RCMP Response to the MacNeil Report (Independent Review - Moncton Shooting - June 4, 2014)
"This is why, individually and organizationally, we have the patience to sweat the small stuff even when – actually, especially when – pursuing major goals. We've learned the hardest way possible how much little things matter."
In the days following the murder of our members, I referred to Justin Bourque as a monster. At that moment, I didn't know how else to understand him or what he'd done. Even as the words left my mouth, I knew we would have to come quickly to a better understanding of who he was and how he was able to murder our three colleagues.
I asked recently retired Assistant Commissioner Alphonse MacNeil to take on this task because I knew he could bring us that understanding, position the Force to learn from this tragedy and recommend any changes we'd need to make.
Having members or employees killed on duty strikes us all profoundly. No one more profoundly than the family members, friends and colleagues of the fallen. Each of us must develop and manage our own grieving and loss strategies so as to go on with life in the face of the senseless murder of our loved ones. This hurt never goes away.
Dave, Fabrice and Doug are heroes. They sacrificed their lives in the call to duty. They, like all of the brave men and women of the Force who responded to this dangerous situation, did what they did so that others could be safe. They went towards danger with incredible courage drawn from their life commitment to protecting the citizens we are so proud to serve. All Canadians are grateful and amazed by their courage and professionalism. That will never change.
The repeated analysis, court appearances, media reports and opinions generated in the wake of these murders only make the grieving process more difficult. But there is no escaping that they are necessary for us all to understand what happened. There is no better source of the facts of what happened here than the authoritative and precise account provided in our criminal investigation of these murders. We now know what took place on June 4, 2014 and the killer has pleaded guilty in the face of this powerful account of his actions. I am grateful for the professionalism, thoroughness and courage of our investigative team who so ably put this case together so quickly.
The court proceedings and associated records provide answers for most but not all of our questions. We have a duty to critically analyse what happened with a view not to assigning blame – there is only one person responsible for these murders – but rather to improving our operations in the future. It's not reasonable or practical to expect perfection in the face of such an unprecedented situation, but when we self-analyse and critically debrief ourselves, perfection is what we must put our performance against. That is how we learn from our successes and our mistakes. That is what makes us professionals. In this spirit, I asked Assistant Commissioner (ret'd) MacNeil 13 difficult questions and in the result he has provided us with his analysis and recommendations.
Chris Hadfield's recent book An Astronaut's Guide to Life on Earth has a chapter called "Sweating the Small Stuff". In it, he talks about how, in both his flying and astronaut careers, he and his teammates would continually self-assess and critically debrief one another without fear of personal retribution or animosity in an effort to "get it right". When lives are on the line, we've got to get it right. All of us in the Force would do well to apply this critical analysis to the things we do every day.
Policing is a dangerous profession; lives are on the line and we can never be sure how or where or when the next deadly threat will present itself. No one saw Bourque coming and we cannot conduct our affairs with the citizens we serve in a way that has us seeing a Justin Bourque around every corner. But we do need to think and prepare for the next Bourque. As our honour roll sadly confirms, there has always been and there will continue to be deadly threats to police officers in this country. It is our obligation - our duty - to make sure that we can be as prepared as humanly possible to meet these threats, having regard for who we are and where we live. That's why this report is as frank as it is and our action plan is as clear as it is; we must learn from this tragedy. We have and we will.
The MacNeil Report is a comprehensive and critical assessment of what took place. There are 64 recommendations, many of which can be adopted in the short term. Some recommendations have already been implemented and work is being done on many others. A few of the recommendations will require a more complex response and substantial follow-up. We have prepared an action plan that transparently lays out our response to the recommendations and we will track our progress towards implementation.
There will be some public discussion, debate and even criticism about the contents of the Report and that is to be expected. I am satisfied that the Report canvasses all aspects of our response and provides us with a solid basis to make improvements to our response to this type of threat.
I would like to thank Alphonse MacNeil and his team, and the employees and individuals who contributed to the preparation of the report. It can't have been easy going over these circumstances with a critical eye but, in the end, the Report will prepare us for the next monster so that we don't have to endure this kind of loss again. Let me close by thanking the families, friends and colleagues of our fallen members for their forbearance and courage through this impossibly difficult time.
The evening of Wednesday, June 4, 2014 was marked by tragedy. Constables Fabrice Gevaudan, Douglas Larche, and Dave Ross were murdered and Constables Eric Dubois and Darlene Goguen were wounded. RCMP members were the specific target of the shooter Justin Bourque, but an entire community's sense of safety and security was undermined.
The initial events of June 4, 2014 unfolded quickly. At 7:18 p.m., the first 911 call alerted police to an armed man in camouflage walking in a Moncton neighborhood. Officers were immediately dispatched and established a perimeter. At 7:47 p.m., when police first confronted and called out to Bourque, he immediately turned and fired upon them, killing Constable Gevaudan. Within two minutes, Constable Ross was shot and killed and, in the subsequent 18 minutes, Constables Dubois and Goguen were wounded and Constable Larche was shot and killed. A total of 29 hours passed from the first 911 call until the time Bourque was apprehended.
