Audit of RCMP Memoranda of Understanding

Final

February 2019

Table of contents

• Acronyms and abbreviations
• Executive summary
• Management's response to the audit
• Background
• Objectives, scope and methodology
  • Objective
  • Scope
  • Methodology
  • Statement of conformance
• Audit findings
  • Governance
  • MOU review process
  • Policy Compliance
  • Oversight and monitoring
• Conclusion
• Recommendations
• Appendix A – Audit objective and criteria
• Appendix B – Management action plan

Acronyms/definitions

CFAO

Chief Financial Administrative Officer

CHRO

Chief Human Resources Officer

CM&C

Corporate Management and Comptrollership

CO

Commanding Officer

CROPS

Criminal Operations Support

DFSA

Delegation of Financial Signing Authority

DG

Director General

DOJ

Department of Justice

MOU

Memoranda of Understanding

NAS

National Accounting Services

NHQ

National Headquarters

OSB

Operations Strategy Branch

RCMP

Royal Canadian Mounted Police

RBAEP

Risk-based Audit and Evaluation Plan

TB

Treasury Board

TEAM

Total Expenditures and Asset Management System

Executive summary

In the course of carrying out its mandate, the RCMP regularly enters into arrangements with other police forces, levels of government or participants, to share information, cooperate on joint projects, provide or receive services, and share equipment, personnel or property. Memoranda of Understanding (MOUs) are non-legally binding arrangements used to describe the terms under which the RCMP cooperates with partners. If an MOU is with another level of government and involves the acquisition of goods, services or construction in exchange for a monetary payment, it may qualify as a contractual arrangement.

The RCMP Administration Manual contains requirements for MOUs through the Policy on RCMP Agreements and the Ministerial Directive on RCMP Agreements. The Policy and Directive specify the mandatory clauses that should be included in RCMP MOUs, the review and consultation requirements, as well as the approval authority for MOUs.

The objective of the audit was to assess whether the use of MOUs is consistent with applicable policy requirements within the RCMP. The scope of the audit included RCMP MOUs in place as of September 2018 within business lines and divisions, with a particular focus on those considered to be contractual arrangements.

The audit found that a majority of MOUs were missing key mandatory clauses required by Policy and contained limited financial information. Testing indicated that reviews of MOUs were not conducted systematically and approvals were not always performed at the required level. In addition, there was no central oversight function in place to ensure that MOUs were respecting core elements of the Policy and were aligned with RCMP priorities.

The audit also found that there was a general lack of knowledge surrounding contractual arrangements and the approval authorities that applied to them, which increased the risk of exceeding the authorities.

Overall the audit concluded that the MOU process should be strengthened to address gaps; that employees drafting MOUs have the proper tools and guidance they need; that reviewers follow a standardized process and document their review; and that the MOU Coordination Unit is involved in monitoring and oversight to ensure compliance with policies.

Opportunities also exist to update policy instruments to clarify roles, responsibilities and authorities, especially as it relates to contractual arrangements; to review potential contractual arrangements to ensure that limits and authorities conform to Treasury Board Guidelines; and to improve the MOU Registry to ensure that a complete MOU population exists and that relevant and sufficient information can be retrieved for decision making.

The management response and action plan developed in response to this report demonstrate the commitment from senior management to address the audit findings and recommendations. The RCMP Internal Audit will monitor the implementation of the management action plan and undertake a follow-up audit if warranted.

Management's response to the audit

Corporate Management agrees with the findings and recommendations in the audit report. The audit has highlighted areas for improved governance and management of Memoranda of Understanding, particularly related to the use of Contractual Arrangements. Corporate Management has already taken steps to improve the governance of Memoranda of Understanding and will continue to strengthen the governance, training and monitoring of Memoranda of Understanding.

Corporate Management will implement a detailed management action plan to address the recommendations in the audit. The plan will include revised policy and governance, tools, training, guidance and risk-based reviews.

Although not forming part of the management action plan, Corporate Management will consider whether the tracking and approval processes for Memoranda of Understanding could be improved through a business transformation initiative. An initiative will be proposed to the Corporate Management Business Transformation team and assessed against the prioritization criteria and ranked against other initiatives within Corporate Management. If the initiative is selected, there is the possibility that efficiencies in the review and approval process could be found through automation of the process.

Dennis Watters
Chief Financial Administrative Officer

Background

In the course of carrying out its mandate, the RCMP regularly enters into arrangements with other police forces, levels of government or participants, to share information, cooperate on joint projects, provide or receive services, as well as share equipment, personnel and property. Memoranda of Understanding (MOUs) are an important part of policing given that they document the work done jointly with partners, which contributes to the achievement of RCMP objectives.

Several administrative instruments can be used to enter into arrangements with partners depending on the nature of goods or services provided and the type of relationship with the other entity. An MOU is a type of arrangement used to describe the terms under which the RCMP provides or receives services, information, assets, assistance, or engages in cost-shared projects with partners. MOUs may also be described as letters of intent, memoranda of agreement, collaborative arrangements or other similar terms. MOUs are non-legally binding and can be terminated at any given time by one of the participants.

MOUs can have a cost-recovery component or may involve no exchange of funds depending on the purpose of the agreement. If an MOU is with another level of government and involves the acquisition of goods, services or construction in exchange for a monetary payment, it may qualify as a contractual arrangement. In this case, the MOU is subject to different obligations and must respect core contracting policy principles as well as financial delegated authorities for sole-source contracts as stated in Treasury Board (TB) policies.

The RCMP Administration Manual contains requirements for MOUs through the Policy on RCMP Agreements and the Ministerial Directive on RCMP Agreements. The Policy defines MOUs as either major or local and describes the review process required for each type.

Major MOUs are defined as written arrangements or understandings which have an international, national, or interdivisional impact on the delivery of law enforcement services, or contain provisions for the sharing personal information. Local MOUs are defined as written arrangements or understandings that are routine in nature, which facilitate the effectiveness of day-to-day RCMP administrative or operational activities, and are not major.^{Footnote 1}

The Policy also defines the roles and responsibilities of MOU originators, the national MOU Coordination Unit, Corporate Management and Comptrollership (CM&C), Legal Services as well as Commanding Officers (COs) and Director Generals (DGs):

• MOU Originators are responsible for drafting and arranging for the signing of MOUs;
• The MOU Coordination Unit located in the Procurement and Contracting Branch is the policy centre for MOUs. They are responsible for reviewing MOUs for compliance to the Policy, coordinating the review of all major MOUs, providing advice and guidance to drafting units and maintaining a national MOU registry;
• CM&C is responsible for providing advice on resources, assets, property, procurement and financial aspects including cost recovery mechanisms pertaining to all MOUs;
• Legal Services is responsible for reviewing MOUs to ensure they conform to legal principles; and
• COs and DGs are responsible to ensure that MOUs conform to policies and directives.

Divisional MOU Units located in the Operations Strategy Branch (OSB) or Criminal Operational Support (CROPS) offices determine if MOUs are major or local, coordinate the review process for local MOUs, and facilitate the MOU approval process by the CO on behalf of the MOU originator.

The 2018-2023 Risk-based Audit, Evaluation and Data Analytics Plan (RBAEDAP) approved by the Commissioner included an audit of MOUs. Specifically, the RBAEP identified an increased need to ensure that originators of MOUs followed established review and approval processes given the variety and quantity of MOUs in place across the RCMP. Furthermore, the Treasury Board Secretariat issued guidelines in 2014 on the use of contractual arrangements for the acquisition of goods and services from / to other levels of government. The audit will assess the extent of compliance of RCMP MOUs to policy requirements.

Objective, scope and methodology

Objective

The objective of the audit was to assess whether the use of MOUs is consistent with applicable policy requirements within the RCMP. Appendix A presents the audit objective and criteria.

Scope

The scope of the audit included all RCMP MOUs, with a particular focus on those considered to be contractual arrangements. The scope of the examination included MOUs that were in place and valid as of September 2018 within business lines and divisions.

Methodology

Planning for the audit was completed in August 2018. In this phase, the audit team conducted interviews, process walkthroughs and examined relevant policies, procedures and results of previous audit work performed.

The examination phase, which concluded in November 2018, employed various auditing techniques including interviews, documentation reviews and data analysis. Site visits took place at three divisional headquarters to review files and assess practices.

A file review was conducted on MOUs in place as of September 2018 to assess compliance against the requirements of the RCMP Policy on Agreements and TB Guidelines on Contractual Arrangements. In order to capture a wide variety of MOUs across the Force, the audit team selected a total of 205 MOUs consisting of two samples for file testing as follows:

• A random sample from the national MOU Registry for divisions (excluding E, K and O) and National Headquarters (NHQ) business lines (65 files from divisions and 20 from NHQ business lines for a total of 85 MOUs); and
• A random sample of 40 MOUs maintained at the divisional level (by MOU Units and Records Offices) in each site visited (40 in E, K and O Divisions for a total of 120 MOUs).

The audit intended to select a random sample of MOUs with financial expenditures from the Total Expenditures and Asset Management System (TEAM) to identify contractual arrangements. However, the Internal Audit, Evaluation and Review's Data Analytics Section could not identify a population of MOUs in TEAM because MOU payments did not have an identifier code.

As a result, a key word search was used to identify transactions in TEAM that could potentially be MOUs. Of these transactions, the audit team selected 15 transactions based on judgment and assessed whether they qualified as contractual arrangements. The audit team also conducted a key word search of the national MOU Registry to identify potential contractual arrangements.

Upon completion of the examination phase, the audit team held meetings to validate findings with personnel and debriefed senior management on the relevant findings.

Statement of conformance

The audit engagement conforms to the Institute of Internal Auditor's International Professional Practices Framework and the Treasury Board of Canada Directive on Internal Audit, as supported by the results of the quality assurance and improvement program.

