This report has been reviewed in consideration of the Access to Information Act and Privacy Act. An asterisk [*] appears where information has been removed; published information is UNCLASSIFIED.
Final Report: October 2012
|9-11||September 11, 2001 Terrorist Attacks in the United States|
|ADM||Assistant Deputy Minister|
|CAIP||Capabilities Improvement Process|
|CBRN||Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear|
|CBRNE||Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear and Explosives|
|CBSA||Canada Border Services Agency|
|CCG||Canadian Coast Guard|
|CFB||Canadian Forces Base|
|CIC||Citizenship and Immigration Canada|
|CSIS||Canadian Security Intelligence Service|
|DND||Department of National Defence|
|DRDC||Defence Research and Development Canada|
|GPPAG||Government Partners Public Affairs Group|
|GS&PS||Games Security and Public Safety|
|IOC||International Olympic Committee|
|IPC||International Paralympic Committee|
|ITAC||Integrated Threat Assessment Centre|
|JIG||Joint Intelligence Group|
|MAP||Management Action Plan|
|MESF||Major Events Security Framework|
|MOFR||BC Ministry of Forests and Ranges|
|NORAD||North American Aerospace Defence Command|
|NOTAM||Notice to Airmen|
|OCS||Office of the Coordinator for V2010 Olympics and G8 Security|
|OGD||Other Government Departments|
|OMOC||Olympic Marine Operations Centre|
|PCO||Privy Council Office|
|PHAC||Public Health Agency of Canada|
|PIDS||Perimeter Intrusion Detection System|
|POR||Post Operations Report|
|PS||Public Safety Canada|
|RBAF||Risk-Based Audit Framework|
|RCMP||Royal Canadian Mounted Police|
|RMAF||Results-Based Management and Accountability Framework|
|SAMS||Security Accreditation Management System|
|TAF||Temporary Accommodations Facilities|
|TAV||Temporary Accommodation Vessel|
|USPS||United States Postal Service|
|V2010||2010 Vancouver Olympic and Paralympic Winter Games|
|V2010 ISU||Vancouver 2010 Integrated Security Unit, led by the RCMP|
|VANOC||Vancouver 2010 Organizing Committee|
|VPD||Vancouver Police Department|
|"E" Division||British Columbia division of Pacific Region, RCMP|
The evaluation of Games Security and Public Safety (GS&PS) for the 2010 Winter Olympic and Paralympic Games was conducted by the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) in collaboration with GS&PS partners: Canada Border Services Agency, Canada Post Corporation, Canadian Coast Guard, Canadian Security Intelligence Service, Citizenship and Immigration Canada, Department of National Defence and Canadian Forces, Health Canada, Industry Canada, Public Health Agency of Canada, Public Safety Canada and Transport Canada. This evaluation conforms with the Treasury Board's Policy on Evaluation and provides an evidence-based, neutral assessment of the relevance and performance of GS&PS for the Games.
Canada hosted the 2010 Winter Games (the Games) in Vancouver and Whistler British Columbia. This was the largest sporting event ever undertaken in Canada. Games Security and Public Safety was a major consideration in the planning and conduct of the Games. As the lead agency responsible for the development and delivery of the GS&PS, the RCMP led the Vancouver 2010 Integrated Security Unit (V2010 ISU), a multi-organizational, integrated security team. The V2010 ISU had the overall responsibility for coordinating and providing safety and security for the Games with a goal of providing 'safe and secure Games' for the athletes, officials, and visitors. The RCMP worked closely with GS&PS partners to meet this objective.
Achievement of Expected Outcomes
Governance, Roles and Responsibilities
Design and Planning Phase
Games Operations and Knowledge Transfer
Efficiency and Economy
In keeping with the philosophy of this being 'an athletic event with security, not a security event with athletes', partners successfully accomplished its outcome of hosting 'safe and secure Games'.
On July 2, 2003 Canada won the bid to host the 2010 Winter Games (the Games) which consisted of the Olympic Games (February 12 to February 28) and the Paralympic Games (March 12 to March 21) in Vancouver and Whistler British Columbia (BC). This was the largest sporting event ever undertaken in Canada with over 27 days of events and celebrations.
Vancouver 2010 Organizing Committee (VANOC) led the planning and execution of the Games with both the private and volunteer sectors. The organization was responsible for planning and organizing the Games and for communicating with the International Olympic Committee (IOC). In November 2002, prior to awarding the Games to Canada, the Federal Government entered into a multi-party agreement to support Vancouver and Whistler's efforts to host the Games. The 2002 Multi-party Agreement with VANOC outlined contributions from the various levels of government, including Canada, BC, Vancouver and Whistler for all Games related activities including GS&PS.
The Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) was identified as the lead agency responsible for the development and delivery of Games safety and security. To do this, the RCMP led the Vancouver 2010 Integrated Security Unit (V2010 ISU), a multi-organizational, integrated security team. The V2010 ISU had the overall responsibility for coordinating and providing safety and security for the Games and a goal of providing 'safe and secure Games' for the athletes, officials, and visitors. Working with the RCMP were GS&PS partners including Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA), Canada Post Corporation, Canadian Coast Guard (CCG)Footnote 1, Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS), Department of National Defence (DND), Health Canada, Industry Canada, Public Health Agency of Canada (PHAC), Public Safety Canada (PS) and Transport Canada.
The initial $175 million security budget was developed in 2001 by Vancouver city employees prior to the announcement that Canada had won the bid to host the Games. The focus of the initial budget was on the security of venues and the general Vancouver area. It was not led by the RCMP and did not include all GS&PS partners nor a full scope of security and safety required in a post-9-11 environment. The security budget of $175M was used for initial planning. By 2010, approximately $868 million of incremental funding was made available to GS&PS partners in order to deliver 'safe and secure Games'Footnote 2. Appendix A presents a timeline of critical stages of implementing GS&PS.
A Results-Based Management and Accountability Framework (RMAF) including a logic modelFootnote 3 was developed in 2009 to outline the major activities and outcomes of providing 'safe and secure Games'. A four-phased approach was used in providing 'safe and secure Games':
The GS&PS partnersFootnote 4 agreed to a coordinated evaluation to address the Treasury Board Policy on Evaluation (2009) core issues for the relevance and performance of GS&PS. Eleven evaluation questions were developed:
Achievement of Expected Outcomes
Demonstration of Efficiency and Economy
A multi-method approach to the evaluation was used, including:
Documentation was provided by partners to assess the evaluation questions listed in Section 2.2. A document collection template derived from the RMAF was developed to ensure consistency amongst partners in collecting information. Documentation included after-action reports, media releases made during and after the Games, internal and external communications between partners, operational plans and budget and expenditure reports.
