the GL MSOC is useful and cited an example from 2011-12 where a GL MSOC product, the MEIL, helped the MSET create their operational plan and identify targets for the season. In 2011-12, the GL MSOC provided assistance to three MSET Search and Rescue responses.
Two information products were reviewed specifically as part of the evaluation to better understand the use and value of the information for operations. One information product, a Quarterly Intelligence report, was seen as providing good information that raises awareness of the GL MSOC's area of responsibility at a strategic level. However, most interviewees indicated that they had not found it particularly helpful for either tactical purposes (i.e. deployment of resources) and/or for decision-making. The second product that was reviewed was a RFI which is a formal agency to agency request for material regarding a specific issue. As an example, one individual interviewed stated that the information received from the RFI was useful in assisting the NPET with an investigation into a vessel in the GL MSOC's area of responsibility.
C. For strategic program and policy analysis, less than half of interviewees (8/19) spoke to the value of the information/intelligence received from the GL MSOC and its value in strategic decision-making. Of those, a few (3/8) acknowledged that it may be valuable, while more than half (5/8) believed the information/intelligence was of little or no value. It was suggested that the information/intelligence being provided was not strategic enough to be useful for policy purposes. In some cases, policy staff were not receiving any information from the GL MSOC.
TC and PS are two partners that may be using GL MSOC products for strategic decision-making. TC uses GL MSOC information to create threat assessments. In 2011-12, 20 threat assessments were created. Footnote 37 PS has a role to provide oversight of the GL MSOC and other National Security programs and initiatives. However, there was no evidence of GL MSOC products being provided to or used by PS for a coordinated and strategic approach to policy and program analysis.
To strengthen marine domain awareness and marine security, the Centre and its partners must understand the quality and usefulness of the information products it is generating. There was limited evidence of a feedback process to know whether or not the information provided by the Centre is valuable for the other partners. It is simply not enough to produce and share information without the knowledge of how valuable it is in strengthening the partner's awareness of the maritime environment.
In order to ensure that partners are satisfying GL MSOC clients' needs and producing value-added quality products and intelligence, RCMP, PS and partners will update the performance measurement strategy. As well, partners will conduct a needs analysis and establish a feedback mechanism through on-going monitoring and oversight.
Finding 7: The program would benefit from synergies with other marine and border security initiatives operating in the GL/SLS region.
Prior to the establishment of the GL MSOC, there was no formal mechanism for ongoing collaboration among the five core partners to enhance awareness of the marine security environment in the GL/SLS. Footnote 38 Colocation at one centre since 2008 has allowed for stronger partnerships to be built among these organizations. As an information and intelligence centre, the GL MSOC supports operations through collaborative development of different products.
In addition to the GL MSOC there are currently a number of other marine or border security initiatives that have been implemented on the GL/SLS. The following are some enforcement programs and/or initiatives:
- IBET - RCMP, CBSA, USCG, CBP, ICE
- IBETs are intelligence-led, field-level groups of law enforcement officials dedicated to securing the integrity of the shared border between Canada and the United States, while respecting the laws and jurisdiction of each nation.
- MSET - RCMP and CCG
- MSETs are a joint RCMP-CCG project that combines the law enforcement powers of the RCMP with CCG vessels and expertise in order to provide an armed, on-water law enforcement capacity in the GL/SLS region.
- NPET - RCMP and CBSA
- NPETs are a joint RCMP-CBSA initiative of intelligence-led teams and integrated with federal, provincial and municipal law-enforcement agencies. Their goal is to significantly disrupt and/or eliminate the capacity of organized crime groups to utilize Canada's seaports as a conduit for cargo and/or persons that may pose a threat to national security.
- "Shiprider"- RCMP and USCG
- "Shiprider" is a legislated border security arrangement between Canada and the United States. The program involves vessels jointly crewed by specially trained and cross-designated Canadian and U.S. law enforcement officers authorized to enforce the law on both sides of the international maritime boundary.
In addition to these, other MSOC partners have their own internal programs/initiatives which support marine and/or border security in the GL MSOC's area of operation. As an example, the CCG, while not having a direct mandate for marine security, is engaged in initiatives in support of other partners. Some examples include:
- Automatic Identification System (AIS) National Project - AIS is equipment that large vessels must carry by international regulations that automatically transmits key data such as identification, position, course and speed over the Very High Frequency maritime band. Coast Guard collects vessel data at its physical shore stations (including remote sites), and routes and filters it for its domestic security partners, allowing them to see the real-time position of all vessels within 50 miles of our shores.