Audit findings

A sound governance structure, including up-to-date policies, detailed processes, clear accountabilities and effective oversight, must be in place to ensure that risks associated with MOUs are assessed and mitigated prior to being signed. This would support the RCMP entering into agreements that are in its best interest.

Accordingly, in regards to the MOU process, we expected to find:

• Clear and up-to-date MOU policies and delegation of authorities communicated across the Force;
• Guidance and tools clarifying the MOU review and approval process available to employees involved in the MOU process;
• A review process documenting sign-off or certification by Financial Management, Procurement and Contracting, Legal Services and other relevant stakeholders depending on the nature of the MOU; and
• An accurate and complete inventory of RCMP MOUs that is monitored regularly.

Governance

Policy and procedures

The RCMP has a governance framework in place that defines the MOU process within the Force. The framework includes the Ministerial Directive on RCMP Agreements, the RCMP Policy on Agreements, the Delegated Financial Signing Authority (DFSA) Matrix and supplementary divisional policies on agreements. In addition to RCMP documents, the TB Guidelines on Contractual Arrangements released in 2014, define contractual arrangements and establish the requirements and delegated authorities for this type of agreement.

The Ministerial Directive on RCMP Agreements provides guidance regarding the accountability and consultation requirements for RCMP agreements. The Directive states that RCMP agreements shall be signed by the Commissioner or delegates; shall be supported by advice from Legal Services and Global Affairs Canada; and shall be maintained along with pertinent documents in a record system allowing for easy access.

The RCMP Policy on Agreements identifies the roles and responsibilities of relevant stakeholders in the MOU process; the structure and content of MOUs; and the review and consultation requirements as well as the approval authority for local and major MOUs.

Some divisions developed supplementary policies to further establish and clarify the divisional review, consultation and approval processes for local MOUs. C, D, E, F, L and V Divisions had divisional policies on agreements. Other divisions did not have supplemental policies and relied on national policy for guidance.

In 2014, Treasury Board released the TB Guidelines on Contractual Arrangements to provide advice and interpretation on contractual arrangements. The guidelines define contractual arrangements as MOUs between the federal government and a public sector organization (other than federal government departments) that involves the acquisition of goods, services, construction services or the leasing of real property in exchange for a monetary payment. The guidelines state that contractual arrangements are subject to sole-sourcing contracting limits (i.e. $40k for goods and construction and $100k for services) and should respect core contracting policy principles.

The audit found that while the RCMP policy instruments provided valuable information to employees involved in the MOU process, they had not been updated recently and did not reflect the latest information on MOUs. For example, the Ministerial Directive on RCMP Agreements (updated in 2002) and RCMP Policy (updated in 2010) did not address contractual arrangements and information contained in the 2014 TB Guidelines. The DFSA Matrix approved in 2017 established the signing authorities for MOUs. However, it did not include financial signing authority limits for contractual arrangements, which are equivalent to non-competitive contracting limits. Divisional supplementary policies were also in need of updating. For example, in C Division, the divisional policy had not been updated since 1995 and was in the process of being removed from the divisional manual. In E Division, the divisional policy was in the process of being updated to reflect changes in the divisional process.

Policy instruments also contained inconsistencies and unclear definitions. For example, the Ministerial Directive and Policy on Agreements were inconsistent on the requirement for legal review. While the Ministerial Directive required all agreements to be supported by legal advice, the Policy required Legal Services to review only major MOUs and local MOUs that are not structured in accordance with MOU templates. In addition, the MOU signing authorities in the DFSA and the Policy on Agreements were inconsistent. The Policy authorized the approvals of MOUs by COs in the divisions and DGs and above at NHQ. However, the DFSA allowed for the approval of MOUs by procurement officers and managers, directors and regional Corporate Management Officers (depending on the amount payable). The authority level of these positions were below the CO/DG level, and as such were inconsistent with the RCMP Policy on Agreements.

Finally, the definitions of major and local MOUs contained in the Policy on Agreements were unclear to users and left room for interpretation. The audit team found that 70 out of 205 MOUs tested were considered local and routine in nature by the divisions, however, they had an information sharing component which is a characteristic of major MOUs according to Policy. The divisions defined MOUs as routine in nature based on the type of partner and collaborative arrangement instead of labeling them as major based on their information sharing component. The unclear definitions between local and major MOUs had an impact on the review process and level of risk associated to MOUs.

As part of CM&C's 2018-2019 Annual Performance Plan, the Procurement and Contracting Branch has committed to implement MOU governance enhancement initiatives in fiscal year 2018-2019 which includes updating the RCMP Policy on Agreements and DFSA to reflect the latest information on contractual arrangements. There is an opportunity to also review the definitions of major and local MOUs to provide greater clarity to employees involved in the MOU process.

Roles and responsibilities

The RCMP Policy on Agreements defines the roles and responsibilities of MOU originators, the national MOU Coordination Unit, CM&C, Legal Services as well as COs and DGs, especially as they relate to the MOU review and approval process.

Interviews with employees involved in the MOU process indicated that they had a clear understanding of their roles. However, the audit found that due to limited resources in the national MOU Coordination Unit (which consists of one AS-02 and one AS-04 position), the Unit had not been able to fulfill its role as a policy centre in accordance with its policy mandate which included providing direction, supporting employees and coordinating the MOU process. This impacted the effectiveness and timeliness of the MOU review process for major MOUs as well as the provision of advice for local MOUs.

Furthermore, the level of service provided by Legal Services varied amongst divisions. While some divisions such as E Division had access to a Department of Justice (DoJ) lawyer onsite who reviewed the majority of MOUs, most divisions had to request advice from NHQ Legal Services. In the past, NHQ Legal Services indicated that they did not have the capacity to review all MOUs originating from across the Force. In order to mitigate the risks of not providing Legal advice on all MOUs, they developed MOU templates to be used across the Force in coordination with the national MOU Coordination Unit.

The audit found that the RCMP Policy on Agreements did not document the roles of divisional MOU Units located in OSB or CROPS offices. Employees working in those units informed the audit team that they were responsible for determining if MOUs were major or local, coordinating the review process for local MOUs, and facilitating CO approval of the MOUs on behalf of the MOU originator.

When reviewing the RCMP Policy on Agreements, there is an opportunity to update the roles and responsibilities of different units involved in the MOU process and to clarify the involvement of the MOU Coordination Unit and Legal Services to ensure that it aligns with capacity and priorities.

Guidelines, training and tools

MOUs are written by operational and administrative units across the Force as needed to facilitate operations. As the drafting of MOUs is an infrequent duty for most employees, it was expected that employees involved in the MOU process would have access to training, tools and guidance necessary to successfully carry out their roles and responsibilities with respect to the MOU process.

The audit found no evidence of national tools or training available to all employees drafting MOUs with the exception of national templates available on the Infoweb. Procurement and Contracting Branch has issued written communication and has delivered limited training on MOUs in the past but clear guidance and step-by-step procedures have not been consolidated in a complete and accessible document.

For example, Procurement and Contracting Branch included some information on MOUs in presentations offered to CM&C employees in 2016 but this information was not available to all RCMP employees. Similarly, in September 2018 a Force-wide message on MOUs was sent to all employees with information on contractual arrangements and the MOU review process but the information was placed on GCpedia.^{Footnote 2} While this is a positive initiative, information placed on GCpedia does not have the same authority as the information in the RCMP administrative manuals nor is it found as easily by employees. Policies found in the manual should contain the most up-to-date information.

The MOU templates developed by the national MOU Coordination Unit and Legal Services were available on the Infoweb and were generally used across the Force. They included templates for generic MOUs, information sharing MOUs, and joint-force operation MOUs. While the templates were deemed useful by employees drafting MOUs, employees informed the audit team that the templates should provide specific examples of language that can be used in MOU clauses. MOU drafting units indicated that it would be helpful to have access to previously approved MOUs or generic MOUs to reduce time spent on drafting and editing.

In the absence of national guidelines and tools, most divisions have developed local training and resources to assist employees drafting and reviewing MOUs (with the exception of C and M Division). For example, in O Division, the MOU Unit located in the CROPS Office had developed a training presentation on MOUs to be distributed across the division. In F, H, J, K, and O Divisions, MOU Units had developed process maps and process narratives to clarify the review process and assist employees drafting MOUs. Although divisional tools are helpful, not having national training and guidance may result in duplication of efforts and inconsistencies. Divisional tools and guides may also be incomplete and out of date as they rely on information currently available in national policies.

As part of CM&C's 2018-2019 Annual Performance Plan, the Procurement and Contracting Branch is in the process of developing training material to address gaps surrounding contractual arrangements. In the process of developing national tools, there is an opportunity to review and leverage existing tools and training developed by divisions. The development of national tools and training would ensure that all employees have a common understanding of the process and requirements.

MOU review process

Review process

According to the RCMP Policy on Agreements, major MOUs should be sent to the MOU Coordination Unit at NHQ which would coordinate reviews by CM&C (Financial Management and Procurement and Contracting) as well as Legal Services. As per Policy, local MOUs are not required to be sent to the MOU Coordination Unit but are required to be reviewed at the divisional level.

The Ministerial Directive on RCMP Agreements stipulates that the RCMP is to keep an inventory of all RCMP agreements, amendments, audit reports and any other correspondence relating to these agreements in a records system to ensure that they can easily be reviewed. Accordingly, the audit expected to find evidence of review in MOU files.

Testing indicated that reviews of MOUs were not conducted systematically and documented on file. There were no mandatory requirements to indicate what reviews should consist of to mitigate financial, legal and other risks associated with MOUs. No national review checklist existed for employees to document the review process and the results of consultations held were not always documented on file. The audit found evidence of a review in 35% of the files tested (71/205 files). Evidence of the review for major and local MOUs are provided in Table 1.