Key Informant Interviews
Between June 2010 and September 2010, over 100 interviews were conducted with key informants. Interviews were conducted with GS&PS partners at National Headquarters (NHQs) in Ottawa and in Pacific Region at the Deputy Minister (DM), Assistant Deputy Minister (ADM), Director General (DG), Director, and Manager/Operator levels. The majority of interviews were conducted with RCMP and DND representatives as approximately 92% of GS&PS incremental funding was provided to these two organizations.
Games – Observations
Typically for a RCMP-led major event, resources are deployed to the event to implement operational plans developed prior to their deployment. In most cases, resources (from the RCMP and other police forces) were deployed to the Games for a specific period of time and then redeployed back to their home unit. Site visits were conducted by evaluation team members as well.
Vancouver 2010 Evaluability Assessment (RCMP-led)
During 2009, a GS&PS assessment was conducted including the relevance and achievement of activities, outputs and immediate outcomes for the Design and Planning Phase and Operational Readiness Phase of the project. Analysis conducted for this assessment was used in supporting findings of this evaluation. The assessment was derived from:
Key challenges associated with conducting this evaluation included:
Magnitude and complexity of providing 'safe and secure Games'
GS&PS involved eleven key federal partners, one Crown Corporation, the Province of BC, multiple municipal police forces and private and not-for-profit stakeholders. The varying roles of GS&PS partners made it challenging to capture detailed assessments of individual contributions to the Games. Instead, this evaluation presents themes relevant to all partners with an emphasis on findings from the RCMP and DND as the two major recipients of GS&PS incremental funding.
Collection of performance information in accordance with the GS&PS RMAF
The GS&PS RMAF was not completed until March 2009. There were still a number of partners, such as the CCG and Canada Post Corporation who were identified as GS&PS partners after March 2009. While the RMAF was an evergreen document that could be updated as necessary, most partners were in the midst of planning for the Games that, at the time, were less than a year away. As a result, there were some gaps in the collection of RMAF-related performance information by partners. This was mitigated by creating specific document collection templates to assist the evaluation. For future major events, it would be valuable to ensure that performance measurement strategies are more reflective of the needs of the partners, and that information is collected in accordance with the performance measurement strategy prior to the start of an evaluation.
Access to members following the Games
While information obtained during the Games was used to scope the evaluation and support findings, formal interviewees with RCMP members deployed specifically for Games Operations was not conducted. This limited the amount of information available to answer evaluation question #11 – to what extent were human resources efficient for implementation of the project.
As this is an evaluation of a major event, a project with a set end date, it was difficult to provide recommendations that the GS&PS partners would be able to respond to in the normal timeframe expected of implementing a Management Action Plan (MAP). Without another major event to demonstrate how recommendations from this evaluation would be considered, this report focuses on presenting lessons learned and best practices as findings. Recommendations have only been made where a MAP can be developed without the requirement of conducting another major event to demonstrate successful implementation.
Canadian Heritage was the lead department coordinating the federal participation in support of the 2010 Winter Games, with the exception of Games Security and Public Safety. As the original federal lead, Canadian Heritage developed an RMAF and Risk-Based Audit Framework (RBAF) to capture the contribution of those departments and agencies that received incremental funding to support the Games or used existing resources with respect to the delivery of mandated Essential Federal Services. In order to ensure accountability for GS&PS, a separate RMAF for security was developed by the RCMP in collaboration with GS&PS partners. The final GS&PS outcome of 'safe and secure Games', contributed to the overarching Government of Canada RMAF/RBAF strategic outcome of 'successful delivery of mandated essential federal services'.
Canadian Heritage led a horizontal evaluation on the activities undertaken by federal departments and agencies responsible for delivering essential federal services, excluding Games Security and Public Safety. The second evaluation, led by the RCMP, focused solely on Games Security and Public Safety. Canadian Heritage and the RCMP worked closely together to ensure consistency between both evaluations.
Finding #1: There was a demonstrated need for Games Security and Public Safety. GS&PS activities were aligned with federal government priorities, roles and responsibilities. All GS&PS activities were aligned to partners' strategic outcomes and mandates.
The rationale behind providing GS&PS included, but was not limited to:
There was a clear linkage between the Government of Canada's priorities for GS&PS and the strategic outcomes of the GS&PS partners. A priority vision for this project was the development of global confidence in the Canadian Federal Government's ability to protect and defend large public events in Canada. Appendix B presents the relevant aspects of the mandates of the respective GS&PS partners and demonstrates their alignment and contribution to federal priorities.
Given the international scope of the Games, the Memorandum of Agreement between the Federal Government and the Province of British Columbia articulated a clear role and responsibility for the federal government to deliver a 'safe and secure Games'. The integrated approach taken to provide security and safety ensured that all stakeholders with a mandate to participate were included in planning and operations.
Finding #2: Establishment of the Office of the Coordinator for Security at the Privy Council Office for a whole of government approach to safety and security ensured that planning occurred in a coordinated and timely manner.
Initially, Canadian Heritage was the lead federal department for the Games because of its historic role in sports funding. Canadian Heritage defined and co-led issue clusters for different aspects of the Games including policing and security, public health, and safety and emergency management. Strategic planning for the Games had begun, in a limited way, by 2003 under the Canadian Heritage umbrella. However, the integration of partners and full scope of GS&PS did not exist to the extent needed for planning until after the creation of the Office of the Coordinator for V2010 Olympics and G8 Security (OCS) within the Privy Council Office (PCO) in October 2007.
For the Games and the G8 and G20 Summits, the OCS assumed some of the responsibilities of Public Safety Canada for major events. For the Games, responsibilities included general oversight of GS&PS, interfacing with the Province of BC to develop Memorandums of Agreements and planning for Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear and Explosives (CBRNE). The creation of the OCS resulted in confusion about the roles and responsibilities of the RCMP, Public Safety Canada and the OCS.Footnote 6 The Bronze, Silver and Gold exercises (discussed under Finding #6), and senior-level working groups and steering committees reduced confusion over time.