- Long Range Identification and Tracking (LRIT) - LRIT is a secure point-to-point system which collects, stores and routes data from vessels wherever they are on the high seas. Unlike AIS, LRIT signals are encrypted, ensuring they cannot be read by unwanted eavesdroppers.
- Fleet Presence - CCG owns and operates the government civilian fleet. These vessels, provide a strong maritime presence in all Canadian coastal waters and in the GL/SLS.
These various programs that include some of the GL MSOC partners and internal departmental initiatives potentially complement each other, however, in numerous instances there may also be duplication. One third of interviewees (9/26) agreed that there is a need for more coordination and communication between the various marine-related programs in order to identify and eliminate any duplication of roles that may have developed. Some interviewees (6/26) expressed that there is duplication of the GL MSOC activities with other programs such as IBET and MSET.
By operating in the same area of responsibility, albeit with varying mandates, there is an expectation that the different enforcement programs would complement and not duplicate each other. In this way, each program could leverage the work done by other teams to contribute to the achievement of greater situational awareness and security in the GL/SLS.
GL MSOC partners should work with operations centres, the Government Operations Centre, the different marine enforcement teams, and other complementary initiatives to support a whole of government approach to assessing and responding to maritime threats and incidents.
The evaluation found that the mandate of the program is relevant and continues to be aligned with current government priorities. Federal departments acting individually cannot achieve a comprehensive and accurate marine security situational awareness. It is essential that federal departments combine their expertise to collect, analyze and share information and intelligence. The program is creating intelligence products and a picture of marine security for the GL/SLS is being developed. However, the ability of the GL MSOC to meet its outcomes in an effective and efficient manner is limited by:
- Information sharing constraints;
- Challenges with the strategic governance of the program and linkages with the other MSOCs;
- Lack of knowledge of the usefulness and quality of intelligence products;
- Unknowns including how many resources, both financial and human, are required to develop an effective maritime security picture; and
- The various initiatives by the partners are not integrated into a common approach.
As well, synergies with other marine security programs operating in the same area of responsibility are necessary so that the level of effort is optimized through a more collaborative approach. To be effective and strengthen awareness of and response to threats in the maritime environment, these programs must complement each other.
5.0 Management Responses and Action Plan
5.1 Management Responses
The evaluation report on the Great Lakes Marine Security Operations Centre has been reviewed by all partners (Canada Border Services Agency, Department of Fisheries and Oceans/Canadian Coast Guard, Department of National Defence/Canadian Forces, Department of Justice, Public Safety Canada, Transport Canada, Royal Canadian Mounted Police). The RCMP and its partners are satisfied that the report addresses their key challenges. These partners accept and support the evaluation and recommendations and to the extent where possible/reasonable will take the steps to implement changes to address these recommendations.
The RCMP and its Great Lakes Marine Security Operations Centre partners have already taken steps towards addressing the recommendations from the evaluation report by collaborating in the development of the Management Response Action Plan.
It is also important to note that the partners have moved into the new facility in January 2015. The new facility will provide better opportunities for collaboration and the inclusion/development of technologies that will no doubt lead to greater comprehensive maritime domain awareness of the Great Lakes and St-Lawrence Seaway.
5.2 Management Action Plan
Recommendation 1: Together, the RCMP, PS and partners of the GL MSOC should revisit what outcomes they would like to jointly achieve, taking into consideration the activities of other security, border and maritime initiatives so as to better support a whole-of-government approach to maritime security. Jointly, departments should conduct an assessment to determine the number of resources, both financial and human, that are required to achieve the GL MSOC's mandate and outcomes. They should also establish minimum service standards and their corresponding resource requirements.
|Mgt Response |
|Planned Action||Lead Dept./Agency||Deliverable (s)||Implementation Status as of 31 December 2014||Diary Date Footnote 39|
|Accept||1. Partners will collaborate to revisit the GL MSOC outcomes to better support a whole-of-government approach.||1. RCMP Federal Policing in collaboration with GL MSOC partners.||1. Revised GL MSOC outcomes.|| |
1. The GL MSOC Policy Working Group (PWG) is working to establish a new mandate beyond national security to include Maritime Domain Awareness for whole-of-government purposes. This deliverable is still a work in progress. It is anticipated that desired outcomes will continue to evolve and be integrated into a revised MSOC logic model. (Original diary date - December 2014.)