Testing indicated that only 40% (21/53) of major MOU files contained evidence that MOUs had been reviewed and only 33% (50/152) of local MOU files contained evidence of review. However, Table 2 depicts that of the 21 major MOUs reviewed, the national MOU Coordination Unit reviewed 8 major MOUs, resulting in only 15% (8/53) of major MOUs being reviewed in accordance with policy requirements. The remaining 13 major MOUs were reviewed by divisional MOU units but should have been sent to the national MOU Coordination Unit for review. In addition, testing indicated that 8 local MOUs were sent to the national MOU Coordination Unit for review.

The audit team was informed by interviewees in the divisions that MOUs submitted for review to the national MOU Coordination Unit did not receive a timely response. The review of major MOUs by the MOU Coordination Unit, CM&C, Legal Services and other applicable operational directorates at NHQ could take several months. In the absence of a timely response from NHQ, divisions informed the audit team that they had been reviewing MOUs locally and making decisions on MOUs to address operational needs in order to meet timelines. Given that the MOU Coordination Unit was not tracking response times, the audit team was unable to assess service standards and confirm whether divisions received timely responses to their requests.

As per table 3, results from testing showed that Procurement and Contracting rarely assessed MOUs as part of the MOU review process. Interviews with divisions indicated that Procurement and Contracting was consulted informally at the regional level if necessary. Testing and interviews also showed that other relevant stakeholders such as Real Property and Movable Assets were not included in the review process even if MOUs were related to vehicles and accommodations. In addition, there was no evidence that Legal Services was systematically assessing all major MOUs as part of the review process with the exception of E Division, where a DoJ lawyer located on site reviewed the majority of major and local MOUs prior to approval. Testing showed that 36 of the 39 MOU files reviewed by Legal Services, as indicated in table 3, originated in E Division.

Note that some MOUs had a review by more than one function.

The MOU Coordination Unit confirmed that no national review guidelines and checklist had been provided to the divisions to clarify and document the review process. The audit found that some divisions had developed local checklists to document their review process, while others did not document their review process. Table 4 depicts the use of checklists across the divisions.

Divisional review processes included different stakeholders such as Finance, Procurement and Contracting, Legal Services and Departmental Security Branch. However, there were no commonalities in terms of format or minimum requirements. Testing also showed that divisional checklists and tracking lists were not consistently used and did not serve as a control mechanism to ensure that all stakeholders identified as reviewers were involved in the review process.

Given that drafting MOUs is a secondary duty for many employees and there is a frequent rotation of operational staff, there is a need for a standardized review process with mandatory review requirements to ensure that controls are in place. The MOU process would benefit from having a standardized checklist used across the Force to document the review process. A mandatory review by Procurement and Contracting should be included to ensure that contractual arrangements are identified and financial authorities are verified. There is an opportunity to draw upon existing divisional review checklists to create a single national checklist that incorporates the required review guidance and sign-off.

Policy compliance

The RCMP Policy on Agreements and national templates define the mandatory sections that should be in all MOUs.^{Footnote 3} These include:

• Purpose and objective clause
• Obligations and committed resources clause
• Departmental representative responsible for the MOU
• Provision for amendments
• Provision for termination
• Effective and expiry dates
• Dispute resolution clause
• Review and monitoring clause
• Security classification
• Financial arrangements section
• Name and level of signatories

The results of compliance testing in relation to mandatory sections indicated that a majority of MOUs were missing key mandatory elements required in the Policy. As indicated in the Table 5, with the exception of identifying the MOU purpose, obligations and committed resources, the results of testing indicated that a high percentage of MOUs were not in compliance with key mandatory elements.

The level of compliance was affected by the lack of process standardization across the Force. The audit found that each division had developed a review process of its own, some being more systematically used and aligned with Policy than others. Interviewees also explained that some MOUs originated from partners who used different templates. Not all drafting units ensured that RCMP mandatory sections were included in the MOU prior to approval. In the absence of a strong and systematic review process, some MOUs were signed even if they were non-compliant with policy requirements.

The level of compliance was also affected by the date the MOUs were drafted. During testing, MOUs dating back to 1989 were found in the sample. The older MOUs often did not have an expiry date and did not include all mandatory sections required by Policy. As per table 6, 29% had been drafted more than 15 years ago.

The absence of an expiry date on 63% of MOUs (129/205) in the sample can be explained by the fact that the RCMP Policy on Agreements does not require MOUs to have an expiry date but rather mentions the need for a "termination date, expiry date or a mechanism for termination". Accordingly, MOUs that have a clause stating that "parties can terminate the agreement at any given time" could be considered in conformance with the Policy.

While including an expiry date is not required by Policy currently, it is a key control to ensure that MOUs are reviewed regularly and remain current and in the best interest of the RCMP. Older MOUs are at risk of not reflecting updated Force practices, new partner structural or organizational changes and modifications in legislation such as privacy of information requirements.

Procurement and Contracting Branch should consider adding a requirement in the Policy stipulating that MOUs need to include an expiry date and cannot be deemed indefinite. This would ensure that MOUs are reviewed periodically and amended if necessary.

Approval process

According to the RCMP Policy on Agreements, COs and DGs are responsible for signing MOUs. If an MOU qualifies as a contractual arrangement, approval authorities for sole-source contracting apply.

Testing showed that 20% of MOUs (5/25) reviewed had been signed below the DG level at NHQ. In the divisions, 25% of MOUs (45/180) were signed by a signatory other than the CO. Local MOU Units confirmed that they did not have a mechanism to identify MOUs that would have been signed without undergoing the proper review and approval process at the divisional level. However, interviewees explained that divisional MOU Units had increased the amount of communication surrounding MOUs in recent years in order to reduce instances when detachment or unit commanders would sign MOUs and bypass the local MOU review process.

Contractual arrangements

TB Guidelines on Contractual Arrangements state that MOUs qualifying as contractual arrangements are subject to sole-sourcing contracting limits of $40k for goods and construction and $100k for services. If the amount payable exceeds RCMP authorities, Public Service and Procurement Canada can be asked to sign the MOU under their delegated authority or a TB Submission may be required.

Interviews and testing highlighted 22 MOUs that could qualify as contractual arrangements. They related to vehicle / building maintenance and repair, radio communication services, guard services and research and development. Some of these MOUs were expired or not yet signed. Information on costing was limited, details of the arrangement were not provided nor was a business rationale on file. This did not allow the audit team to confirm with certainty that they met the thresholds provided by the TB Guidelines on Contractual Arrangements. These MOUs were brought to the attention of Procurement and Contracting's senior management for further review and should be the subject of greater scrutiny to determine whether they meet TB requirements for contractual arrangements.

Overall, interviews with business lines and divisions demonstrated that there was a general lack of knowledge surrounding contractual arrangements and the approval authorities that applied to them. The operational environment, joint police work and use of police service agreements increased the ambiguity surrounding contractual arrangements. Employees in divisions did not always understand that MOUs in place to use or purchase partners' goods, services or infrastructure could qualify as contractual arrangements if there were other options available in the private sector.

There is also ambiguity surrounding contractual arrangements due to the absence of specific signing authorities for contractual arrangements in the Policy and DFSA. For example, contractual arrangements above the RCMP's contracting authority were signed by COs in the past because general MOU signing authorities were applied.

Most interviewees confirmed that Procurement and Contracting would be best qualified to identify contractual arrangements and provide advice on signing authorities and the approval process. However, given that Procurement and Contracting is not systematically part of the MOU review process, there is a risk that a contractual arrangement could be signed without being identified as such and that contracting authorities could be exceeded.

Contractual arrangements can have a significant impact on RCMP operations given that they may have to go through a TB submission process to be approved if they exceed RCMP's sole-source contracting authorities. The TB submission process can take 6 to 8 months. Divisional employees stated that they did not have the resources or expertise to develop TB submissions.

Overall, there is a need to develop guidance on contractual arrangements, as well as identify the types of MOUs within the RCMP that may constitute contractual arrangements. This should be included as part of the tools and training to be developed as previously mentioned to increase awareness within the Force. There is also an opportunity for the national policy centre to determine the most efficient approach to developing TB submissions for contractual arrangements, particularly if they relate to goods or services used Force-wide.

Costing and invoicing

The RCMP Policy on Commitment requires units to record commitments over $5,000 in TEAM through a funds commitment. As per the Financial Administration Act, an officer is required to certify and sign section 32 to ensure that commitments entered into are within their delegated authority. A section 34 certification is required to ensure that goods / services have been received prior to payment. These requirements apply to MOUs with financial implications.

Audit testing identified a number of MOUs with financial implications and assessed whether MOU files included estimated costs, invoicing information and evidence that fund commitments had been created.

Testing indicated that 152/205 MOUs (74%) had financial implications. Of those 152 MOUs, 79 MOUs (52%) did not identify associated costs or have an estimate of the financial commitment to the RCMP in the MOU or on file. Also, 98/152 MOUs (64%) did not have invoicing or cost recovery information in the MOU or on file. In addition, there was no evidence in any of the MOU files to show that fund commitments had been created when the MOUs were signed. Interviewees confirmed that fund commitments were not always created for MOUs and if they were, there could be a delay between the signing of the MOU and the creation of the commitment.

Overall, MOU files included limited financial information which made it difficult to assess compliance with policy requirements. Identifying the estimated total value of the MOU, the amount and frequency of invoicing, the approval levels required and the need for fund commitment for MOUs in the sample was not possible based on the information available.