The OCS was valuable to safety and security planning given the unique case of two highly complex major events with multiple partners and stakeholders in 2010. The OCS was disbanded in the fall of 2010. It is expected that activities undertaken by the OCS for oversight of safety and security for the Games and G8 and G20 Summits will be fulfilled by Public Safety Canada for future major events.
Finding #3: RCMP major event practices for the Games were not fully aligned with policies in relation to the governance and oversight of RCMP-led major events.
The mandate of Major Events and Protective Policing articulates its significant role in the planning, budgeting and oversight of major events. However, in contrast to RCMP PolicyFootnote 7, "E" Division representatives, such as the V2010 ISU and the Commanding Officer of "E" Division, worked closely with VANOC and other GS&PS partners co-located in BC to plan for the Games. The Assistant Commissioner, V2010 ISU had a dual reporting relationship to the Commanding Officer, "E" Division and to the Assistant Commissioner, Protective Policing. However, given the location of the Games, ultimately the Commanding Officer of "E" Division was responsible for providing security for the event rather than the Assistant Commissioner of Protective Policing (at RCMP NHQ).
RCMP-led major security events are typically short in duration which allows transition from Major Events and Protective Policing (NHQ) to a Division Operations Commander to occur relatively seamlessly. Interviewees indicated that in practice, the Division Operations Commander reports to the Commanding Officer of the division where the event will be held and that the current policy does not reflect the actual reporting structure utilized for major events.
The dual reporting relationship structure that occurred for the Games did not hinder the achievement of 'safe and secure Games' but it did create a risk of internal conflict and a dependence on personal relationships and interpersonal skills to be successful. It is important for the RCMP to recognize this risk for future major events.
Finding #4: Roles and responsibilities for the majority of partners were defined in order to achieve Effective Games Operations. However, the interdependencies of Games Operations components were not articulated until 2009.
Roles and responsibilities were defined for GS&PS senior management through committees such as the DM Security Advisory Committee, led by the OCS and the ADM Emergency Management Committee co-led by the OCS and PS.
Excluding the RCMP discussed under Finding #3, roles and responsibilities internal to each partner organization tended to be understood and clearly defined. Efforts were made by partners to create specific teams dedicated to ensuring that organization objectives were met in the context of supporting 'safe and secure Games'.
Interdepartmental roles and responsibilities for the majority of Games Operations components were defined by regulatory frameworks and mandates of each partner, the testing exercises, working groups and steering committees. However, there were challenges due to the inefficiencies of sharing classified information. This is further discussed in Section 3.2.3 Operational Readiness.
The interdependencies of Games Operations components were not well communicated early in the Design and Planning Phase. Planners of one component were not necessarily aware of the roles and responsibilities of planners from another component and the possible impacts those plans may have on their own operations. This was especially the case between partners planning for security (the prevention of incidents) and partners planning for safety and consequence management (restoring safety after an incident has occurred).
Some partners started planning in 2003 and the majority started in 2006 and 2007. However, documents such as the GS&PS RMAFFootnote 8 and Silver After Actions ReportFootnote 9 did not exist until 2009. As well, these documents were not distributed, in all instances, within each organization as a communication tool. With the final test of operational readiness scheduled for November 2009, these documents were not available early enough for partners to be aware of the interdependencies between components for Games Operations. Good working relationships and the exercises minimized some risk and this did not impact on Games Operations. Clearly documented and communicated roles and responsibilities would assist in the learning curve associated with participating in an event involving a multitude of partners and stakeholders.
Public Safety Canada and the RCMP work with key security partners to explore the development of a governance framework, which would identify the accountabilities and interdependencies of all participant federal departments and agencies, including the sharing of classified information among participants, to support the management of security and safety at future major events.
Finding #5: Plans were scalable to address various levels of threat although commonly accepted definitions of threat levels did not exist amongst partners during the Design and Planning Phase.
The RCMP was responsible for identifying the overall threat level for the Games and the Integrated Threat Assessment Centre (ITAC) was responsible for the threat levels concerning nine categories to support the RCMP and the GS&PS partnersFootnote 10. As well, individual partners also conducted internal threat assessments to appropriately develop operational plans. The ITAC assessments indicated 'low' threat levels for the Olympic Games. However, partners planned at a 'medium' threat level so that plans could be scalable to either 'high' or 'low' if intelligence indicated that the threat level should be escalated or de-escalated prior to or during the Games.
During interdepartmental discussions, it became apparent that commonly recognized and accepted definitions of the threat levels did not exist amongst GS&PS partners. [*]. As discussed under Finding #4, roles and responsibilities between components were not shared early in the Design and Planning Phase of the Games. This may have contributed to the confusion around the meanings of and potential responses to different threat levels for the GS&PS partners.
Since the Games, efforts have been made to facilitate a discussion amongst partners regarding the necessity and feasibility of a national threat network. In February 2011, Public Safety Canada undertook an analysis of national security-related threat level systems and presented the results to senior management security operations committeesFootnote 11.
The development of plans was highly influenced by information provided by external stakeholders and changing environmental factors. Since the Games was a sporting event with a security component, planners had to be adaptable and react to the evolving plans of VANOC. For example, identification of venues and sites remained undecided, in some instances, until as late as winter 2009. With the exception of the exercises, informal gap identification processes existed internally to each partner organization and through interdepartmental meetings to update operational plans. Virtually all security and safety plans were evergreen and adapted as necessary to changing circumstances.
Finding #6: A comprehensive series of exercises was used to test, and validate organizational capabilities and capacities in order to support interoperability and declare operational readiness leading up to the Games.
The complexity of a pre-event exercise program that would actively involve the participation of an extensive number of stakeholders within a single framework had never been previously undertaken in Canada. For the Games, a robust exercise and testing program was designed and put into place. The exercise program consisted of hundreds of exercises that integrated partners from the security and public safety domains to test, confirm and validate the assumptions that were made throughout the Design and Planning Phase.
Integrated plans were tested through a set of exercises called Bronze, Silver and Gold. These Exercises were led by the OCS and supported with resources from PS and DND. The program consisted of:
Exercises Bronze and Silver occurred while plans were still being developed. In the absence of input from several organizations, resulting from the competing, concurrent demands on staff, a large portion of the exercise program development work was based on educated assumptions of what the plans or policies would eventually beFootnote 12. For most organizations that had experienced staff turnover during the multi-year Design and Planning Phase, there was little or no continuity from one exercise to the next. The value of the exercises and the extent to which they were utilized effectively varied from partner to partner. Overall, the phased-approach to the exercises was successful in bringing all partners together to coordinate information sharing and develop relationships in order to declare operational readiness.