|2. Partners will undertake a needs analysis of the resources (financial, technological and human) required to effectively deliver on the GL- MSOC purpose and mandate.||2. RCMP Federal Policing in collaboration with GL MSOC partners.||2. A GL-MSOC resource needs analysis (financial, technological, and human).||2. The GL MSOC Senior Departmental Representatives (SDRs) completed a needs analysis on the number of human resources required in the GL MSOC. Reports were submitted to Public Safety in March 2014 and were completed without consideration of budget allocations/restrictions. Since the reports were submitted, no further discussions have taken place on human resources. |
The GL MSOC has identified its technological needs to the Border Integrity Technology Enhancement Project (BITEP), led by the RCMP. The BITEP is still reviewing the various technologies with the goal of finalizing the submission on behalf of all clients including the GL MSOC. (Original diary date - November 2014)
|3. Based on this assessment, partners will collectively identify minimum service delivery standards (financial, technological, and human) to ensure that all partners are well-positioned to effectively deliver on the GL-MSOC purpose and mandate.||3. RCMP Federal Policing in collaboration with GL MSOC partners.||3. Development of a service delivery business case and an accompanying Action Plan, detailing how each partner will implement the agreed upon service delivery standard including, if necessary, the reallocation of (financial, technological and human) resources.||3. Discussions will need to take place in the near future to address financial, technological, and human resources required to effectively operate the GL MSOC. (Original diary date - December 2014)|
Recommendation 2: RCMP, PS and GL MSOC partners should establish a clear terms of reference for governance committees and implement a sound structure to communicate, address challenges and most importantly, establish linkages with the Coastal MSOCs to ensure a whole-of-government approach to maritime security. As well, the RCMP and PS should work with GL MSOC partners to develop requisite program authorities to address information sharing challenges. This would include reviewing and analyzing the potential brought forward in any new legislation.
|Mgt Response |
|Planned Action||Lead Dept./Agency||Deliverable (s)||Implementation Status as of 31 December 2014||Diary Date Footnote 39|
|Accept||1. Partners will assess existing horizontal and vertical governance structures and bodies, as well as program management capability, to ensure the GL-MSOC operates effectively and efficiently with established linkages to the Coastal MSOCs within an envisioned unified program to ensure a whole-of-government approach to maritime security.||1. PSC - ADM Community Safety and Countering Crime Branch CCG - Deputy Commissioner, Operations DoJ - SADM Policy Sector.||1. Develop a comprehensive MSOC governance assessment with recommendations for reform. ** Note the deliverable above will be spearheaded by the MSOC Policy Working Group (PWG) given their mandate to review MSOC governance from interdepartmental ADMs.|| |
1. The GL MSOC PWG has been working for over 12 months on the MSOC Governance structure. This is still work in progress. Once complete, this will potentially lead to having MSOC legislation that would establish the following:
(Original diary date - October 2014)
Recommendation 3: In order to ensure that partners are satisfying GL MSOC clients' needs and producing value-added quality products and intelligence, RCMP, PS and partners will update the performance measurement strategy. As well, partners will conduct a needs analysis and establish a feedback mechanism through on-going monitoring and oversight.
|Mgt Response |
|Planned Action||Lead Dept./Agency||Deliverable (s)||Implementation Status as of 31 December 2014||Diary Date Footnote 39|
|Accept||1. Partners will establish clear metrics to help demonstrate and measure performance as a means of quantifying the value of the GL MSOC.||1. RCMP Federal Policing in collaboration with GL MSOC partners.||1. Review the GL MSOC Performance Measurement Strategy to demonstrate and measure GL MSOC performance and activities.|| |
1. GL MSOC partners had preliminary discussions on the complexities associated with measuring the value-added or impact of the GL MSOC products and intelligence produced by the partners. Further discussions will be undertaken once the current work of the PWG has been completed and a revised logic model has been developed. (Original diary date - December 2014).
|2. Partners will work with stakeholders to determine ways that the GL MSOC can better serve and respond to the needs of the larger MDA community, law enforcement partners as well as other regional stakeholders.||2. RCMP Federal Policing in collaboration with GL MSOC partners.||2. Develop a stakeholder engagement strategy that aligns GL MSOC capabilities with the needs and expectations of stakeholders (municipal, regional, national, bi-national etc.). |
As part of the engagement strategy, develop a targeted communications plan that would promote GL MSOC accomplishments and successes in order to create a better understanding of GL MSOC capabilities and contributions, and help promote cooperation and coordination with stakeholders.