Interviewees confirmed that monitoring compliance with financial policies for payment associated with MOUs is difficult. Unlike contracts (which are identified as purchase orders in TEAM), MOU transactions do not have a single identifier in TEAM and cannot be subject to internal controls specific to MOUs. Payments associated with MOUs are subject to the Internal Control Account Verification process, where National Accounting Services (NAS) employees request a funds commitment number or a copy of the MOU in order to pay invoices over $10K. However, interviews with NAS employees indicated that in some cases invoices could be paid before MOUs had been drafted and fund commitments created with the understanding that MOUs would be signed in the future. To assess the risk associated with this, the audit tested 54 of 205 MOUs that had an associated payment and found one instance of invoices having been paid prior to the MOU being signed.

Not having detailed financial information in MOUs may result in the RCMP incurring payments that were not included in the unit's budget or for costs that were not intended when the MOU was signed. This is particularly significant for MOUs that do not have an expiry date as agreements may evolve over time. There is an opportunity to strengthen controls in place especially as it relates to mandatory sections included in MOUs, approval authorities as well as financial controls for budgeting and invoicing.

Oversight and monitoring

Information systems

According to the RCMP Policy on Agreements, the MOU Coordination Unit is responsible for maintaining a national MOU Registry. Policy requires that all original MOUs along with supporting documentation be included in the national Registry.

As a result, we expected all RCMP agreements to be housed in a national MOU registry that would allow for the retrieval of information required to monitor and oversee compliance with RCMP policies and directives.

Representatives from the MOU Coordination Unit confirmed that they maintained a national Registry in the Records Document Information Management System. They explained that MOUs sent to the Unit were forwarded to the Records Office for filing and inclusion in the Registry.

Based on analysis, the audit found the following limitations associated with the national MOU Registry:

• The fields in the Registry contained information about the IM record rather than the MOU (i.e. prefixes, file number, file title, file status, file date, and file type). This information only allows the IM records office to manage files;
• The Registry did not provide sufficient details to track and report on MOUs. For example, fields to record MOU type, expiry date, originating division, and partners were not included in the Registry;
• Given that the majority of information related to the MOU were contained in the file title, search capabilities were limited to key word searches. The system did not allow for reports to be generated or for MOU files to be retrieved easily; and
• Access to the Registry was limited to the MOU Coordination Unit employees, which did not allow other employees to search and access MOUs.

Of the 120 MOU files tested during site visits, only 4 files contained evidence that the original signed MOU had been sent to the MOU Coordination Unit for inclusion in the national Registry. Interviewees from divisional MOU units indicated that they did not always send MOUs to the national MOU Coordination Unit for inclusion in the Registry, confirming the Registry's incompleteness. The audit team could not cross reference divisional tracking lists against the national MOU Registry to validate if there was duplication or to what extent it was complete because the naming convention used for MOUs in the division was different than the one used in the national Registry for the same MOUs.

The audit also found that 13 out of 15 divisions had developed independent systems to track and file MOUs. However, interviewees indicated that there was no assurance they were capturing all MOUs originating in their respective division. Site visits confirmed that divisions did not have accurate MOU holdings. Divisional tracking lists contained expired MOUs, MOUs drafted by other divisions or business lines, and documents such as occupancy agreements, secondment agreements and contracts. As a result, the audit team concluded that no complete inventory of MOUs existed in the various RCMP systems.

Current limitations associated with the national Registry have a direct impact on reporting capabilities and how the Registry can be used to provide relevant and accurate information for decision making. There is a need to improve upon the current national MOU Registry to ensure that it is representative of all RCMP MOUs. Information captured should be complete, relevant and accurate and allow for the monitoring and oversight of MOUs.

Monitoring and oversight

According to the RCMP Policy on Agreements, the national MOU Coordination Unit is responsible for reviewing MOUs to ensure that they comply with directives and policies. It was expected that a monitoring and oversight function would be in place to ensure that MOUs complied with policy requirements and that deficiencies in the MOU process would be communicated to management and addressed in a timely manner.

Interviewees from the MOU Coordination Unit confirmed that they did not ensure that all major MOUs were forwarded for review and all original MOUs were sent for inclusion in the national Registry. A Force-wide call-out had not been performed since 2004 to confirm that the Registry contained a complete inventory of MOUs. The MOU Coordination Unit also indicated that they did not monitor MOUs to ensure that they were renewed or terminated upon expiry dates.

Most divisional MOU units stated they were tracking MOU expiry dates and review dates. For example, in E Division, the audit team observed that renewal and review dates were tracked using a system that allowed them to set diary dates and upload the MOU document for reference. However, testing showed that tracking was performed inconsistently and the depth of the review was scarce. Given that testing identified 63% of the MOUs did not have an expiry date, there is a need for more systematic monitoring.

In terms of monitoring compliance with MOU obligations, the RCMP Policy on Agreements states that COs (divisionally) and DGs (nationally) are responsible for ensuring that a process is in place to monitor MOUs for compliance. Furthermore, the Policy states that MOU originators are responsible for monitoring MOUs for performance measurement.^{Footnote 4}

Unit managers and representatives from divisional MOU units indicated that the monitoring of MOUs was primarily conducted informally during day-to-day operations and regular meetings with partners. They confirmed that formal monitoring and reporting did not occur as stated in the MOUs monitoring and reporting clauses. While a Unit Level Quality Assurance (ULQA) guide was in place to monitor compliance with both RCMP Policy and the Ministerial Directive on RCMP Agreements, it was last updated in 2007 and interviewees could not confirm that it was being used actively.^{Footnote 5}

The absence of a formal monitoring and oversight function increases the risk that the MOU process is not respected, that the RCMP engages in activities that are not compliant with government policies, and that MOUs are signed even if they do not align with the RCMP's priorities and mandate.

Conclusion

MOUs are an important part of policing given that they document the work done jointly with other police forces and levels of government, which contributes to the achievement of RCMP objectives. In order to mitigate the financial and legal risks associated with MOUs, strong controls need to be in place to ensure that MOUs are written according to approved templates, are reviewed and signed by appropriate stakeholders and are monitored closely.

The audit concluded that the MOU process could be strengthened to increase compliance; that employees drafting MOUs have the proper training, tools and guidance they need; that reviewers follow a standardized process and document their advice; and that the MOU Coordination Unit is involved in monitoring and oversight to ensure compliance with the Policy, approval authorities and financial controls.

Opportunities also exist to update policy instruments to clarify roles, responsibilities and authorities, especially as it relates to contractual arrangements; review potential contractual arrangements to ensure that limits and authorities conform to TB Guidelines; and improve the MOU Registry to ensure that a single MOU population exists and that evidence-based information can be retrieved for decision making.

Recommendations

1. The Chief Financial Administrative Officer should ensure that policy instruments are updated to clarify roles, responsibilities and authorities, especially as it relates to contractual arrangements.
2. The Chief Financial Administrative Officer should establish a Force-wide standard review process that includes Financial Management, Procurement and Contracting, Real Property, Moveable Assets and Legal Services and is supported by national guidelines and checklists.
3. The Chief Financial Administrative Officer should develop tools, training and guidance to assist employees developing MOUs, and clarify the requirements and approval process for contractual arrangements. The types of RCMP MOUs that could qualify as contractual arrangements should be identified and assessed to ensure that expenditure limits and authorities conform to Treasury Board Guidelines.
4. The Chief Financial Administrative Officer should update the RCMP MOU inventory to ensure it is complete and modernize the system used to maintain MOUs to ensure that it can generate accurate data to support decision making, monitoring and oversight.

Appendix A – Audit objective and criteria

Appendix B – Management action plan

National DNA Data Bank 2017-2018 Annual Report

Executive Summary

The 2017-2018 National DNA Data Bank (NDDB) Annual Report is a straightforward account of the NDDB's operating processes and accomplishments for the 2017-2018 fiscal year.

When the NDDB was established in 2000, it initially consisted of two DNA Indexes: the Convicted Offender Index, which contains DNA profiles of convicted offenders, and the Crime Scene Index, which contains DNA profiles from crime scenes across Canada.

In March 2018, legislative amendments to the DNA Identification Act allowed for the creation of five new indexes: three humanitarian (the Missing Persons Index, the Human Remains Index, and the Relatives of Missing Persons Index), and two criminal (the Victims Index and the Voluntary Donors Index). These new indices give police, coroners and medical examiners additional tools for solving crimes, identifying serial offenders, and investigating missing persons and unidentified remains.

This year, the Annual Report focusses on the collaboration and partnerships that help make the NDDB a valuable policing tool. We highlight the ways in which the law enforcement community, including police officers, judges, and forensic laboratories, work together to collect samples, identify offenders, support humanitarian investigations and keep communities safe.

If you would like to receive a PDF copy of the full 2017-2018 NDDB Annual Report, please send an email to NDDB-BNDG@rcmp-grc.gc.ca.

Quick facts

United by a common goal

Collaboration is key to the success of the National DNA Data Bank (NDDB), and over the past 18 years, the NDDB has been an important contributor to the administration of justice, thanks to some key partnerships. The value provided by the NDDB in criminal investigations stems directly from the efforts of numerous individuals and agencies working towards a common goal: to protect the public and keep communities safe.

The NDDB provides a critical role in criminal investigations by quickly identifying offenders who commit serious crimes and eliminating innocent people from suspicion. Often, it provides the link across jurisdictions and different police agencies by connecting crimes that have a common suspect.

It takes many dedicated, hard-working professionals to build a case, collect and analyze the evidence, identify a suspect and ensure successful prosecution. Each partner plays an important role in the process, and this year, we're highlighting some of these partners and the work that they do.

Police officers are the people on the front lines, attending crime scenes and collecting evidence. The evidence they collect can help break the case and identify a suspect. They also collect biological samples from offenders once a DNA order has been issued by the courts. The NDDB provides training and support to Canadian police officers and peace officers involved in the collection and submission of biological samples from convicted offenders. The value of DNA evidence to police investigations is enormous, and the NDDB relies on the work that police officers diligently perform.