Finding #7: GS&PS partners relied on multiple information systems, good working relationships and the exercises to share information [*].
[*]. For the Games, it was the ingenuity and resourcefulness of the GS&PS personnel that established work-arounds to overcome this deficiency.
GS&PS partners made information technology (IT) systems and information sharing 'work'. Many partners used multiple information systems and face-to-face meetings to share information. For example, some staff used one information system to communicate within their own organization, another to communicate with the V2010 ISU for protected information and yet another to disseminate information to other partners who may not have the same security clearance. This process was time consuming and impeded efficient information sharing.
The V2010 ISU aided interoperability by providing the opportunity for partners to interact face-to-face. As well, the V2010 ISU developed two new networks in 2008: one for sharing unclassified Protected A data and encrypted Protected B data amongst partners and the other for sharing classified "SECRET" data between the RCMP and the DND/CF. Despite the development of these systems, information sharing remained an issue because of the various definitions of classified and unclassified information by partners and because the systems were not implemented until late 2009.
While it was challenging and inefficient to use multiple information systems to process information, good working relationships and the exercises facilitated the development of work-arounds. [*].
Finding #8: Plans were implemented as intended and there were no serious security incidents over the course of the Games resulting in effective Games Operations.
Games Operations were approximately 56 days longFootnote 13 during which GS&PS partners were successful in achieving 'safe and secure Games'. There were ten 'high' or 'medium' security incidents recorded during the Olympic Games and there were no 'high' or 'medium' security incidents at the Paralympic Games. Over the duration of the Games there were 850 'low' security incidentsFootnote 14.
All incidents were responded to according to operational plans with resources being activated in a timely manner. For example:
Finding #9: The success of achieving 'safe and secure Games' is attributable to the multitude ofcollaborative working relationships amongst GS&PS partners and with stakeholders.
Providing 'safe and secure Games' was a collaborative initiative amongst partners. For some partners this was the first time they had worked together and there was a requirement to learn about each others' mandates and operations in order to successfully build relationships. For others that had worked together previously, the Games enhanced understandings of other organizations and strengthened existing relationships. The following are examples of inter-agency cooperation resulting in a positive impact on the Games:
Finding #10: Accreditation processes supported Games Operations although there was some duplication of efforts amongst the partners involved.
Access to the Games, specifically for temporary foreign visitors such as athletes and their families and Games delegates, required both travel visas and accreditations. To streamline the process, the RCMP, CSIS, CBSA and CIC came together to determine how background screenings would occur and worked with VANOC to communicate the process to foreign visitors.
The RCMP recognized early in the planning process that existing systems for completing required background checks was not adequate to process the large numbers of anticipated Games accreditation applicants. In response, the RCMP enhanced its existing Security Accreditation Management System (SAMS) for the Games to process automated background checks through multiple databases, owned by relevant partners in the accreditation process.
While the accreditation process was a success, it was not without its challenges. Roles and responsibilities of each partner were not clearly defined at the beginning of the accreditation process which created some issues with access to information, delays in communication and duplication of efforts. These challenges were identified by each partner as a result of the Games and should be mitigated for future processes.
In total over 204,000 background checks were successfully completed mainly in between 2008 and 2010. SAMS is now the RCMP's national platform for the processing of major events security accreditation background checks and was used for the 2010 G8 and G20 Ontario Summits.
Finding #11: Minimal information from previous events was available for partners in planning. Partners identified knowledge transfer as a priority and collected best practices and lessons learned.
Minimal relevant and readily accessible information was available for partners in planning for the Games. Much of the information available from previous Games did not apply to securing a sporting event post 9-11 in Canada. Some information from the 2002 Salt Lake City Winter Games was used for national security considerations and some information from the 2000 Sydney Summer Games was considered since the geography of Australia is similar to BC.Footnote 21. Being located close to the US borderFootnote 22 and having two separate hosting locationsFootnote 23 made it difficult to apply lessons learned from previous events.
Interviewees, who had been involved in the 2002 Kananaskis Summit and the Games, relayed their frustration in only having minimal documentation and information available from the 2002 Summit to support planning for the Games. In an effort to support future international major event planners, the V2010 ISU facilitated the transfer of knowledge and information on all aspects of security planning to 700 visiting government officials, international police and security agencies and security plannersFootnote 24.
Early in the design and planning phase, it became apparent to partners that it would be vital to capture the progress, knowledge and lessons learned from the Games so that this information could be used for future major events within Canada. In a few cases, such as for the DND/CF, lessons learned from the Games were immediately transferred to the 2010 Ontario G8 and G20 Summits.
One specific example where lessons learned were captured was in regards to vehicle screening areas in support of effective policing. Vehicle screening areas were the responsibility of the RCMP but were affected by the lack of data from previous Games and ever changing information provided by VANOC. The actual vehicle traffic experienced during the Games was significantly less than anticipated.Footnote 25 Due to inaccurate estimates of traffic volumes and patterns provided by VANOC, there was some over-design and over-staffing of the Vehicle Screening Areas. In an effort to capture lessons learned from the Games and with the early involvement of Defence Research and Development Canada (DRDC), operational capabilities were tested and data was collected to establish flow rates for determining the necessary number of vehicle screening areas for future major events.
In June 2010, a lessons learned workshop was held in Ottawa, Ontario. The workshop was attended by representatives from the federal GS&PS partners and Emergency Management British Columbia partners. The objective of this workshop was to verbally share security and safety planning observations, lessons learned and best practices acquired from the Games. Since after-action reports and findings were still being confirmed by many partners, the workshop allowed participants to informally share thoughts and identify consistencies in their findings.
All partners created after-action reports and knowledge transfer legacies that involved regional and headquarter personnel. Partners are confident that these reports will be kept on record and available to future event planners internal to their organization. However, after-action reports do not currently exist in one central location for future inter-agency initiatives. As well, NAV CANADA was not included in any horizontal post-Games initiatives. Since the organization is a regular partner in projects with the RCMP, Transport Canada and other federal partners, NAV CANADA should be involved in future knowledge transfer activities.