2. Discussions are underway regarding the installation of the Border Integrity Operations Centre (BIOC) in the GL MSOC, the establishment of the two new Shiprider units in the Kingston and Niagara area. Additionally, the RCMP has established a working group from the law enforcement / intelligence community enhancing collaboration throughout the GL MSOC's area of responsibility. Further work is still required by all partners to address this recommendation fully. (Original diary date - December 2014)
Recommendation 4: GL MSOC partners should work with operations centres, the Government Operations Centre, the different marine enforcement teams, and other complementary initiatives to support a whole of government approach to assessing and responding to maritime threats and incidents.
|Mgt Response |
|Planned Action||Lead Dept./Agency||Deliverable (s)||Implementation Status as of 31 December 2014||Diary Date Footnote 39|
|Accept||1. Based on the GL-MSOC purpose and mandate, partners will assess how its mandate and activities align with those of existing and future border integrity, maritime security, and other operations centres (e.g., GOC), to minimize duplication and promote cooperation and synergies where appropriate, in support of a whole-of-government approach to identifying, assessing and responding to maritime threats and incidents.||1. RCMP Federal Policing in collaboration with GL MSOC partners||1. Develop Terms of Reference, Standard Operation Procedures, and/or similar arrangements, as appropriate, to clearly outline respective roles, responsibilities and avenues for ongoing collaboration between the GL MSOC and other border law enforcement initiatives and programs.|| |
1. The GL MSOC will be developing a Border Integrity Operations Centre (BIOC) that will assist in providing tactical and operational support to both Shiprider and MSET programs in the GL MSOC area of responsibility. The relocation of the Niagara MSET (RCMP personnel) into the new GL MSOC facility is also planned. Discussions are taking place that would allow for closer working relationships between the GL MSOC personnel and those of Shiprider and MSET teams. Further work is required by all partners to address this recommendation fully.(Original diary date - December 2014)
6.1 Appendix A: Logic Model
Great Lakes Marine Security Operations Centre - Logic Model
Description of graph follows.
13. CONTRIBUTION TO DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL PEACE, SECURITY, SAFETY, AND STABILITY
Ultimate Outcomes (Government of Canada, PAA Strategic Outcome Level)
12. Contribution to GL-SLS MSOC Partner Departments/Agencies PAAs:
- RCMP: Ensure the safety and security of Canadians and their institutions, domestically and globally.
- DND: Success in assigned missions in contributing to domestic and international peace, security and stability
- DFO-CCG: Safe and accessible waterways
- CBSA: Effective border management; illegal entry and smuggling prevented
- TC: Safe and secure marine transportation system
- PS: A safe and resilient Canada
- DOJ: A fair, relevant and accessible justice system that reflects Canadian values; and
A federal government that is supported by effective and responsive legal services
11. Enhanced preparedness and security capabilities in the GL-SLS region to identify and address marine security threats
10. Stronger partnerships among GL-MSOC partner departments and agencies
9. Well-coordinated inter-organizational response to marine security threats on the GL-SLS
8. Effective policy and program analysis for a coordinated and strategic approach
7. Well-informed decisions
6. More complete intelligence products (of GL-MSOC partner departments/agencies
5. Enhanced awareness of the GL-SLS marine security environment
4. COORDINATION OUTPUTS
- Policy/legal framework
- Joint meetings
- Inter-departmental working groups
- Situation reports
- Policy and legal briefings
- Recommendations for lead department
- Recommendations for continued support
3. CONTRIBUTIONS TO PRODUCTS OF INDIVIDUAL PARTNERS (OUTSIDE OF GL-SLS MSOC):
- Input into broader threat assessments, risk reports, and trend analysis of partner departments from GL-SLS area of responsibility and area of interest.
2. GL-MSOC VALUE ADDED PRODUCTS
- National Domain Awareness (NMP + data)
- MSOC surveillance lists (MSL)
- Vessel profiles: vessels of interest (VOI)
- Daily maritime status report
- Classified detailed specific VOI reports
- Responses to RFIs (bilateral, all partners)
- Risk reports and trend analyses
- Operational intelligence reports
1. INFORMATION PRODUCTS
- National Maritime Picture (NMP) validated and integrated data elements
- Basic set of shareable data elements
- Open source (public domain) information products
- ONGOING ACTIVITIES
- Discuss and coordinate activities (e.g. day to day activities; data gathering planning requests): exchange information and intelligence: recommend actions to partners
- Provide legal advice (DOJ).