The nature of this tragedy and deaths of our members demand that we understand the facts of the event and our response in order to learn from them and enhance the safety of our officers and the community in the future. As such, on June 30, 2014, the RCMP asked Assistant Commissioner Alphonse MacNeil (retired) to conduct an independent review to better understand all facets surrounding the Moncton shooting and make recommendations that could improve our response to these types of events. Mr. MacNeil submitted his final review (the Report) to the RCMP on December 1, 2014.
The Report concludes that the initial RCMP officer response was robust, appropriate, and displayed correct risk assessment and decision-making. Members were effectively directed to the right locations by the Operational Communications Centre personnel, who obtained adequate detail during the initial calls. The information was broadcast and a sufficient number of members were dispatched to the area where Bourque was last seen. Further, it finds that the decision of the first officers who arrived on scene, set up a perimeter, acquired visual contact of Bourque, and directed citizens into their homes and away from danger was the correct response and contributed to the community's safety.
The Report also highlights the benefits of the use of social media to provide timely and accurate information to the public. The citizens of Moncton quickly moved to rely on RCMP social and traditional media updates as their main, trusted source of information during the event. This, in turn, allowed the public to quickly respond to directions from the RCMP to stay indoors and to turn on the lights outside to make it easier to survey the area.
In a short period of time, the RCMP amassed a significant number of human and material resources. More than 300 law enforcement officers were involved in ensuring the safety of the community during the event. This included the New Brunswick municipal forces of Bathurst, Miramichi, Fredericton and Saint John, RCMP members from several other provinces, and many other personnel from specialized units.
The collaboration of RCMP members and the other police forces, along with the assistance of the citizens of Moncton, led to the resolution of this situation. As noted in the Report, it is important to reiterate the key role the community of Moncton played during the incident. The actions of the citizens of Moncton to provide detailed information of sightings of the shooter, assist injured officers, or follow the direction from law enforcement personnel during the 29-hour community lockdown, allowed the RCMP to continue their police operations and secure the safety of the community.
After the initial shooting,the Report notes that the subsequent operation was successful, given Bourque's arrest and no further casualties. Following the arrest, the Report finds that the overall provision of aftercare for employees and families was well coordinated and responsive to their needs. The Report specifically notes that the effectiveness of this care was due to the dedication of people charged with this work. Support was and continues to be provided to ensure the well-being of RCMP members and staff, their families, and volunteers involved.
The investigation of this event was impressive and led to the successful prosecution of Bourque. Despite the complexity of processing numerous crime scenes, conducting countless interviews and compiling all the forensic evidence, Crown counsel approved the applicable charges that resulted in a guilty plea. Bourque was convicted of three counts of first-degree murder and two counts of attempted murder and, on October 31, 2014, was sentenced to life in prison with no chance of parole for 75 years.
While complimentary of many facets of the RCMP response to this situation, as mandated, the Report contains 64 recommendations. These can be grouped under five broad themes: supervision; training; technology and equipment; communications; and aftercare. The Report concludes that the recommendations put forward "will contribute to the safety of membership and enhance the quality of service that supports all RCMP employees and family members".
The RCMP has conducted a thorough analysis of the Report and has developed a response to clearly outline the actions the RCMP will undertake to continue to improve existing policies and operational procedures to ensure the health, safety, and well-being of our members, employees and the communities we serve.
Two other reviews of the Moncton shooting have been launched, one by the Hazardous Occurrence Investigation Team (HOIT) and the other by Employment and Social Development Canada (ESDC). These reviews are mandated by the Canada Labour Code when federal government employees are killed on the job. The RCMP is committed to examining any recommendations from the HOIT and ESDC reviews and will incorporate these where appropriate.
This document outlines the RCMP's response to some of the key recommendations in the Report. The attached appendix contains a full list of all 64 recommendations and the RCMP's specific response to each. A number of these actions are already underway, while some will involve further analysis and consultation. The RCMP commits to publicly report on the implementation status of the activities outlined in the response in one year.
Response to Recommendations
The following response summarizes the Report recommendations under five broad themes: supervision; training; technology and equipment; communications; and aftercare and outlines the key actions the RCMP will undertake to address each area.
The Report identifies opportunities for the RCMP to provide frontline supervisors with additional training and support for critical incidents. The Report finds that there was a need for more effective and timely supervision during the initial stages of the incident. This challenge continued for several hours following the shootings until such time as a command post was established in the early morning hours of June 5, 2014.
Existing courses delivered by the Canadian Police College (CPC) provide RCMP officers and supervisors with scenario-based training and practical learning experiences drawn from recent investigations in order to better respond to critical incidents. For example, a five-day Initial Critical Incident Response course provides officers, who are required to assume initial command of police operations in critical incidents, with the knowledge and skills for effective and efficient supervision in crisis situations. In addition, a ten-day Critical Incident Commanders course provides commander level officers with additional knowledge and skills, such as assessing the nature of the incident and the need for resources, establishing an effective command post and command structure, and demonstrating command presence.
The RCMP recognizes the extraordinary challenges that the officers and their supervisors faced during the Moncton shooting. The Report has identified gaps in critical incident supervision training provided to our supervisors to manage large-scale critical events within communities. The RCMP is committed to addressing these gaps in order to provide the enhanced tools and training required to strengthen supervision and coordination during critical incidents.