Findings from GS&PS after action-reports are consistent with the findings from this evaluation. Common themes that emerged include:
Public Safety Canada, in consultation with GS&PS partners, lead the analysis of lessons learned developed by participating security and safety departments/agencies, and initiate a capabilities improvement process, where appropriate.
Finding #12: The RCMP-led Major Events Security Framework addresses many of the findings presented in this evaluation report and provides the RCMP with detailed guidance for major events security and safety planning.
In 2011, Major Events and Protective Policing of the RCMP created a Major Events Security Framework (MESF). While this tool was not available for the Games, it has been made available through the Government of Canada's GCPedia website and will be used by the RCMP for security planning for future major events.
The MESF is currently an internal RCMP tool but it has the potential to be used as a whole of government Major Events Security Framework. For the RCMP, the MESF has addressed many of the lessons learned which were identified in this evaluation, specifically around governance and interoperability for future major events by providing:
Finding #13: The original Bid Budget was not inclusive of all GS&PS activities and was influenced by requirements of external stakeholders.
The initial $175 million security budget, referred to as the Bid Budget, was developed in 2001, prior to the announcement that Canada would host the 2010 Winter Games. The Bid Budget was developed by Vancouver city employees in consultation with a broad selection of government and non-government public safety experts. It was not led by the RCMP and did not include all of the GS&PS federal partners. The Bid Budget was developed based on the information available at the time and without a full understanding of the size and complexity of safety and security in a post-9-11 environment.
The original Bid Budget included security planning for venues and the general Vancouver area as well as some support services. In 2003, after the announcement that Canada would host the 2010 Olympic and Paralympic Winter Games, the RCMP was tasked with providing the security planning and policing for the GamesFootnote 26. V2010 ISU planners identified, planned and budgeted for many aspects of providing Games security which the initial Bid Budget planners had not anticipated. Some of the more significant items for which costs were not provided or were underestimated include:
VANOC also had the option of requesting additional assistance from any level of government, if required, to meet its obligations to deliver the Games. It was at the discretion of the respective level(s) of government approached by VANOC whether they provided additional assistance and, if so, the amount provided. Usually for sporting events, physical security measures and private security to protect athletes would be the responsibility of the host management, in this case VANOC. The deliverers of a sporting event would provide both fencing and security personnel to ensure that access is limited to only paying guests, and that those guests do not bring in any substances which could lead to the disruption of the sporting event. For the Games, the RCMP was tasked with providing private security to not only supplement policing roles but to provide venue security and access control for the Games. The original Bid Budget estimated the private security costs at $25 million to supplement police officers in traditional event security rolesFootnote 28. The final private security costs were $83.4 millionFootnote 29 out of the RCMP funding allocation.
Finding #14: The size and complexity of GS&PS changed from 2001 to 2010 which meant that partners were planning in an environment without a realistic funding target.
The terrorist attack on September 11, 2001, affected the paradigm of security operations at both a local and national level. Prior to 9-11, security for major sporting events was approached as local policing initiative with national security agencies being involved in the gathering and interpretation of intelligence and the priority being given to the personal security and protection of visiting dignitaries. As planning progressed it became better understood that the threat of global terrorism, the increased public engagement and the greater risk of violent civil disobedience had increased the security requirements for major events requiring more federal involvement in planning and more integration amongst partners.
In the early days (2001 – 2006), partners were very dependent on each other for defining the scope of GS&PS operations and on external stakeholders for information that would affect planning. Due to these circumstances, there was not a broadly shared understanding of the complexity of the safety and security operation. At the time, it was not possible to predict a well-defined budget. In 2007, with a better understanding of the scope of security for the Games, the RCMP updated and sought approval of its budget. As well, the creation of the OCS in 2007 encouraged a common appreciation among all of the GS&PS partners of the need for more funding to strengthen GS&PS measures in order to achieve 'safe and secure Games'. Further details regarding the timeline of GS&PS activities are presented in Appendix A.
Planners proceeded with the Design and Planning Phase of the Games without a realistic funding target and with delays in obtaining funding. For some partners, internal cash management was required to proceed with planning until the GS&PS funds could be obtained.Footnote 30 The evolving nature of GS&PS had an impact on other partners:
The following tableFootnote 32 outlines the total incremental funding (including contingency funds) allotted and unaudited incremental expenditures for each GS&PS partner:
|Canada Post Corporation||0.7||0.7||0|
|Health CanadaFootnote 33||0||0||0|
|Public Safety Canada||1.2||0.96||0.24|
|RCMP including the OCS||559.4||521.8||37.6|
|Transport Canada including NAV CANADA||33.9Footnote 34||28.0Footnote 35||5.9|
|TOTAL||867.9 ≈ 868Footnote 36||784.79Footnote 37||83.11|
Security costs were shared with the Province of BC. The 2006 Memorandum of AgreementFootnote 38 between the Province of BC and the Federal Government was developed when the budget for security was established at $175M. The agreement stipulated a 50-50 sharing of costs between the provincial and federal governments, setting the provincial security costs at $87.5M. As costs rose, a 2009 Memorandum of AgreementFootnote 39 was signed. Although budget forecasts had risen from $175 million, the Province of BC agreed to raise its commitment from $87.5 million to a ceiling of $252.5 million. The federal government assumed responsibility for the balance of the GS&PS budget.
As the time for the Games drew nearer, planning progressed, the threat of global terrorism became better understood, public engagement increased and the risks and resultant responses to potential GS&PS incidents became clearer. Perceptions and understandings of the necessary factors that would be needed to have 'safe and secure Games' were considerably different and much more precise in 2008 than they were when the Bid Budget was developed in 2001. Overall, evidence indicated that processes to obtain funding were not reflective of the nature of major events.
Finding #15: Although the budget rose from 2001 to 2010, challenge functions did exist and partners were cognizant of striving towards cost-effectiveness.
As a result of the increase in funding requirements, the Memorandum of Agreement Security Committee requested that a peer review process be undertaken to validate the security cost estimates for the Games. The 2008 OCS-led peer review consisted of an examination and confirmation that the revised operational plans and corresponding funding needs for the delivery of the security component of the 2010 Games was necessary. Partners such as the RCMP and DND also conducted internal reviews in 2009 to assess planning and adjust plans accordingly.