- Support oversight and provide policy coordination (PSEP)
- SUPPORT CONTINGENCY PLANNING
ANLAYSIS / INTELLIGENCE
- Analyze data (NMP and individual partner data)
- Actioning requests for info. (RFIs)
- Provide intelligence support to lead organization
- Amplification (Work-up) of nominated vessels of interest (VOI)
DATA GATHERING AND INTEGRATON
- Collect, filter and validate information
- Enter elements of the maritime domain (e.g. environnemental info. marine vessels, facilites, meteorological)
- Monitor, identify and report on anomalies
- Timely and accurate tracking and targeting of marine vessels
- Dissemination of alerts, reports
6.2 Appendix B: Evaluation Questions
The evaluation respects the TB Policy on Evaluation, the TBS Directive on the Evaluation Function, the TBS Standard on Evaluation for the Government of Canada, the TBS Guidance on the Governance and Management of Evaluations of Horizontal Initiatives.
1. What need did the GL MSOC address and does that need continue to exist?
2. To what extent did the GL MSOC align with:
- Government priorities
- Strategic outcomes of partners
- Federal roles and responsibilities
3. To what extent is there a distinct role (and value added) for the GL MSOC?
4. To what extent are there more complete intelligence products and enhanced awareness of the Great Lakes and St. Lawrence Seaway marine security environment?
5. To what extent are there more well-informed decisions as a result of the GL MSOC?
6. To what extent do stronger partnerships exist and to what extent are there well-coordinated inter-organizational response to marine security threats on the GL/SLS?
7. Is the GL MSOC being delivered efficiently?
8. To what extent has the efficiency and economy of the GL MSOC improved over time?
6.3 Appendix C: Bibliography
Dunne, Tim. "Guardians of the Gateway: Maritime Security Operations Centre." Frontline Security. Vol. 6 No. 2 (Summer 2011). Web. October 29, 2013. http://frontline-security.org/index_archives.php?page=425
Government of Canada. Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada. Canada - United States Beyond the Border Action Plan: Implementation Report. Ottawa, NCR: Government of Canada, December 2012. Print
Government of Canada. Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada. Perimeter Security and Economic Competitiveness: Action Plan. Ottawa, NCR: Government of Canada, December 2012. Print
Government of Canada. Department of Justice. Program Activity Architecture. Ottawa, NCR. Department of Justice, 2012-2013. Print.
Government of Canada. Interdepartmental Marine Security Working Group. "ADM Marine Security Committee." Records of Decisions. September 18, 2009.
Government of Canada. Interdepartmental Marine Security Working Group. Horizontal Results Management Accountability Framework (RMAF) for the Great Lakes - St. Lawrence Seaway Marine Security Operations Centre. Ottawa, NCR, March 16, 2009. Print.
Government of Canada. Great Lakes Marine Security Operations Centre. Collaborative Effort Terms of Reference. Niagara on the Lake, ON. February 2013. Presentation.
Government of Canada. Great Lakes Marine Security Operations Centre. Document Collection Request. Niagara on the Lake. ON. Government of Canada, February 2013. Print.
Government of Canada. Great Lakes Marine Security Operations Centre. GL MSOC Generic Partner Presentation, Niagara on the Lake, ON. February 2012. Presentation.
Government of Canada. Great Lakes Marine Security Operations Centre. GL MSOC Orientation Guide. Niagara on the Lake, ON: GL MSOC., December 2012. Print.
Government of Canada, Office of the Auditor General of Canada. Status Report of the Auditor General of Canada to the House of Commons: Chapter 5 National Police Services - Royal Canadian Mounted Police. Ottawa, NCR: Office of the Auditor General of Canada, 2011. Print.
Government of Canada. Transport Canada. Canada's Maritime Security Strategic Framework 2020. Ottawa, NCR. Interdepartmental Marine Security Working Group, April 7, 2011. Print.
Government of Canada. Transport Canada. Canada's Maritime Domain Awareness Strategy. Ottawa, NCR. Interdepartmental Marine Security Working Group, [date unknown]. Print.
Government of Canada. Transport Canada. Interdepartmental Marine Security Working Group. Ottawa, NCR: Government of Canada, December 2010. Web.
Government of Canada. Treasury Board of Canada. Treasury Board Submission: Establishment of a Great Lakes/St. Lawrence Seaway Marine Security Operations Centre. Ottawa, NCR, August 29, 2008. Print
Government of the United States of America. United States Coast Guard. Area Maritime Security Training and Exercise Program. Detroit, Michigan. August, 2011. Print.
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