In 2014, key aspects of the above mentioned five-day course were condensed into a three-day pilot curriculum and offered in the field to RCMP members in three detachments. This revised curriculum has received positive feedback and the RCMP plans to examine opportunities to provide this training to all Divisions across Canada; minimizing the need for members to travel to the CPC.
Further, the RCMP will develop an online course to assist supervisors in managing critical incidents. This course will be mandatory for all frontline supervisors and will be linked to their opportunity for promotions. The use of online training will provide greater access to this course for our members across Canada, minimizing their need to travel to central locations for training and keeping officers in the communities they serve.
In addition, while some detachments already use informal scenario training, the RCMP will formally develop table-top scenarios to cover numerous types of critical incidents that could be encountered in the field along with the appropriate operational response. Supervisors and their teams will work through the scenarios to identify roles and the processes that may unfold during the incidents. Each detachment will determine the appropriate operational response based on the human resources, equipment, and services available within their unique regions. The use of table-top exercises will allow supervisors and their teams to rehearse their responses to a large scope of incidents specific to the communities they serve, without requiring any time away from their frontline policing roles.
Building on the existing and proposed courses and training scenarios, an electronically accessible critical incident quick reference guide for all frontline supervisors will be created. Whether at the scene of a critical incident or at the detachment, the guide will be available as a quick reference to remind supervisors of the essential components to consider. This includes the establishment of a command and control structure, information sharing, deployment of resources, proper radio protocol, use of appropriate officer safety equipment, and evaluating risks.
Finally, each division will establish a process for experienced non-commissioned officers to assist the Operational Communications Centre in providing timely situational awareness and guidance to frontline supervisors managing critical incidents. This will offer another layer of assistance to frontline supervisors.
With these actions, the RCMP will provide frontline supervisors with additional tools and training to manage critical incidents.
The Report identifies some disconnect between current training and how officers respond to incidents that involve certain threats, such as calls involving firearms. Task specific training, such as Immediate Action Rapid Deployment (IARD), was identified as requiring revision to provide further detail on topics such as decision making, planning and communication. The Report also recommends that IARD training include various environmental, asset management, and supervision components to better equip officers to respond to these rapidly unfolding and highly volatile situations.
Further, it is recommended that RCMP firearms training and testing for its members include physical exertion, tactical repositioning and communication components in order to allow for a more realistic training environment similar to responding to critical incidents where members are required to use their firearms.
Several recommendations seek to enhance components of use of force training that the RCMP is already delivering to its members. This includes the expedited rollout of patrol carbine training, additional training on lethal force over-watch, the difference between cover and concealment, and examples of penetrative capabilities of bullets from various firearms.
The RCMP's goal is to provide an environment that supports continuous learning, development and training. Members are required every three years to participate in operational skills maintenance that provides scenario-based training on essential aspects of decision making, communication, tactical repositioning and articulation. In addition, members require annual recertification with their firearms and conducted energy weapons (Tasers®).
Prior to the Moncton shooting, the RCMP began a review of the IARD training curriculum with an aim to update it where necessary. In consideration of the Report's findings, as well as the outcomes from the internal IARD review, the Report recommendations associated with IARD training have been supported for inclusion in the new training curriculum.
Further, the RCMP is currently examining whether the IARD training should be mandatory for all members, and whether it will be included in the training curriculum currently offered to cadets at the RCMP Training Academy, "Depot", located in Regina, Saskatchewan. This would ensure all members arriving at their posts would be fully trained and prepared to deal with an active shooter situation.
Depot is also leading a review of the current pistol course of fire. The inclusion of a physical exertion component is being examined as part of this review. The revised pistol course of fire will reflect the firearms handling techniques taught on the patrol carbine course, ensuring consistency in training and allowing members to further refine these skills.
To expedite the delivery of the patrol carbine training to members, the RCMP directed a review of the current 2:1 candidate to instructor ratio to determine if this could be modified without having a negative effect on the achievement of learning objectives and safety. As a result of this review, the RCMP is modifying its ratio to 3:1. Further, the RCMP is actively examining the inclusion of carbine training for all cadets in the Cadet Training Program. By the end of February 2015, in consultation with Commanding Officers and Criminal Operations Officers, the RCMP will discuss the minimum number of members trained on the carbine.
Finally, the RCMP recognizes the value of members participating in face-to-face scenario-based training. Online courses will be developed to decrease the amount of time candidates spend in the classroom. This will allow for additional time to be devoted to scenario-based training.
With these actions, the RCMP will improve training activities to provide its members with the skills and tools they need to respond to critical incidents.
The Report includes a number of recommendations relating to equipment and its improved deployment or use. Specifically, the Report recommends: establishing a common operating picture to allow for simultaneous monitoring of an event; expediting the implementation of patrol carbines; conducting an analysis of procurement processes for equipment that impacts officer safety; and providing briefings and demonstrations to all members on the appropriate deployment of hard body armour (HBA).
The Report also identifies three recommendations that have been redacted from the publicly released version as these relate to officer safety and protective equipment. The RCMP commits to addressing these recommendations but will not publicly disclose further specifics.
Technology and equipment are vital to improve the safety of RCMP members. The RCMP is committed to working with its provincial, territorial, and municipal government partners to address the gaps and challenges in the use, deployment, and procurement of technology and equipment to ensure effective policing and to keep communities safe. In addition, the RCMP has established effective relationships with research and development organizations, as well as with academic researchers to find ways to improve the quality of its technology systems and equipment.