Crown prosecutors and judges are often the key second step in linking an offender to a crime scene. Crown prosecutors make the application for a DNA order to be issued when an offender is convicted of a secondary designated offence, and judges can issue the DNA order. When an offender is convicted of a primary designated offence, the judge has very little discretion not to issue the DNA order that grants officers the authority to collect biological samples from convicted offenders (see Appendix). In accordance with legislation, the NDDB must review any DNA order issued by the court to ensure that the offence listed on the order is a designated offence. The NDDB has a contact in the Attorney General's office of each province and territory for discussing DNA orders and submissions.

The three public forensic laboratories in Canada (RCMP National Forensic Laboratory Services in Ottawa, Edmonton and Vancouver; the Ontario provincial laboratory, Centre of Forensic Sciences in Toronto and Sault Ste. Marie; and the Quebec provincial laboratory, Laboratoire de sciences judiciaires et de médecine légale in Montréal) process biological samples collected at crime scenes. The DNA profiles are then uploaded to the Crime Scene Index via the Combined DNA Index System (CODIS) network, which is the specialized software that allows each of the public forensic laboratories to maintain a local DNA database while using a direct and secure line of communication to send DNA profile information to the NDDB. The NDDB provides the CODIS link to these laboratories through NDDB trained, dedicated CODIS operators at each site. The CODIS network allows the NDDB to connect possible suspects to crime scenes and quickly focus investigations. When such a connection is made, the public forensic laboratory is responsible for transmitting that information to the appropriate investigator(s).

The RCMP's Canadian Criminal Real Time Identification Services (CCRTIS) is the keeper of the documents that link an offender's identity to the unique identifying bar code number associated with each DNA profile. DNA profiles contained within the NDDB are identified only by a unique bar code number, and NDDB staff have no access to personal information regarding offenders. When a crime scene DNA profile matches a convicted offender DNA profile, the NDDB provides the unique bar code number to CCRTIS so that they can release the identity of the offender to the appropriate public forensic laboratory. CCRTIS also certifies the fingerprints provided with a DNA submission to confirm the identity of an offender.

The creation of the National Missing Persons DNA Program (NMPDP) represents an exciting new partnership between the National Centre for Missing Persons and Unidentified Remains (NCMPUR) and the NDDB.

The NMPDP launched on March 6, 2018, bringing with it three new humanitarian DNA indexes:

• The Missing Persons Index, which contains DNA profiles from missing persons found on personal effects
• The Relatives of Missing Persons Index, which contains DNA profiles voluntarily provided by relatives of missing persons
• The Human Remains Index, which contains DNA profiles of unidentified human remains

More than 70,000 Canadians are reported missing every year. While the majority are found within three months (85% are found within seven days), more than 500 new cases remain unresolved each year. Furthermore, approximately 100 sets of unidentified human remains are found every year. The new humanitarian DNA indexes allow DNA profiles developed from biological samples collected and submitted by police, coroners and medical examiners to be compared within the new humanitarian DNA indexes, and for the DNA profiles in the Missing Persons Index and those in the Human Remains Index to be compared to those within the Convicted Offenders and Crime Scene Indexes as well. The DNA profiles in the Relative of Missing Persons Index will only be compared to those in the Missing Persons Index and the Human Remains Index.

Without the contributions of these partners, the NDDB would not be the valuable policing tool it is today.

Rapport annuel de la Banque nationale de données génétiques 2017-2018

Sommaire

Le rapport annuel de la Banque nationale de données génétiques (BNDG) 2017-2018 est un compte rendu simple des processus opérationnels et des réalisations de la BNDG pour l'exercice 2017-2018.

Lorsque la BNDG a été créée en 2000, elle comportait au départ deux fichiers de profils d'ADN : le Fichier des condamnés, qui contient des profils d'ADN prélevés sur des contrevenants reconnus coupables, et le Fichier de criminalistique, qui contient des profils d'ADN recueillis sur des lieux de crime partout au Canada.

En mars 2018, des modifications législatives apportées à la Loi sur l'identification par les empreintes génétiques ont permis de créer cinq nouveaux fichiers : trois fichiers d'application humanitaire (le Fichier des personnes disparues, le Fichier des restes humains et le Fichier des familles des personnes disparues) et deux fichiers d'application criminelle (le Fichier des victimes et le Fichier des donneur volontaires). Ces nouveaux fichiers s'ajoutent aux outils dont les services de police, les coroners et les médecins légistes disposent pour résoudre des crimes, identifier des criminels en série et enquêter sur des personnes disparues et des restes non identifiés.

Cette année, le rapport annuel porte sur la collaboration et les partenariats qui contribuent à faire de la BNDG un outil précieux pour les services de police. Nous y présentons les façons dont les membres de la collectivité d'application de la loi (incluant les policiers, les juges et le personnel des laboratoires judiciaires) collaborent pour recueillir des échantillons, identifier des délinquants, soutenir les enquêtes de nature humanitaire et assurer la sécurité des collectivités.

Si vous souhaitez obtenir une copie en format PDF du rapport annuel complet de la BNDG 2017-2018, faites parvenir un courriel à NDDB-BNDG@rcmp-grc.gc.ca.

Faits et chiffres

Unis par un but commun

La collaboration est au cœur du succès de la Banque nationale de données génétiques (BNDG) qui a, au cours des 18 dernières années, contribué de façon importante à l'administration de la justice, grâce à quelques partenariats essentiels. La valeur qu'elle apporte aux enquêtes criminelles résulte directement des efforts de nombreuses personnes et organisations qui partagent un objectif commun : protéger la population et maintenir la sécurité des collectivités.

La BNDG joue un rôle crucial dans des enquêtes criminelles en identifiant rapidement les auteurs de crimes graves et en dissipant les soupçons à propos de personnes innocentes. Il arrive souvent qu'elle fasse le lien entre des autorités et différents services de police en reliant des crimes qui ont un suspect commun.

Il faut beaucoup de professionnels motivés et infatigables pour établir un dossier, recueillir et analyser la preuve, identifier un suspect et assurer le succès de la poursuite. Chaque partenaire joue un rôle important dans le processus et, cette année, nous braquons les projecteurs sur certains de ces partenaires et le travail qu'ils effectuent.

Les policiers sont en première ligne sur les lieux de crime où ils collectent des preuves. Les éléments probants qu'ils recueillent peuvent contribuer à élucider une affaire et à identifier un suspect. Ils prélèvent aussi des échantillons biologiques de contrevenants dès qu'un tribunal a rendu une ordonnance à cette fin. La BNDG fournie de la formation et du soutien aux policiers et agents de la paix canadiens qui s'occupent de la collecte et de la soumission d'échantillons biologiques de contrevenants condamnés. La valeur des preuves génétiques pour les enquêtes policières est considérable, et la BNDG compte sur le travail que les policiers effectuent avec diligence.

Les procureurs de la Couronne et les juges sont souvent le deuxième élément crucial du rapprochement entre un contrevenant et le lieu d'un crime. Ce sont les procureurs de la Couronne qui présentent une demande pour une ordonnance de prélèvement d'ADN lorsqu'un contrevenant est condamné pour une infraction secondaire, et les juges sont ceux qui autorisent l'ordonnance. Lors d'une condamnation pour une infraction primaire, un juge dispose de peu de pouvoir discrétionnaire et doit rendre l'ordonnance qui accorde aux policiers l'autorité de prélever des échantillons biologiques de contrevenants condamnés (voir l'annexe). Aux termes de la législation, la BNDG doit vérifier toute ordonnance rendue par un tribunal afin que l'infraction visée en soit une désignée. La BNDG a une personne-ressource au bureau du procureur général de chaque province et territoire afin de discuter des ordonnances de prélèvement d'ADN et des soumissions de données génétiques.

Les trois laboratoires judiciaires publics au Canada (les Services nationaux de laboratoire judiciaire de la GRC à Ottawa, Edmonton et Vancouver; le laboratoire provincial de l'Ontario, le Centre des sciences judiciaires à Toronto et Sault Ste. Marie; et le laboratoire provincial du Québec, le Laboratoire de sciences judiciaires et de médecine légale à Montréal) traitent les échantillons biologiques prélevés sur les lieux de crime. Les profils d'ADN sont téléchargés au fichier de criminalistique au moyen du Combined DNA Index System (CODIS), le logiciel spécialisé grâce auquel chacun des laboratoires judiciaires publics tient une base de données génétiques locale et utilise une ligne de communication directe et sécurisée pour acheminer des données génétiques à la BNDG. Le lien au réseau CODIS dont disposent les laboratoires est fourni par la BNDG qui a du personnel formé aux fins du CODIS dans chacune des installations. Le réseau CODIS permet à la BNDG de faire un rapprochement entre des suspects possibles et des lieux de crime et d'orienter rapidement les enquêtes. Lorsqu'un tel rapprochement est fait, le laboratoire judiciaire public a la responsabilité de transmettre l'information aux enquêteurs concernés.

Les Services canadiens d'identification criminelle en temps réel (SCICTR) de la GRC sont les gardiens des documents qui relient l'identité d'un contrevenant au numéro du code-barres d'identification unique associé à chaque profil d'ADN que contient la BNDG. Tous les profils ont un identifiant unique, leur code-barres, et le personnel de la BNDG n'a pas accès aux renseignements personnels à propos des contrevenants. Lorsqu'un profil de criminalistique concorde avec le profil d'ADN d'un contrevenant, la BNDG fournit le numéro du code-barres unique aux SCICTR pour que l'identité du contrevenant soit communiquée au laboratoire judiciaire public approprié. Les SCICTR certifient aussi le dactylogramme fourni avec la transmission de données génétiques afin de confirmer l'identité d'un contrevenant.