Prior to late 2009, the V2010 ISU had an operational challenge function that assessed whether or not plans would meet the security needs of the operation. However, a financial challenge process to proactively ensure economy of resource use did not exist in the initial stages of the Design and Planning Phase. Once an operational plan was set and the resources required were defined, it was up to the corporate functions of the organization to find those identified resources. In other words, Finance had a role in monitoring and forecasting expenditures and procuring items but this was done to meet the operational expectations that were already defined. The RCMP Finance representative assigned to the V2010 ISU was not included in the operational decision-making process until 2009.
Under the 2009 Memorandum of Agreement with the Province of BC, RCMP assets obtained for the Games were cost-shared with the Province and post-Games assets were disposed of through the Public Works and Government Services Canada Crown Asset Distribution Centre. The coordination of disposal of assets was done through a Working Group co-chaired by PS and the BC Ministry of Public Safety and Solicitor General. The majority of assets were procured by the RCMP to integrate the assets into its regular operations, send to the 2010 G8 and G20 Summits in Ontario and store for future major events. The Working Group met regularly throughout, and following the Games to develop and implement a disposal of assets plan in accordance with the 2009 Memorandum of Agreement. The process was delayed in large part due to challenges faced by the RCMP in controlling assets prior to and following the Games. As a result of the Games, the RCMP is currently developing a standard operating procedure for asset management and disposal for major events. It is noteworthy that the work of PS on behalf of the federal government regarding the Disposal of Assets was spoken of positively by other Working Group members.
Finding #16: Housing thousands of GS&PS personnel was a challenging endeavour. The approaches taken by GS&PS partners were cost-effective.
In the lead up to the Games, approximately 25,000 hotel rooms were identified as being available in the Greater Vancouver Area and Resort Municipality of Whistler. VANOC had booked 78% of these rooms for IOC and VANOC related users. With an estimate of 300,000 visitors staying in the Vancouver area during the Games and average hotel costs of $500 per night, the RCMP examined various alternative accommodation options. These included use of non-traditional accommodationsFootnote 40, temporary accommodation facilities (TAFs) and temporary accommodation vessels (TAVs). The use of non-traditional accommodations in Whistler was found to be the most economical and feasible option as the close proximity to the venues allowed easy transportation to and from work sites. In the City of Vancouver, the leasing of accommodation vessels proved to be the most viable option. This option reduced the expense and resources required to provide security for the off-duty personnel, eased the coordination of transportation to work sites, and facilitated economies being achieved through centralized meal and support services.
The CF deployed 4,500 soldiers into operations for the Games. Accommodations, if available, would have cost up to $800 per soldier per night. This would not have included food services and would have required additional transportation requirements. Accordingly, it would have been neither cost effective, nor operationally effective to pursue these types of accommodation.
In 2008 the CF approached the Province of BC for assistance in finding accommodations. As a result of positive relationships developed from assistance provided by the CF in 2003Footnote 41, BC's Ministry of Forests and Ranges (MOFR) offered the CF use of six of its fire camps, including use of provincial lands for $1. The CF accepted this offer and planned to occupy four of the available camps, keeping two in reserve. The CF built the infrastructure to accommodate soldiers at the planned threat level of 'medium' and surge if the threat level increased. Leveraging on the federal-provincial relationship established five years earlier, the CF was able to secure accommodation for soldiers in the MOFR camps for a cost of $118 per soldier per night. Additional accommodations were provided for DND at a cost of approximately $260 per night.
Canadian Heritage worked in cooperation with Public Works Government Services Canada to address the accommodation needs of federal partners, excluding the RCMP and DND/CF, involved in non-security and security-related activities. These two organizations were able to meet the forecasted needs of partners by pursuing economies of scale and by establishing standing offers for sufficient, suitable, accommodations. GS&PS partners, excluding the RCMP and DND, did encounter some challenges in securing accommodations. Some factors that had to be considered included:
Finding #17: Human resources were deployed as defined by operational plans that were designed to respond to a 'medium' threat level.
The Games was the largest and most complex security undertaking ever to take place in Canada. The deployment of security personnel was planned at a 'medium' threat level allowing for the increase in resources to meet unexpected events or to decrease as resources were determined not to be needed. Reviews of the resources (both human and financial) occurred during the Design and Planning Phase and supported the operational plans necessary to meet a 'medium' threat level even though intelligence leading up to the Games indicated that the threat level was 'low'.
As well, planning for the Games was based in large part on the advice provided to planners from the IOC and VANOC. For example, planners were advised that the first week of the games is always calmer than the second week. Based on this assumption some security operations were scaled back or re-deployed to other GS&PS activities for the second week, however there was not a significant decrease in resources during the Olympic Games.
A major threat reassessment did not occur until after the Olympic Games, in preparation for the Paralympic Games. Originally, the Paralympic Games threat level was 'low' resulting in a planned reduction of security forces by 50% between the Olympic and Paralympic Games. During the Olympic Games, the threat assessment was reduced to 'negligible' for Paralympic Games. In response, the RCMP reduced its security contingent by approximately 90% and the CF followed suit. The demobilization resulted in savings of salary dollars and overtime as well as meal expenses for both the RCMP and DND. However, there was no significant savings in RCMP mobilization or accommodation costs due to fixed rate contracts.
The deployment of 6,200 law enforcement officers were drawn from the RCMP (70%) and 118 other police partner agencies (30%) from across the country. The RCMP employed a resource strategy which decreased the cost of the provision of security services to the Games and ensured minimal impact upon policing requirements across the country.
During the Games, the CF was under considerable pressure from competing demandsFootnote 42 for scarce resources. The CF called upon reservists to provide support to the Games so that regular members would not have to be redeployed from other operations to the Games. Of the 4,500 CF resources for the Games, approximately 24% were reservists.
For other GS&PS partners, resources were deployed to BC for the Games without major challenges. Outside of the RCMP and DND, other partners were not required to mobilize thousands of resources to the Games. Partners were able to meet Games operational plans while being conscious of maintaining their non-Games related activities and of the effects that extensive deployments could have on their employees. For example, CBSA increased its capacity in BC and at major airports across the countryFootnote 43 in anticipation of increased demand for border services. The anticipated increase of travelers coming into Canada for the Games was comparable to increases normally experienced during the summer months in Canada. Given that the Games occurred in the winter, a non-peak season, CBSA was able to adapt without a strain on the organization.
Interviewees from all partners indicated that resources were determined according to operational plans and as such were sufficient for delivering GS&PS activities. Interviewees did not specifically indicate if there was any over-staffing of activities. Notwithstanding examples provided in this report, there was insufficient information to determine if GS&PS activities could have been done with fewer resources.