The RCMP is currently exploring options that would allow for a common operating picture to be available for simultaneous monitoring by frontline supervisors, Critical Incident Command, Division Emergency Operations Centres, and the National Operations Centre. This would create a sharing platform that would allow the RCMP and other public safety agencies to: effectively communicate via radio, telephone, or cellular phone; fuse different encrypted radios from outside agencies into a single network; allow for live video and text messaging; and share files and data in a secure environment.
The RCMP is in agreement with the Report's recommendation to expedite the rollout of patrol carbines. As such, the RCMP is modifying the candidate to instructor ratio to 3:1 from 2:1 to assist in the delivery of the training necessary to qualify RCMP members to use the carbine. As previously mentioned, the RCMP is examining the possibility of including carbine training for all cadets as part of the Cadet Training Program.
The Report concludes that HBA would not have prevented the deaths or reduced the severity of injuries to members involved in the Moncton shooting. Despite its availability, none of the uniformed members who responded to the call in the early stages of the incident wore HBA to the scene. The RCMP will implement the Report's recommendation that all members receive a briefing and demonstration building on the Uniform and Dress Manual Bulletin that was published on April 26, 2011, outlining the handling, maintenance and wearing of HBA.
With these actions, the RCMP will improve the deployment and use of specialized technology and equipment required to respond to critical incidents.
The Report finds that there were challenges with the communications systems, including radio use, interoperability and encryption, which limited effective communications between officers during the incident. The Report also notes opportunities to enhance communication with the public during serious incidents.
The RCMP recognizes the tremendous effort that officers and support personnel made to communicate with one another in order to assess, address, and resolve the evolving threat. While RCMP personnel and other assisting law enforcement agencies managed to use existing communication infrastructure, the event did illustrate the limitations of the communications systems in place and the need to update some equipment and procedures to strengthen communications during critical incidents.
The Report demonstrated the strength of RCMP communication services in conveying up-to-date factual information to the public and to the media. However, the incident also demonstrated the importance of having operational subject matter experts on hand to provide appropriate information to the public regarding the nature of the police response and key messages to ensure community safety during the event. In recognition of these findings and recommendations, the RCMP will update its communications systems and processes to continue to support effective communication among officers, staff and to the public.
The RCMP is reviewing the challenges, as outlined in the report, with radio coverage outside of Moncton in the Codiac region with the goal of identifying options to reduce the gaps and/or their impact. Further, the RCMP has developed a National Radio Program Strategic Plan as a solution for radio encryption and is working with the province of New Brunswick to ensure funding is in place to allow for timely radio replacement and upgrade by the spring of 2018. The proposed digital encrypted radio system solution will enhance radio coverage, operational effectiveness, officer safety, and protection of privacy.
Further, the RCMP is revising its internal policy to ensure that members use plain language during critical incidents. Implementing this practice will ensure that members are able to clearly and safely communicate with each other while responding to critical incidents.
The use of technology is also crucial in communicating information to the public. The Report notes the RCMP's use of social media was very effective in informing the public of developments and directing the community to take certain actions to ensure their safety. The RCMP will continue to build on its robust communications efforts, including traditional and social media, during critical incidents to ensure that information is shared as broadly as possible.
The RCMP's standard practice is to include subject matter experts in press conferences. However, this did not happen during the initial press conferences for this incident. The RCMP will update its communications protocols to ensure that subject matter experts are available to participate in press conferences to clearly explain to the public the actions the RCMP is taking to ensure community safety in times of crisis. Furthermore, the RCMP is updating its communications procedures to ensure the appropriate resources are identified and can quickly assist and/or be deployed to crisis situations.
RCMP National Communication Services (NCS) will begin to pilot a social media monitoring tool in early 2015. Based on the results of this trial, NCS will be positioned to provide advice and recommendation to division communicators who are considering implementing social media monitoring solutions within their divisions. Effective monitoring of social media helps RCMP communicators track ongoing coummunication activities, detect and correct mis-information and proactively reach out to our social media audiences to share key messages quickly as the authoritative source during critical incidents.
With these actions, the RCMP will support effective communications among officers and to the public when responding to critical incidents such as the Moncton shooting.
The Report finds that the provision of aftercare was well coordinated and responsive to the needs of RCMP employees and families. Recommendations for further improvements include assigning a liaison officer for each of the families and developing a long-term care strategy for families, officers, staff and volunteers involved in critical incidents.
The RCMP understands that the families, officers, staff and volunteers involved in critical incidents need a significant support network to help address the emotions and stress associated with these difficult circumstances. The RCMP is dedicated to providing responsive, sensitive, and comprehensive services to these individuals and will continue to provide support to the families, officers, staff and volunteers involved in the Moncton shooting.
The RCMP takes the health and safety of its employees seriously. Prevention and intervention measures are currently in place to improve psychological health and safety. On May 21, 2014, the organization implemented a Mental Health Strategy for members to improve their awareness and use of existing policies, programs and services. RCMP employees and their dependents also have access to an employee assistance program that provides counseling services and peer-to-peer support.
With regard to the Report's recommendations, for those members involved in critical incidents, the RCMP will continue to prioritize periodic health assessments and ongoing psychological support to help them. This may include an interview with a psychologist prior to an employee's return to work to prepare them for changes in the workplace that may have arisen following the traumatic incident.