La création du Programme national d'ADN pour les personnes disparues (PNAPD) constitue un nouveau partenariat bénéfique entre le Centre national pour les personnes disparues et restes non identifiés (CNPDRN) et la BNDG.

Le PNAPD a été inauguré le 6 mars 2018, ainsi que trois nouveaux fichiers d'ADN constitués à des fins humanitaires :

• le fichier des personnes disparues, qui contient les profils d'ADN de personnes disparues établis à partir d'effets personnels;
• le fichier des familles des personnes disparues, qui contient des profils d'ADN fournis volontairement par des membres de la famille de personnes disparues; et
• le fichier des restes humains, qui contient des profils d'ADN de restes humains non identifiés.

Chaque année, plus de 70 000 Canadiens sont portés disparus. Bien qu'on les retrouve en général avant trois mois (85 % en moins de sept jours), au-delà de 500 nouveaux cas restent non résolus tous les ans. Par ailleurs, une centaine d'ensembles de restes humains non identifiés sont découverts annuellement. Avec les nouveaux fichiers d'ADN constitués à des fins humanitaires, les profils d'ADN établis à partir d'échantillons biologiques recueillis et soumis par la police, des coroners et des médecins légistes peuvent être comparés aux profils d'ADN des nouveaux fichiers constitués à des fins humanitaires. Les profils d'ADN du fichier des personnes disparues et du fichier des restes humains peuvent être comparés à ceux du fichier des condamnés et du fichier de criminalistique. Les profils d'ADN du fichier des familles des personnes disparues seront uniquement comparés à ceux du fichier des personnes disparues et du fichier des restes humains.

Sans la contribution de ces partenaires, la BNDG ne serait pas l'outil essentiel qui occupe aujourd'hui une place grandissante dans le travail policier.

Remotely Piloted Aircraft System (RPAS) Program

Executive Summary

The Remotely Piloted Aircraft System (RPAS) Program is used by the RCMP to capture aerial images and videos in support of RCMP operations. A RPAS is a power-driven aircraft where its components, such as a camera, are operated without a flight crew member on board. It is also commonly referred to as a drone, Small Unmanned Aircraft (SUA), Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV), and Unmanned Aerial System (UAS). The RCMP currently operates several different systems that carry both still and video cameras, infrared cameras or thermal imagery. When in operation, the RPAS is flown by a pilot remotely, while a payload operator is responsible to capture any images and video.

The RPAS program started in Saskatchewan in January 2010 with one RPAS used for collision reconstruction. RPAS have since advanced RCMP operations in the areas of crime scene investigation, forensic collision reconstruction, search and rescue, monitoring critical incidents, Emergency Response Team (ERT), border integrity, VIP events, surveillance and researching RPA countermeasures. The RCMP does not use RPAS to perform widespread surveillance under normal circumstances. RPAS are used for surveillance purposes only with prior judicial authorization, or where urgent or exigent circumstances make it impractical to first obtain a search warrant. The RCMP currently operates several different systems that carry both still and video cameras, infrared cameras or thermal imagery. Additional payloads such as magnetometers, hyperspectral imaging, and LASER/LIDAR technology are also being examined. These advances contribute to the success of the RCMP's mission of preserving the peace, upholding the law and providing quality service in partnership with our communities. The RPAS Program is designed to add value to evidence gathered during an investigation and should not be relied on as the sole source of evidence.

All information obtained via RPAS is manually transferred from an SD card to a workstation in a secured RCMP building. Following the transfer of information to the workstation, it is deemed either evidentiary, administrative, or transitory in nature. Evidentiary information is passed to the lead investigator of an occurrence (event) and associated to it through the RCMP Operational Records Management Systems (O/RMS) called Police Reporting and Occurrence System (PROS). Evidentiary information is retained by the RCMP for a minimum of two years and until it no longer has business value, at which point it will be destroyed or made anonymous if kept only for statistical and research purposes. Administrative and transitory information is retained for a predetermined period of time before being disposed of.

RPAS strengthen the RCMP's ability to achieve its mandate of preventing and investigating crime; maintaining peace and order; enforcing laws; contributing to national security; ensuring the safety of state officials and visiting dignitaries; and providing vital operational support services to other police and law enforcement agencies within Canada. RPAS are able to provide an overhead view on a scene to support RCMP members, helping the RCMP provide the highest quality service.

The RCMP is committed to safeguarding personal information collected and continuously reviews its policies and procedures to ensure compliance to federal legislation.

Le Programme des systèmes d’aéronef télépiloté (SATP)

Résumé

Le Programme des systèmes d'aéronef télépiloté (SATP) permet à la Gendarmerie royale du Canada (GRC) de prendre des photos et des vidéos aériennes à l'appui des opérations de la GRC. Un SATP est un aéronef motopropulsé dont les composants, comme une caméra ou un appareil photo, sont utilisés sans membre d'équipage à bord. Ces systèmes sont aussi souvent appelés drones, petits aéronefs sans pilote, véhicules aériens sans pilote ou systèmes d'aéronef sans pilote. À l'heure actuelle, la GRC utilise plusieurs systèmes différents dotés d'appareils photo et de caméras vidéo, de caméras infrarouges ou de caméras thermiques. En vol, le SATP est télécommandé par un pilote, tandis qu'un opérateur de charge utile est responsable de prendre les photos et les vidéos.

Le Programme des SATP a été lancé en janvier 2010 en Saskatchewan avec un SATP utilisé pour la reconstitution de collisions. Les SATP ont depuis contribué aux opérations de la GRC en matière d'enquêtes sur les lieux de crime, de reconstitution judiciaire de collisions, de recherche et sauvetage, de surveillance d'incidents critiques, de Groupes tactiques d'intervention (GTI), d'intégrité des frontières, d'événements accueillant des personnes de marque, de surveillance et de recherche de contre-mesures SATP. Normalement, la GRC n'utilise pas les SATP pour effectuer des surveillances à grande échelle. Les SATP ne sont utilisés à des fins de surveillance qu'avec une autorisation judiciaire préalable, ou dans une situation urgente ou pressante qui fait qu'il est difficile d'obtenir un mandat de perquisition préalable. À l'heure actuelle, la GRC utilise plusieurs systèmes différents dotés d'appareils photo et de caméras vidéo, de caméras infrarouges ou de caméras thermiques. Elle envisage en outre de doter les SATP de magnétomètres, de dispositifs de radiométrie spectrale imageante et de dispositifs laser et lidar. Ces progrès contribuent au succès de la mission de la GRC, qui consiste à maintenir la paix, à assurer le respect de la loi et à offrir un service de qualité de concert avec les communautés qu'elle sert. Le Programme des SATP sert à ajouter de la valeur aux preuves recueillies au cours d'une enquête, et ne devrait pas constituer la seule source de preuves.

Toute information obtenue à l'aide d'un SATP est transférée manuellement d'une carte mémoire SD à un poste de travail dans un immeuble sécurisé de la GRC. Cela fait, on détermine si l'information est de nature probante, administrative ou éphémère. Les renseignements probants sont transmis à l'enquêteur chargé d'un incident (événement), et associés à cet incident dans le système de gestion des dossiers opérationnels (SGDO) de la GRC appelé Système d'incidents et de rapports de police (SIRP). Les renseignements probants sont conservés par la GRC pendant une période minimale de deux ans, et jusqu'à ce qu'ils n'aient plus de valeur opérationnelle. Les renseignements administratifs ou éphémères sont conservés pour une période prédéterminée avant d'être détruits.

Les SATP renforcent la capacité de la GRC à réaliser son mandat, soit prévenir la criminalité et faire enquête sur celle-ci, maintenir l'ordre et la paix, appliquer la loi, contribuer au maintien de la sécurité nationale, assurer la sécurité des représentants d'État et des dignitaires, et fournir des services de soutien opérationnel essentiels à d'autres services de police et organismes d'application de la loi au pays. Les SATP peuvent fournir une vue aérienne d'un lieu pour soutenir les membres de la GRC, et donc aider la GRC à fournir un service de la plus haute qualité.

La GRC est déterminée à protéger les renseignements personnels recueillis et à réviser continuellement ses politiques et procédures afin de se conformer aux dispositions législatives fédérales.

Évaluation du Plan d'action Par-delà la frontière – programme Shiprider - Sommaire

Aperçu du programme

Le programme Shiprider, établi en 2012-2013, s'inscrit dans le plan d'action Par-delà la frontière et vise à empêcher l'exploitation de la frontière canado-américaine dans un dessein de criminalité transnationale. Il fait disparaître l'obstacle aux mesures d'application de la loi que représente la frontière maritime internationale en permettant de mener, de façon continue et homogène, des opérations de sécurité et de répression transfrontalières. L'équipage conjoint des navires utilisés dans le cadre du programme est constitué d'agents spécialement formés et désignés du Canada et des États-Unis, qui sont autorisés à faire respecter la loi des deux côtés de la frontière internationale. Le rôle de la GRC est de mener des enquêtes ayant trait à la sécurité nationale et à la criminalité transnationale, ainsi que de permettre l'interception des personnes qui tentent de traverser illégalement la frontière en passant par l'eau. La GRC et la United States Coast Guard (USCG) sont les autorités centrales chargées du programme Shiprider.

Objet de l'évaluation

L'évaluation a porté sur la pertinence et l'efficacité du programme Shiprider au cours de la période allant d'avril 2012 à mars 2017. De nombreuses sources de données ont été analysées pour servir d'assise aux constatations et aux recommandations énoncées dans le rapport.

Constatations

Il y a lieu de maintenir le programme Shiprider puisqu'il s'agit d'une initiative de collaboration unique et spécialisée qui freine la criminalité transfrontalière sur les voies navigables communes au Canada et aux États-Unis. Le besoin varie selon le lieu géographique, le volume de circulation sur l'eau et les activités criminelles connues. Aucune autre initiative connue ne remplit la même fonction que le programme Shiprider.