Games Security and Public Safety for the Vancouver 2010 Olympic and Paralympic Winter Games was a complex, multi-year, horizontal endeavor. The Games were the most watched with 32 million Canadians and 3.5 billion people worldwide tuning inFootnote 44. Eleven federal partners worked collaboratively with the PCO, the Government of British Columbia, crown corporations, municipal authorities in Vancouver, Whistler and surrounding areas and a number of not-for-profit and private sector organizations for security and safety. There was an unprecedented amount of integration of partners in order to successfully achieve the goal of providing 'safe and secure Games'.
The Design and Planning Phase allowed partners to cooperatively develop scalable operational plans. The integrated exercises, inter-agency committees and co-location of partners at the V2010 ISU were all mechanisms that were used to successfully implement GS&PS activities. As well, partners have identified lessons learned and best practices that can be used for future events.
There were no serious GS&PS incidents over the duration of the Games and GS&PS activities did not disrupt the Games. In keeping with the philosophy of this being 'an athletic event with security, not a security event with athletes', the partners involved in GS&PS successfully accomplished 'safe and secure Games'.
It is recommended that:
This Games Security and Public Safety for the Vancouver 2010 Olympic and Paralympic Games Evaluation report has been reviewed and accepted by all GS&PS partners to be tabled at the respective Departmental Evaluation Committees, or otherwise endorsed, for recommendation for Deputy Head Approval. In addition to providing management action plans for partners directly affected by the evaluation's recommendations, all partners were provided the opportunity for responding to or to comment on this report as it relates to their organization.
The RCMP accepts the findings of the evaluation report and supports its recommendations. The RCMP provides the following management action plan:
Action Plan for Recommendation #1:
The RCMP National Major Event Security Framework (MESF) has been developed to reside in the GCPedia collaborative environment. This evergreen framework was developed with the participation of DRDC and Treasury Board. Official Launch authorization has been obtained within the RCMP and portions of MESF residing on the RCMP Info Web have been activated. The MESF is now available on the GCPedia. As well, several MESF presentations have been made to Federal Partners and MESF prototypes are currently being developed with them. The RCMP will continue to present the MESF to federal partners and support federal partners in the development of their respective MESF environments.
Public Safety Canada
Public Safety Canada accepts the findings of the evaluation report and supports its recommendations. Public Safety Canada provides the following management action plans:
Action Plan for Recommendation #1:
Public Safety Canada will lead in the exploration of the development of a whole of government planning and management framework to support the security and safety planning for major events held in Canada in the future. A feasibility assessment will examine the interest level and necessary requirements (human, financial etc) to develop such a framework. Consultations within Public Safety Canada, the Royal Canadian Mounted Police and other security-related federal departments will occur regarding the identification of documents (e.g. roles and responsibilities, Acts and Regulations, best practices, etc) that should be identified and made available through this framework. A corresponding governance structure would be identified for maintenance of such a framework.
Action Plan for Recommendation #2:
Public Safety Canada will lead the review and analysis of lessons learned and after-action reports produced by participating security and safety federal partners. A capabilities improvement process (CAIP) matrix that identifies corrective actions, offices of primary interest, and timelines for implementation of corrective actions will then be developed, which is based on the analysis of observations and recommendations contained in the reports.
Accessibility to those CAIP documents through a centralized repository will be explored to allow for information-sharing in relation to future events.
Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA)
Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA) accepts and supports the findings of the evaluation report and agrees that a governance framework identifying the accountabilities and interdependencies of all participant federal departments and agencies, including the sharing of classified information among participant organizations, would be beneficial to support the management of security and safety at future major events. The CBSA also concurs that an analysis and sharing of lessons learned from participating federal departments and agencies would enhance the preparedness of the Canadian Government in its major events security and safety planning. Hence the CBSA is committed to working with Public Safety Canada, RCMP and other security partners to address the recommendations.
Canada Post Corporation
Canada Post Corporation accepts the findings of the evaluation report and supports all recommendations. Canada Post will support Public Safety Canada with recommendation 2 and provide assistance, as required, with the analysis of lessons learned and capabilities improvement process.
Canadian Coast Guard (CCG))
The Canadian Coast Guard accepts the findings of the evaluation report and supports the two recommendations. No specific Canadian Coast Guard actions are required in support of the recommendations.
Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS)
The findings of the report have been accepted, and the two recommendations are fully supported by CSIS. While none of the recommendations and ensuing management action plans are specific to CSIS, CSIS is fully prepared and committed to participating in any working groups initiated by Public Safety Canada and other key security partners towards the development of improved processes to assist in the planning and successful delivery of future events.
Citizenship and Immigration Canada (CIC)
Citizenship and Immigration Canada (CIC) generally accepts the findings of this evaluation and supports its recommendations. CIC will continue to work with its federal partners to ensure future events are also successfully implemented.
Department of National Defence (DND)
The observations and recommendations in this RCMP-led evaluation report have been well-received at Canada Command. The recommendations are supported in order to optimize effectiveness and improve interoperability for the conduct of similar joint military and whole of government operations in the future. The DND/CF welcomes opportunities to participate in and contribute to initiatives that will effect implementation of the evaluation recommendations.
Health Canada accepts the findings of the evaluation report and supports each of the recommendations. Since there are no specific actions involving Health Canada, the Department cannot respond directly to the implementation of the recommendations. However, Health Canada agrees with the direction of the actions to be taken, and will participate in consultations and discussions where appropriate.
Industry Canada accepts the findings of the evaluation report and supports the recommendations. Industry Canada will share lessons learned from the Games and other major events, as required, to support analysis by Public Safety Canada and the RCMP.
Public Health Agency of Canada (PHAC)
The Public Health Agency of Canada (PHAC) accepts the findings of the evaluation report and supports the recommendations. PHAC will participate in discussions with Public Safety Canada and RCMP on a governance framework for safety and security at major events. In addition PHAC will work with Public Safety Canada to provide input to and assist in the analysis of the lessons learned and capabilities improvement processes.