Families of RCMP Members
As was done in Moncton, the RCMP will make it a standard operating procedure to assign a dedicated liaison officer to the family of an officer killed in the line of duty. These officers will provide assistance with any responsibilities the family may have, connect them with available support services and answer their questions. These services include the Critical Incident Stress Management mental health professionals who provide crisis counseling, stress management education, and other support to mitigate the impact of traumatic incidents on employees and families.
With regard to the Report's recommendations, the RCMP will adopt as a best practice the actions that were taken to support the families following the Moncton shooting by updating and promoting the RCMP Fallen Member Guide. This will include updates to procedures concerning: operational briefings of families; tours of the fallen members' workspaces with families; management of flowers, cards and gifts; and provision of information on the RCMP Memorial at Depot and the Peace and Police Officer Memorial in Ottawa. The timing and nature of pay and compensation processes following the death of an RCMP employee will also be reviewed to ensure best practices are incorporated within the Fallen Member Guide.
With these actions, the RCMP continues to strive to provide the aftercare support families, officers, staff and volunteers need following such tragic incidents.
Appendix - Summary of Action Items
The table below lists the actions that the RCMP will take to respond to all recommendations.
|1.1 Additional training on lethal force over-watch be provided to members||Additional training will be incorporated into existing courses that impact officer safety.||Spring 2015|
|3.1 Members be in possession of a cellular phone or satellite phone (where available) and police radio while on duty, as a required part of Service order #1||The Operational Manual will be updated to include a police radio as mandatory equipment when in uniform.||Within 3 months|
|The RCMP will determine the feasibility of equipping members with a cellular or smart phone.||Fall 2015|
|3.2 The RCMP examine how it trains frontline supervisors to exercise command and control during critical incidents|| To ensure that frontline supervisors utilize the basic principles of command and control during critical incidents tools will be developed. ||Spring 2015|
| To ensure that frontline supervisors utilize the basic principles of command and control during critical incidents tools will be developed. ||Winter 2016|
|3.3 The RCMP provide training to better prepare supervisors to manage and supervise throughout a critical incident until a Critical Incident Commander (CIC) assumes command|| To ensure that frontline supervisors utilize the basic principles of command and control during critical incidents tools will be developed. ||Spring 2015|
| To ensure that frontline supervisors utilize the basic principles of command and control during critical incidents tools will be developed. ||Winter 2016|
|3.4 The RCMP explore options that would allow for a common operating picture (COP) to be available for simultaneous monitoring by frontline supervisors, Critical Incident Command (CIC), Division Emergency Operations Centre (DEOC) and the National Operations Centre (NOC)||The RCMP is examining options that will allow for a COP to be developed during critical incidents.||Winter 2016|
|3.5 That Emergency Management System and the web-mapping service from the National Operations Centre (NOC)' be considered for each Division and policy, training, and supervision be established requiring their use in Critical Incidents, Major Events and disasters, by Division Emergency Operations Centre (DEOC) and the Critical Incident Command (CIC)||Development of a common operating picture (COP), as addressed in the response to Recommendation 3.4, will address this recommendation.||Winter 2016|
|3.6 Where it does not already exist, each Division establish a policy and protocol through an Emergency Operational Plan to identify entry/exit points and major transportation routes that should be alerted and monitored in the event of a relevant crisis||Detachment Emergency Operational Plans will be amended to ensure entry/exit points and major transportation routes are included.||Within 3 months|
|4.1 When transporting Tactical Armoured Vehicles (TAVs) long distances it should be done by rail or flatbed truck||Divisions will explore a commercial transportation alternative for the TAVs if transporting them a long distance.||Within 3 months|
|4.2 Redacted: Relates to officer safety equipment|
|4.3 Redacted: Relates to officer safety equipment|
|4.4 Annual night training exercises with Air Services be developed and undertaken to maintain proficiency for Emergency Response Team (ERT) members||The policy will be amended to include night training exercises and absorb this training into the ERT and Air Services training calendars.||Spring 2015|
|4.5 Infrared (IR) strobes be attached to each Tactical Armoured Vehicle (TAV) to enable them to be identified by specific call-sign during operations with air surveillance||Support the identification of TAVs using IR strobes from existing Emergency Response Team stock.||Complete|
|4.6 Non- Emergency Response Team (ERT) personnel be selected and trained as drivers for Tactical Armoured Vehicles (TAVs) to free up ERT members for primary duties||ERT teams will be supported to assess this recommendation given their human resource situation in deciding course of action and implementation strategy.||Spring 2015|
|4.7 A standard list of equipment be developed for Emergency Response Team (ERT) duties and that this equipment be acquired and distributed across the program||The existing list of standard equipment will be made compulsory for all ERT teams||Winter 2016|
|4.8 In large scale events where Air Services is utilized, Air Services personnel with the appropriate training should be assigned to the Command Post as a liaison for air service support||Policy will be amended to consider Air Services personnel being deployed to Command Posts as necessary to enhance communication between pilots and Critical Incident Commanders during large scale events.||Within 3 months|
|4.9 Redacted: Relates to officer safety equipment|
|5.1 Policy should be amended to state that where a general duty member is qualified in the use of a long barrelled weapon and where one is available; the member must ensure the weapon is in the police vehicle while on duty||The policy regarding the use of long barrelled weapons will be amended as recommended.||Within 3 months|