Le programme Shiprider est conforme aux priorités et aux objectifs stratégiques du gouvernement fédéral et de la GRC du fait qu'il contribue à la sécurité du Canada et qu'il appuie sa relation avec les États-Unis.

Le partenariat entre la GRC et la USCG est essentiel à l'exécution du programme Shiprider, car les deux parties doivent être présentes lors des patrouilles afin de réprimer la criminalité transfrontalière.

La GRC et la USCG qualifient leur partenariat de positif et d'efficace, expliquant qu'il leur permet de tirer profit des domaines d'expertise propres à chaque organisation.

L'évaluation n'a pas permis de déterminer si l'exécution du programme Shiprider se faisait comme prévu. Bien que le mandat du programme soit bien défini et compris, l'étude documentaire et les entrevues ont révélé que l'exécution du programme est censée être axée sur le renseignement. Les évaluateurs n'ont pas trouvé des preuves suffisantes pour conclure que le programme Shiprider était mené conformément à cet objectif.

D'après les preuves recueillies lors de l'étude documentaire et des entrevues, les rôles et les responsabilités liés au programme Shiprider étaient variés, mais ils avaient été définis et ils étaient généralement compris du personnel.

L'absence de données sur le rendement du programme a limité la capacité d'obtenir un tableau complet sur ce point, par exemple de déterminer si les ressources consacrées au programme étaient suffisantes pour en assurer l'exécution réussie. Ce manque de données avait aussi été constaté dans le rapport du Bureau du vérificateur général publié à l'automne 2016 sur le plan d'action Par-delà la frontière. L'incidence du programme Shiprider et sa contribution à la prévention de la criminalité transfrontalière n'étaient donc pas claires.

Recommandations

Deux recommandations ont été formulées à la lumière constatations ressorties de l'évaluation :

• Revoir la méthode d'exécution du programme Shiprider afin d'assurer sa prestation en fonction des orientations établies et sa conformité aux priorités actuelles de la Police fédérale.
• Recueillir des données sur le rendement qui mesurent adéquatement les résultats globaux attendus du programme Shiprider et qui appuient la prise de décisions.

Evaluation of the Beyond the Border Action Plan - Shiprider Program - Summary

About the program

The Beyond the Border Action Plan - Shiprider Program (Shiprider) was established in 2012-13 with the expected result of preventing criminals from leveraging the Canada-U.S. border to commit transnational crime. Shiprider removes the international maritime boundary as a barrier to law enforcement by enabling seamless continuity of enforcement and security operations across the border. It involves vessels crewed by specially trained and designated Canadian and U.S. law enforcement officers who are authorized to enforce the law on both sides of the international boundary line. The RCMP's role is to pursue national security and transnational investigations, and to make it possible to interdict individuals attempting to illegally cross the border by water. The RCMP and United States Coast Guard (USCG) are the Central Authorities for Shiprider.

What we examined

The evaluation assessed the relevance and effectiveness of the Shiprider program between April 2012 and March 2017. Multiple lines of evidence were analyzed to support the findings and recommendations of the report.

What we found

There is a continued need for Shiprider, as it is a unique and specialized program that through a cooperative approach, combats cross-border criminality on Canadian and U.S. shared waterways. The need is dependent upon geographical locations, amount of vessel traffic and known criminal activity. There are no known programs that duplicate Shiprider.

Shiprider is aligned with federal government and RCMP priorities and strategic outcomes as it contributes to the safety and security of Canada and supports Canada's relationship with the U.S.

The partnership between the RCMP and USCG is essential to the delivery of Shiprider, as both parties must be present during patrols in order to combat cross-border criminality.

The RCMP and USCG described their partnership as positive and effective and explained it allowed them to benefit from each other's unique areas of expertise.

The evaluation was unable to determine if Shiprider was being delivered as intended. While Shiprider has a well-defined and understood mandate, documents and interviews indicated that Shiprider's delivery approach is to be intelligence-led. The evaluation did not find sufficient evidence that Shiprider was progressing towards this desired state.

From evidence gathered from document reviews and interviews, the Shiprider roles and responsibilities were varied but defined and generally understood by Shiprider personnel.

A lack of available performance data limited the ability to tell a complete performance story, including whether resources were adequate for the successful delivery of Shiprider. The lack of performance data is consistent with the findings from the Office of the Auditor General's Fall 2016 Report on the Beyond the Border Action Plan. The impact of Shiprider and its contribution to the prevention of cross-border criminality was unclear.

What we recommend

Based on the findings of the evaluation, the following two recommendations were made:

• Review and revise the Shiprider delivery approach to ensure the program is being delivered as intended and is aligned with current Federal Policing priorities.
• Collect performance data that adequately measures the overall Shiprider expected results and supports decision-making.

National DNA Data Bank

1. About the Program

The National DNA Data Bank (NDDB) is a national database of DNA profiles, used to identify, link and investigate individuals involved in designated offences, and to assist in the investigation of missing persons and unidentified human remains. It is administered by the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) Forensic Science and Identification Services (FS&IS), and operates under the stewardship of the RCMP's National Police Services (NPS) program.

The NDDB was established in June 2000 through the enactment of the DNA Identification Act. It is Canada's only comprehensive database for the recording and rapid retrieval of DNA profiles related to designated offences, and is used by law enforcement officials across Canada to assist in criminal investigations.

In December 2014, the DNA Identification Act was amended to expand the NDDB and the use of DNA analysis by the RCMP so as to assist in the investigation of missing persons and unidentified human remains. These amendments came into force on March 6, 2018. Under the amended Act, the NDDB was expanded to create five new DNA indices: the Relatives of Missing Person Index (RMI), the Missing Persons Index (MPI), the Human Remains Index (HRI), the Victims Index (VI), and the Voluntary Donors Index (VDI).

The RMI, MPI and HRI were created primarily to assist investigators (law enforcement, coroners and medical examiners) in the humanitarian investigation of missing persons and identification of human remains. This provides officials with a nationally coordinated tool to advance these investigations where all other investigative options have been exhausted. The VI and VDI were created primarily for criminal investigation purposes. They allow for the collection of biological samples from victims and other volunteers.

2. Scope of the Privacy Impact Assessment (PIA)

In 2016-2017, a PIA was undertaken with respect to the NDDB. The purpose of the PIA was to identify and analyze the potential privacy impacts associated with the collection, use, disclosure and retention of personal information by the RCMP in the operation and administration of the NDDB, and to identify and mitigate new risks arising from the creation of new DNA indices under the amended DNA Identification Act.

The PIA provides evidence of the RCMP's continuing compliance with legislative requirements concerning privacy, and fulfills its obligation to report key program privacy risks and mitigation plans to senior management.

The NDDB PIA was completed under the direction of the NDDB's Director of Science and Strategic Partnerships. Its focus is on the operation and administration of the NDDB by the RCMP. Although the PIA speaks incidentally to the law enforcement activities of other police forces, including the collection of biological samples by local police agencies, it does not include a review of agency-specific practices with respect to the collection and use of those samples. Federal, provincial and municipal users of the NDDB (including those at the RCMP) are expected to conduct their own respective PIAs to ensure that their personal information handling practices are compliant with the law.

3. Privacy Analysis

As confirmed by the PIA, the inherent risks arising from the operation and administration of the NDDB are considered to be moderate to high. Recommendations from the present PIA however, as implemented by the RCMP, are expected to reduce these risks to an acceptable (or low) level.

4. Risk Area Identification and Categorization

A: Type of Program or Activity

On a scale of 1 to 4, the program (NDDB) level of risk to privacy is rated as a level 4 as it involves personal information used for investigations and enforcement in a criminal context (i.e. resulting matches may lead to criminal charges/sanctions or deportation for reasons of national security or criminal enforcement).

B: Type of Personal Information Involved and Context

On a scale of 1 to 4, the type of Personal Information involved in NDDB and the Context is rated as a level 4 as it refers to sensitive personal information, including detailed profiles, allegations or suspicions, bodily samples and/or the context surrounding the personal information is particularly sensitive.

C: Program or Activity Partners and Private Sector Involvement

On a scale of 1 to 4, the program (NDDB) activity is rated as a level 4 as it involves private sector organizations or international organizations or foreign governments in addition to federal/ provincial and/or municipal government(s), other federal institutions and within the department (amongst one or more programs within the department).

D: Duration of the Program or Activity

On a scale of 1 to 3, the duration of the program (NDDB) or activity is rated as a level 3 risk to privacy because it is a long-term program – an existing program that has been modified or is established with no clear "sunset".

E: Program Population

On a scale of 1 to 4, the program is rated as a level 3 because it affects certain individuals for external administrative purposes.

F: Technology and Privacy

The program (NDDB) or activity does not involve the implementation of a new electronic system, software or application program including collaborative software (or groupware) that is implemented to support the program or activity in terms of the creation, collection or handling of personal information.

The program or activity does not require substantial modifications to Information Technology legacy systems and/or services.

The program or activity does not involve the implementation of potentially privacy invasive technologies.

G: Personal Information Transmission

On a scale of 1 to 4, the program (NDDB) level of risk to privacy for personal information transmission is rated as a level 3 as the personal information may be printed or transferred to a portable device.

H: Risk Impact to the Individual or Employee

On a scale of 1 to 4, the program is rated as a level 4 as the impact may involve physical harm, including restrictions to an individual's freedom of movement or association.

I: Risk Impact to the Department

On a scale of 1 to 4, the program risk impact to the department is rated as a level 4 as it may involve reputation harm, embarrassment, loss of credibility. Furthermore, it may decrease confidence by the public, place elected officials under the spotlight, compromise departmental strategic outcome, compromise government priority, and impact on the Government of Canada Outcome areas.