Transport Canada has reviewed the evaluation, accepts the findings and supports its recommendations. Transport Canada looks forward to working with Public Safety Canada and other federal partners in implementing the recommendations of this report.
|July 2001||2010 Bid Corporation was formed to assist the cities of Vancouver and Whistler in the 2001 launch of the international bid to host the Games.|
|Fall 2001||Government of Canada departments and agencies began working with the Department of Canadian Heritage and the Vancouver 2010 Bid Corporation to determine preliminary cost estimates for security and policing at the 2010 Games.|
|December 2001||Bid Budget $175 million for security for the Games, tabled in Parliament as part of the Federal Government's overall, post-911 Security Budget.|
|2002||Initial cost estimates were reflected in bid documents provided to the International Olympic Committee.|
|July 2003||Strategic planning for security began immediately following the July 2003 announcement that Canada would host the 2010 Olympic and Paralympic Winter Games. The RCMP's V2010 ISU led these efforts.|
|FYs 2004-05 to 2006-07||V2010 ISU expenditures totaling $12.1 million were incurred and shared 50/50 by RCMP and Province of BC. RCMP cash managed these funds from its A-Base (program funding) and Province of BC remitted its share to RCMP. Throughout this period it was becoming increasingly clear to program staff that costs would significantly surpass the original Bid Budget. The lead for the RCMP initiative was made aware of the evolving cost creep as clarity of the scope and complexity of the operation improved, but resisted presenting revised figures to government until a sufficient level of confidence was achieved with refined projected cost estimates.|
|October 2007||On the recommendation of the National Security Advisor, the OCS (part of the Privy Council Office) was established for the Games and the G8 Summit in Huntsville.|
|Fall 2007||An updated multi-year budget of $496.7 million ($490.1 million for the V2010 ISU and $6 million for OGDsFootnote 45) was identified, then corrected in Spring 2008 to $498.6 million.|
|November 2008||RCMP forecasts for items that would turn out to be significant cost drivers were: Perimeter Intrusion Detections Systems (PIDS), Private Security, and Temporary Accommodation Vessels (TAVs). These were funded by cash management from the original A-Base funding and cash that was made available through Central Agency approval of the original $175 million.|
|January 2009||Additional funding / expenditure authority was sought for RCMP Operating funds $132M, & Capital $3.3M, CSIS $8.5 M, Citizenship and Immigration $2.4M, Industry Canada $9.8M, Transport Canada $8.3M, DND $209.9M, Public Works and Government Services Canada $0.6M.|
|February 2009||A revised cost sharing agreement was ratified between the federal government and Province of British Columbia.|
|July 2009||The V2010 ISU's multi-year budget was adjusted to $555.5 million, primarily as a result of increased cost projections related to three major contracts: Private Security, Accommodation Vessels and the Perimeter Intrusion Detection System.|
|August 2009||DND/CF, experiencing forecasted rising costs and internal differences of opinion on the reliability of cost projections, strikes an internal Tiger Team – independent operational planners and implementers – to validate forecasts.|
|September 2009||RCMP's revised forecasts drove previous estimates from November 2008 for PIDS, Private Security and TAVs. The combined pressure temporarily rose to $55.05M, until expenditure approval was obtained for these items from Central Agency.|
|November 2009||DND sought and obtained approval for a contingency funding of $19.1MFootnote 46, CCG for $3.8M, CBSA for $0.7M, and Canada Post Corporation for $0.7M. The overall budget for GS&PS now being declared by the media as being $900 million.|
|December 2009||Final multi-year ceiling for RCMP security expenditures was set at $521.8M.Footnote 47|
The following bullets provide both relevant aspects of the mandates of the respective federal departments and agencies and demonstrate how each partner aligned with and contributed to federal priorities:
Footnote 4For the purposes of this evaluation, GS&PS partners include CBSA, Canada Post Corporation, Citizenship and Immigration Canada, CCG, CSIS, DND/CF, Health Canada, Industry Canada, PHAC, PS, RCMP and Transport Canada.
Footnote 6RCMP, Public Safety Canada, Department of National Defence and others were already very much involved in the security component, when OCS was formed and inserted into the security effort. The creation of the OCS brought a new partner into GS&PS planning and coordination. Once the OCS was engaged, it became apparent that there would be a shift from the policy focus that had been provided to that point by PS, to one that would place urgent attention on building operational capacity to deliver GS&PS.
Footnote 10 ITAC acts as a fusion centre where all terrorism threat related information is shared to enable the production of integrated assessments of the terrorism threat to Canadian interests, both domestically and internationally. ITAC was responsible for the threat levels concerning the nine categories (Terrorism-International and Domestic, Domestic Extremism, CBRN, Cyber, Critical Infrastructure, Organized Crime, Espionage/Foreign influenced activity, Public Health and Natural Hazards. It is within this context that ITAC worked with the RCMP and GS&PS partners for Games safety and security planning and operations. However, ITAC was not identified as a partner in this evaluation and therefore was not directly included in the scope of this evaluation.
Footnote 24Key visits included representatives from the London Metropolitan Police in preparation for the 2012 London Summer Games, the Russian Security Team for Sochi 2014 and the Indian Security Team for the 2010 Commonwealth Games.
Footnote 27The JIG was operational during the Design and Planning Phase of the Games and was modeled after the 2002 G8 Summit held in Kananaskis, Alberta. At its peak, the JIG was composed of approximately 200 representatives from various police services, RCMP, CSIS, CBSA, Transport Canada and the DND/CF.
Footnote 28The Bid Budget included $25 million for private security to address costs of hiring of retired police officers, retired DND/CF personnel and private security trained personnel to supplement police roles. The intention was to reduce the impact of removing police officers from their home communities.
Footnote 31The CCG's Fleet Operations Planning process generally requires information for special events requiring dedicated vessels in advance (often two years) in order to meet its service delivery requirements for other clients.
Footnote 32The figures in this table represent incremental funding only as of November 2010 and were provided to the evaluation team by program areas. Internal A-based funding is not reflected in this table.
Footnote 42Other operations for the DND/CF included NATO-led International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan, African Union/United Nations Hybrid operation in Darfur, the CF response to the earthquake in Haiti.
Footnote 45At this point only planning money had been identified for OGDs, but for operational funds for other organizations like the CF (estimated to require $209M for its ops capability) had not yet been identified.
Footnote 46$9M to cover additional projected personnel costs, $3M for Marine Barriers, $4.2M additional costs for commissionaires, and $2.9M for CBRNE = $19.1M – In the end this contingency funding was not required as instead of spending its authorized $212M (excluding contingency) DND spent $196.4M.