|5.2 Firearms must be stored with sufficient ammunition||The ammunition stock will be reviewed for each detachment.||Spring 2015|
|A multi-year carbine strategy is being developed, which will ensure that ammunition stock is retained.||Spring 2016|
|5.3 All RCMP members receive a briefing and demonstration on the appropriate deployment of Hard Body Armour (HBA)||A demonstration video on HBA will be developed and distributed to each detachment/unit commander for mandatory member viewing.||Spring 2015|
|5.4 Shotguns should be fitted with slings to enhance their deployment and safety||Shotguns will be fitted with slings.||Fall 2016|
|5.5 Maintenance and storage procedures of all detachment firearms and ammunition must be the subject of a mandatory Unit Level Quality Assurance (ULQA)||A Unit Level Quality Assurance (ULQA) will be developed, which will standardize storage requirements and maintenance of firearms and ammunition.||Summer 2015|
|5.6 During high stress/high risk incidents a supervisor must clearly provide direction regarding equipment use||This recommendation may not be feasible in all instances due to evolving circumstances or opportunities.|
|Operational policies will be amended to require supervisors and Operational Communications Centre personnel to communicate risks and provide continuous updates to support members' risk assessments.||Fall 2015|
|6.1 Trainers and supervisors take into account how cognitive biases undermine training and consider how to mitigate the effect of these natural and universal thought processes||Awareness of cognitive biases undermining training will be incorporated into use of force courses, such as Incident Management Intervention Model (IMIM) and Immediate Action Rapid Deployment (IARD).||Fall 2015|
|6.2 Any testing component of RCMP firearms use include a physical exertion component as well as tactical repositioning and communication. This should be supplemented with practice, scenario based, dynamic training and evolving risk assessment. They should include reminders of the firearms capability, even beyond qualification distances||This is being addressed through the ongoing firearms review project and the development of a new course of fire that will incorporate the suggestions within this recommendation.||Winter 2016|
|6.3 Training material be made available concerning the difference between cover and concealment, including examples of the penetrative capabilities of bullets from various firearms||Additional learning material on cover and concealment, including the penetrative capabilities of bullets from various firearms, will be incorporated into the applicable use of force courses such as Incident Management Intervention Model (IMIM), Immediate Action Rapid Deployment (IARD), and during annual pistol qualifications.||Fall 2015|
|6.4 Immediate Action Rapid Deployment (IARD) training be adapted to include various environments as well as decision making, planning, communication, asset management, and supervision components to ensure members work through constant risk assessments and that Operational Communications Centre training in coordination/ response to high risk incidents should be conducted at the same time as IARD training to emphasize the realism of the scenario||The IARD course training standard and learning material will be modified to reflect this recommendation.||Fall 2015|
|Decisions will be made to determine whether the course is designated as mandatory for all members, and if it will be added to the Cadet Training Program.||Within 3 months|
|7.1 Codiac Operational Communications Centre (OCC) consider the implementation of an automatic numeric identification (ANI) system to support officer safety||Training will be provided to ensure ANI is being used effectively in Codiac as well as in OCCs across the country.||Spring 2015|
|7.2 Codiac detachment radio coverage be examined outside of Moncton center to rectify areas that have gaps in coverage||A signal strength survey of identified dead zones in the Codiac area will be completed.||Within 3 months|
|A proposal will be completed for the Division management's consideration, presenting options for resolving the issue of radio signal dead zones.||Fall 2015|
|Tactical standard operating procedures will be developed to ensure that Codiac members dispatched are aware of radio dead zones until the issue is resolved.||Fall 2015|
|7.3 The RCMP examine the implementation of encrypted radio systems for operational effectiveness, officer safety and protection of privacy||The RCMP has initiated a five-year National Radio Program Strategic Plan that will replace all analog radio systems with encrypted radios.||Spring 2018|
|7.4 The two Moncton radio repeater sites be permanently patched to ensure members have optimum radio coverage while maintaining communication with the Operational Communications Centre (OCC)||This issue could be resolved if the planned project to upgrade to encrypted radios proceeds. There are some short-term solutions but they may be cost prohibitive.||Winter 2016|
|7.5 Primary and secondary channels be examined in greater detail, to allow dispatchers better control of network airtime||This issue could be resolved if the planned project to upgrade to encrypted radios proceeds. There are some short-term solutions but they may be cost prohibitive.||Winter 2016|
|7.6 Policy be developed that mandates the creation of a radio user guide which will be available to all members. This should incorporate a map of the province showing repeater sites/detachments and a list of the radio channels||The Mobile Communications Policy will be updated to add a section for repeater/radio site lists and map.||Fall 2015|
|7.7 A system be developed, both radio and data, that would allow for communication between RCMP members from the Maritime Divisions, when required to work outside of their home jurisdiction||A radio system upgrade and replacement providing complete radio interoperability in "H", "J" and "L" Divisions (Nova Scotia, New Brunswick and Prince Edward Island) is to be completed.||Winter 2017|
|In the interim, the Maritimes Divisions will collaborate to develop mutual aid standard operating procedures to meet communication requirements in a timely manner in emergency situations.||Within 3 months|
|7.8 A high resolution mapping system, such as the web-mapping service from the National Operations Centre (NOC), be integrated within Computerized Integrated Information and Dispatch System (CIIDS), having the ability to share vital information as perimeters and location data||The technology exists to upgrade CIIDS maps within the Divisions. Divisions will ensure that they have access to the most recent mapping capabilities within the CIIDS program.||Winter 2016|