Banque nationale de données génétiques

1. Au sujet du programme

La Banque nationale de données génétiques (BNDG) est une base de données nationale qui sert à identifier des individus, à établir des liens et à orienter les enquêtes sur les personnes impliquées dans des infractions désignées, et à soutenir les enquêtes sur des personnes disparues et des restes humains non identifiés. Elle est administrée par les Services des sciences judiciaires et de l'identité (SSJI) et relève du programme des Services nationaux de police (SNP) de la Gendarmerie Royale du Canada (GRC).

La BNDG a été établie en juin 2000 à la suite de l'adoption de la Loi sur l'identification par les empreintes génétiques. Il s'agit de la seule banque de données au Canada permettant l'enregistrement et la récupération rapide de profils génétiques dans le contexte d'infractions désignées. Elle est exploitée par les responsables d'organismes canadiens d'application de la loi à l'appui d'enquêtes criminelles.

En décembre 2014, la Loi sur l'identification par les empreintes génétiques a été modifiée de façon à élargir la portée de la BNDG et l'application de l'analyse génétique à la GRC pour soutenir les enquêtes sur les personnes disparues et les restes humains non identifiés. Les modifications à la loi sont entrées en vigueur le 6 mars 2018. La BNDG comprend depuis cinq nouveaux fichiers : le fichier des familles des personnes disparues (FFPD), le fichier des personnes disparues (FPD), le fichier des restes humains (FRH), le fichier des victimes (FV) et le fichier des donneurs volontaires (FDV).

Le FFPD, le FPD et le FRH ont été créés essentiellement pour aider les responsables (policiers, coroners et médecins légistes) dans les enquêtes d'ordre humanitaire sur les personnes disparues et l'identification des restes humains. Il s'agit de fournir un nouvel outil national coordonné pour faire avancer ces enquêtes là où d'autres méthodes ont échoué. Le FV et le FDV, quant à eux, servent principalement aux enquêtes criminelles en permettant le prélèvement d'échantillons biologiques auprès de victimes et de donneurs volontaires.

2. Portée de l'Évaluation des facteurs relatifs à la vie privée (EFVP)

En 2016-2017, une EFVP sur la BNDG a été entreprise. Le but était de déterminer et d'analyser les répercussions éventuelles sur la vie privée de la collecte, de l'utilisation, de la divulgation et de la conservation de renseignements personnels par la GRC relié à l'exploitation et l'administration de la BNDG. De plus, l'évaluation permettait d'identifier et d'atténuer les risques découlant de la création de nouveaux fichiers génétiques en vertu des modifications apportées à la Loi sur l'identification par les empreintes génétiques.

L'EFVP montre que la GRC respecte les exigences législatives en matière de vie privée, et remplit son obligation de signaler à la direction les principaux risques du programme pour la vie privée ainsi que les plans d'atténuation en la matière.

L'EFVP a été effectuée sous la direction du directeur des Sciences et Partenariats stratégiques et portait sur l'exploitation et l'administration de la BNDG par la GRC. Si l'évaluation reflète accessoirement les activités d'autres services de police, y compris le prélèvement d'échantillons biologiques, elle ne constitue pas un examen des pratiques de ces services pour ce qui est du prélèvement et de l'exploitation de ces échantillons. Les utilisateurs fédéraux, provinciaux et municipaux de la BNDG (dont les utilisateurs à la GRC) sont tenus d'exécuter leur propre EFVP afin de faire en sorte que leurs pratiques de traitement des renseignements personnels sont conformes à la loi.

3. Analyse des facteurs relatifs à la vie privée

Comme le confirme l'EFVP, les risques inhérents à l'exploitation et à l'administration de la BNDG sont évalués de moyens à élevés. Toutefois, les recommandations issues de la présente évaluation, telles que mises en oeuvre par la GRC, devraient permettre de réduire ces risques à un degré acceptable (soit faible).

4. Détermination et catégorisation des éléments de risque

A : Type de programme ou d'activité

Sur une échelle de 1 à 4, le degré de risque pour les renseignements personnels au sein du programme est évalué à 4, car il touche les renseignements personnels exploités dans les enquêtes et l'application de la loi dans un contexte criminel (c.-à-d. que les correspondances établies peuvent entraîner le dépôt d'accusations criminelles et l'imposition de sanctions pénales, voire l'expulsion d'un sujet pour des raisons de sécurité nationale ou de répression criminelle).

B : Type de renseignements personnels recueillis et contexte

Sur une échelle de 1 à 4, le genre de renseignements personnels recueillis dans la BNDG et le contexte sont évalués à 4, car il s'agit de renseignements personnels de nature délicate, incluant des profils détaillés, des allégations ou des soupçons, des échantillons de substances corporelles, et/ou le contexte des renseignements personnels est de nature particulièrement délicate.

C : Participation des partenaires et du secteur privé au programme ou à l'activité

Sur une échelle de 1 à 4, les activités du programme (BNDG) sont évaluées à 4, car elles touchent des organisations du secteur privé ou d'envergure internationale, ou encore des gouvernements étrangers, en plus des gouvernements fédéral, provinciaux ou municipaux, d'autres institutions fédérales ou au sein de l'institution (d'autres programmes au sein de l'institution).

D : Durée du programme ou de l'activité

Sur une échelle de 1 à 3, la durée du programme ou de l'activité (BNDG) est évaluée comme risque de degré 3 pour les renseignements personnels, car il s'agit d'un programme à long terme – un programme existant qui a fait l'objet de modifications ou qui ne fait pas l'objet de dispositions de réexamen.

E : Personnes concernées par le programme

Sur une échelle de 1 à 4, le programme est évalué au degré 3, parce qu'il touche certains individus à des fins administratives externes.

F : Technologie et vie privée

Le programme ou l'activité (BNDG) ne comprend pas la mise en œuvre d'un nouveau système électronique, logiciel ou programme d'application incluant un collecticiel (ou logiciel de groupe) qui sera mis sur pied afin de créer, collecter ou traiter les renseignements personnels dans le but de soutenir le programme ou l'activité.

Le programme ou l'activité ne nécessite pas de modifications importantes à des services ou systèmes de hérités des technologies de l'information.

Le programme ou l'activité n'exige pas la mise en œuvre de technologies intrusives dans la vie privée.

G : Transmission des renseignements personnels

Sur une échelle de 1 à 4, le degré de risque pour les renseignements personnels sur le plan de la transmission est évalué à 3, car les renseignements personnels peuvent être imprimés ou transférés à un dispositif portatif.

H : Risque pour l'individu ou l'employé

Sur une échelle de 1 à 4, le programme est évalué au degré 4, car les facteurs relatifs à la vie privée peuvent entraîner un préjudice physique, notamment des contraintes pour la liberté de mouvement ou d'association d'une personne.

I : Risque pour l'institution

Sur une échelle de 1 à 4, le risque pour l'institution est évalué au degré 4, car il y a risque d'un préjudice à sa réputation, d'embarras ou de perte de crédibilité. De plus, il y a risque d'affaiblir la confiance du public, de placer des responsables élus sur la sellette, de compromettre les résultats stratégiques de l'institution, de compromettre les priorités du gouvernement et d'avoir des répercussions sur les secteurs de résultats du gouvernement du Canada.

Frequently asked questions - Individual Web Services

On this page

• Checking your application status
• Registering your firearms
• Renewing your licence
• Signing up to use the system
• Printing

Checking your application status

My application status information doesn't tell me what I want to know. Where can I get more detail?

The application status displayed online is of a general nature and will typically inform you if your application has been received, is in processing or has been finalized. If your application has been sent by mail, please allow 2-4 weeks for the application to be entered into the system. For more detailed information you may wish to contact the CFP directly by calling 1-800-731-4000.

Registering your firearms

Is my firearm registered once I submit it online? Will I be able to print the registration certificate?

No. The online registration tool allows you to submit your application but it still must go through several stages of validation to ensure you maintain a valid licence and privileges for that firearm.

You will receive a confirmation number to prove your registration is in progress and you are making every attempt to comply with the law, however you will not be able to print the registration certificate.

You may be contacted for additional information to process your registration application.

I need to register my firearm but I don't have access to the Internet. What do I do?

Public access to the Internet is available at kiosks in libraries and Internet cafes. There is no requirement to use the online service to register your firearm; you are still free to renew by paper form available for download on the website or by mail by contacting the CFP.

Renewing your licence

Does the online licence renewal apply to business firearms licences?

No. There is no functionality to renew a business licence online at this time.

Is my licence renewed once I submit it online?

No. The online renewals tool allows you to submit your application but it still must go through several stages of validation to ensure you remain qualified to maintain a valid licence and privileges.

You will receive a confirmation number to prove your renewal is in progress.

You may be contacted for additional information to process your renewal application.

Signing up to use the system

Why am I asked to update my profile with an e-mail address?

Like individuals, businesses and other government services, the CFP is gradually transitioning from paper correspondence to electronic messaging like email. This is a cost-saving benefit to taxpayers, as well as providing a faster, easily available communication to clients. Email is virtually instant, especially as more and more clients use mobile devices to receive emails while on-the-go.

In the future the CFP will be able to offer clients the choice to e-mail vital updates and communications about your licence in a timely manner.

If you don't have an e-mail account, set one up by searching "free e-mail services" on the Internet.

Printing

I can't print a document from the system. What should I do?

If you are able to save and open the document, but cannot print it, you may have a problem with your printer. Make sure the printer cable is properly plugged into your computer or that your wireless router is working properly if you have a wireless connection.

If you are still unable to print, you should either review your print manual or seek outside technical assistance.

Date de modification :

1969-12-31