|7.9 Redacted: Relates to officer safety equipment|
|7.10 Operational Communications Centres (OCCs) should have an experienced non-commissioned officer (NCO) available to coordinate operations in critical incidents and to offer direct operational advice to call takers and dispatchers||Divisions will review their procedures to ensure access to a senior NCO to offer timely guidance during a critical incident.||Fall 2015|
|7.11 The reporting structure of Codiac Operational Communications Centre (OCC) is refined to ensure the Support Services Officer is engaged in the provision of training, equipment and policy considerations||Communication between the Codiac OCC and "J" Division Criminal Operations Officer (CROPS) will be improved. For example, a monthly briefing note outlining issues impacting OCC operations, administration and service delivery will be sent to the CROPS.||Spring 2015|
|7.12 Emergency Response Teams (ERT) develop a quick reference guide for non-ERT trained members who may be called upon to offer assistance (e.g. aerial spotters and other observation posts). These reference guides could be provided by the ERT telecommunications technician who would be in a position to instruct members on ERT radio protocols||A quick reference guide will be developed and distributed, along with training procedures.||Spring 2015|
|7.13 The RCMP create policy that allows for the use of plain language as an alternative to 10-codes in urgent situations||The Informatics Manual II.2 Mobile Communications – Ten Code Signals will be amended to include the use of common plain language during critical incidents.||Summer 2015|
|8.1 National Communication Services (NCS) create a plan that can be referenced to allow relief for Division communications staff in the event of a prolonged incident. The plan should be developed to take into consideration the requirements of each Division||A crisis communications guideline and standard operating procedures will be developed in consultation with Divisions to address this recommendation.||Fall 2015|
|8.2 Standard operating procedures be developed to ensure communications personnel are part of the initial operational callout procedure for serious events||Standard operating procedures for telecom operators and Divisional Emergency Operations Centre will be developed to ensure strategic communications resources are part of the initial operational callout for serious events.||Spring 2015|
|8.3 News conferences in these types of incidents should have a spokesperson presenting the operational perspective of the investigation to reassure the community that police are taking action||Standard operating procedures will be established to recommend when feasible, a subject matter expert be available during press conferences to provide an operational perspective.||Fall 2015|
|8.4 Software solutions be sought by National Communication Services (NCS) in order to properly monitor social media||A pilot project using commercially established software will be implemented.||Spring 2015|
|The Government of Canada is proposing a dashboard of social media tools. If approved, it will be adopted by the RCMP.||Spring 2017|
|8.5 Up to date, functional, portable devices be provided to Communications personnel to enable them to effectively use social media and permit them to effectively do their job||A pilot is already underway with the purchase of tablets for media relations units.||Winter 2016|
|8.6 National Communication Services (NCS) provide a point of contact with the essential skills for regimental funerals (internal or external to the RCMP) who is paired with the Strategic Communications Unit||A list of subject matter experts will be developed and maintained and the Fallen Member Guide will be reviewed and updated to reflect this recommendation.||Spring 2015|
|8.7 All regimental funerals have a professional photographer to ensure they are properly recorded||The RCMP will update the Fallen Member Guide to ensure that the photography services from National Headquarters are available to Divisions for the proper recording of all regimental funerals.||Spring 2015|
|8.8 Families of fallen members be made aware that communications assistance is available to act as a buffer between the families and the media. In addition this will provide families access to the RCMP website to post messages/photos||The Fallen Member Guide will be reviewed and updated to ensure that the most appropriate and effective support is provided to families.||Spring 2015|
|8.9 Divisions have access to real-time social media monitoring which could help identify operational risks and inform a communications strategy||A pilot project using commercially established software will be implemented.||Spring 2015|
|The Government of Canada is proposing a dashboard of social media tools. If approved, it will be adopted by the RCMP.||Spring 2017|
|9.1 The RCMP develop an improved system to enable members to obtain ammunition for practice||Firearms policy will be streamlined to ensure that the steps required for members to receive ammunition for training are simplified and clearly outlined.||Spring 2015|
|9.2 The relevant policies and practices should be reviewed to ensure there are appropriate controls and no constraints that would interfere with members improving their firearms proficiency||Regions will schedule a minimum of two practice sessions per year for members with a Basic Firearms Instructor on site to assist members in improving their firearms skills||Fall 2015|
|11.1 The RCMP consider broadening its support for initiatives that support young people with mental illness||The RCMP will continue to support numerous initiatives that focus on mental health. For New Brunswick, a mental health screener will be implemented under their youth intervention model in order to identify mental health issues and ensure appropriate support.||Within 3 months|
|12.1 Development of a national guide to establish roles and responsibilities and advice for managers and persons tasked with implementing an after care strategy. This could include a plan for rapid and scalable deployment plus consideration for long term maintenance to prepare for notable events such as the first year anniversary of the tragedy||This recommendation will be addressed in the existing RCMP Mental Health Strategy. Establishing a national standard for aftercare will be a priority.||Fall 2016|
|12.2 Updating of the existing Fallen Member guide with considerations for the following: operational briefings of families, possible tour of the fallen members' work space with the family, consideration for the management of flowers, cards and gifts, provision of information on the Depot Memorial and the Peace and Police Officer Memorial in Ottawa||The Fallen Member Guide will be reviewed and updated by the Warrant Officer Group, subject matter experts and stakeholders to address this recommendation.||Within 3 months|
|The guide will be made more accessible by posting on the RCMP's Intranet site.||Spring 2015|
|12.3 The Critical Incident Stress Management (CISM) team should consist of experienced psychologists who understand policing; experienced RCMP employee peer support personnel, RCMP chaplains and nurses trained in CISM||The delivery of the Critical Incident Stress Management (CISM) course will be reviewed with the goal of training the appropriate number of qualified candidates, as determined by the Health Services Officer.||Spring 2015|
|12.4 Development of a plan for ongoing follow-up at specified periods during the first year and also during periodic health assessments (PHSs) for those members directly involved. Consideration should be given to the utilization of the questionnaire as noted in this section of the review||Members involved in the Moncton incident have been identified for ongoing follow-up and care.||Complete|
|12.5 A review of the processes related to the provision of aftercare services to those involved such as families, municipal employees, auxiliary constables and volunteers should be undertaken||The RCMP's Health Policy will be reviewed as part of the Mental Health Strategy. Any proposed increase in benefits will require extensive consultations with the RCMP's provincial, territorial and municipal partners.||Fall 2016|
|12.6 Consideration should be given to ensuring that members who are unable to return to work are kept informed of information that could affect them||Members, who have been identified by the Health Services Officer as unable to work, will be provided with key information that affects them by their supervisor or their delegate (as indicated in section 19.3 of the Administration Manual).||Fall 2015|
|The RCMP will also consider this recommendation in the development of the Disability Management and Accommodation Framework and the Mental Health Strategy Action Plan for 2015-16.||Fall 2016|
|12.7 An interview with a psychologist should be conducted with employees prior to their return to duty to prepare them for changes in their work environment that have taken place as a result of a traumatic incident||This recommendation will be addressed as part of the ongoing development of the Mental Health Strategy. The RCMP supports its employees' ability to have timely access to mental health professionals.||Fall 2016|
|12.8 A Critical Incident Stress Management CISM) team, which was not involved with the operation, should provide a Post Action Staff Support (PASS) debriefing for those who conducted debriefings. This should occur once the operation is completed and preferably prior to their return to their home units||The relevant RCMP policy will be reviewed with the various Health Services Officers to increase awareness around the need for a PASS for those who conducted the debriefings of critical events.||Spring 2015|
|12.9 When an employee is killed on duty certain pay and compensation mechanisms are triggered that generate automated messages and mail to families relating to the cancelation of certain benefits. These automated processes lack sensitivity and cause undue stress. It is recommended a review of these systems be conducted to prevent this from occurring||RCMP management along with the Staff Relations Representatives and the Corps Sergeant Major will review these procedures to ensure that communication with families of fallen members is appropriate and considerate of their tragic circumstances. An updated approach will be established and incorporated into the Fallen Member Guide.||Spring 2015|
|12.10 Following the death of a member of the RCMP, there is a substantial amount of required paper work and procedural processes expected of family members. It is recommended that a liaison be identified to assist family members on behalf of the deceased with the completion of all necessary paperwork||In Moncton, liaisons were appointed to assist family members in a variety of areas. It is supported that this best practice be adopted in the upcoming review of the Fallen Member Guide.||Spring 2015|
|12.11 When a member is physically/psychologically injured or deceased and thus unable to join appointments with their family, the spouses and children of the member cannot access the member's insurance and must rely on private insurance coverage. This coverage can only reimburse the cost of 5 to 7 hours of psychological services per year. It is recommended that steps be taken to rectify this to remove the burden this insufficient funding places on families of the members||The RCMP is exploring opportunities for Veterans Affairs Canada (VAC) to offer its psychological support services to the families of members killed in the line of duty. VAC programming offers confidential counseling and referrals by mental health professionals across the country on a 24-hour basis every day of the week.||Fall 2015|
|13.1 The RCMP take immediate action to expedite deployment of patrol carbines across the Force. This action must include significant and permanent augmentation of the Force's training capacity||The candidate to instructor ratio of the patrol carbine training course will be changed to 3:1 from 2:1.||Within 3 months|
|A review of the feasibility of adding patrol carbine training to the Cadet Training Program is underway.||Spring 2015|
|A minimum number of members to be trained will be established.||Fall 2015|
|13.2 The RCMP conduct a thorough analysis of the approval and procurement processes (including the research and development phase) relating to equipment that impacts officer safety. This analysis should include identifying an appropriate senior authority to take responsibility for such projects, establishing appropriately resourced project teams and setting deadlines for delivery||For priority officer safety initiatives, milestones will be set to ensure a specific percentage of members in each Division are equipped within a certain period of time (as decided by Senior Executive Committee). These priority initiatives will be led by a Senior Officer from Contract and Aboriginal Policing.||Within 3 months|
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