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2010 G8 and G20 Summits RCMP led Horizontal Evaluation Report

Final Report: January 2014

This report has been reviewed in consideration of the Access to Information and Privacy Acts. An asterisk [*] appears where information has been removed; published information is UNCLASSIFIED.

Table of Contents

  • Acronyms/Definitions
  • 1 Executive Summary
  • 2 Background and Context
    • 2.1 Events Profile
    • 2.2 Purpose and Scope
    • 2.3 Methodology and Approach
    • 2.4 Limitations to Conducting the Evaluation
  • 3 Findings and Lessons Learned
    • 3.1 PERFORMANCE
    • 3.1.1 Design and Planning of Summits
    • 3.1.2 Operational Readiness and Interoperability
    • 3.1.3 Performance - Demonstration of Efficiency and Economy
    • 3.2 RELEVANCE
  • 4 Conclusion
  • 5 Appendices
    • 5.1 Appendix A: Evaluation Questions
    • 5.2 Appendix B: G8-G20 Summit - June 2010 - Overall Assessment Questionnaire
    • 5.3 Appendix C: Constraints for Comparing the Summits to Other Major Events
    • 5.4 Appendix D: Federal Partners' Contribution to "Safe and Secure G8 and G20 Summits"
    • 5.5 Appendix E: Alignment of Project with Federal Partners' Strategic Outcomes
    • 5.6 Appendix F: Federal Partners' mandated responsibilities for the Summits
    • 5.7 Appendix G: Reviews, Investigations, After-Action Reports
  • Footnotes

Acronyms/Definitions

CBRNE
Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear and Explosive
CBSA
Canada Border Services Agency
CSIS
Canadian Security Intelligence Service
CAF
Canadian Armed Forces
DND
Department of National Defence
Games
2010 Vancouver Olympic and Paralympic Winter Games
G8
Group of Eight
G20
Group of Twenty
GPPAG
Government Partners Public Affairs Group
IPP
International Protected Person
ISU
Integrated Security Unit
JIG
Joint Intelligence Group
MESF
Major Events Security Framework
MTCC
Metro Toronto Convention Centre
OCS
Office of the Coordinator for Security of the 2010 Olympics and Summits
OPP
Ontario Provincial Police
PACT
Public Affairs Communication Team
PHAC
Public Health Agency of Canada
PMES
Performance Measurement and Evaluation Strategy
POJ
Police of Jurisdiction
PS
Public Safety Canada
RCMP
Royal Canadian Mounted Police
SCFP
Security Cost Framework Policy
SMO
Summit Management Office
Summits
G8 and G20 Summits
TB
Treasury Board
TPS
Toronto Police Service

1 Executive Summary

From June 25 - 27, 2010, world leaders attended the G8 and G20 Summits in Muskoka and Toronto, Ontario to discuss global and economic issues. The complexities of hosting two major events in two cities consecutively resulted in 21,000 security personnel working together from municipal, provincial and federal organizations to ensure the safety and security of everyone attending the Summits.

To address information requirements of senior management and fulfill Treasury Board Policy on Evaluation requirements, this evaluation was conducted on the safety and security of the G8 and G20 Summits.

What we examined

The evaluation of the Summits was conducted by the Royal Canadian Mounted Police in collaboration with Canada Border Services Agency, Canadian Security Intelligence Service, Department of National Defence, Health Canada, Industry Canada, Public Health Agency of Canada, Public Safety Canada and Transport Canada.

The objective of the evaluation was to examine federal activities and outcomes that contributed to 'safe and secure G8 and G20 Summits' including design and planning, operational readiness, sharing of information and knowledge amongst federal partners, cost and efficiencies.

Why it is important

The hosting of two world summits consecutively was unprecedented. The G8 Summit expected 2,500 people in attendance and the G20 Summit expected 7,500 people in attendance. Both Summits brought together heads of state, senior government officials, and representatives from numerous countries to discuss economic and issues of mutual global interest. Contributing to the complexity of hosting two world Summits consecutively was the fact that summits have served in the past as a target for domestic and global activists to engage in protests. Safe and secure G8 and G20 Summits was a key achievement in demonstrating the Canadian government's ability to safely carry out large public events in Canada. This included balancing security operations and individual rights and freedoms to peaceful demonstration as guaranteed under the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

There were 660 reported incidents at the Summits. Of these, 40 incidents were of extreme, high or medium priority and 620 were of low priority. All incidents were responded to without disrupting the Summits and while maintaining the safety of the Internationally Protected Persons and delegates.

What we found

As the Summits were specific events that had a short duration, this evaluation presents findings and lessons learned rather than recommendations. The following highlights the key findings:

  • Federal partners detected, responded and mitigated threats in accordance with operational plans. There were minimal serious incidents and all incidents were responded to without disrupting the Summits. This resulted in the achievement of a 'safe and secure Summits'.
  • * Upgrading security clearances and tailoring information was time consuming and labour-intensive but necessary in order to support secure operations.
  • In 2011, the Auditor General of Canada reported that there was approved funding of $846M for safety and security and that the total projected cost was $510M.Footnote 1 Due to a number of factors outside of the control of the safety and security partners, funding requests were based on assumptions which resulted in an overestimation of financial resources.
  • All federal partners had adequate human resources to support their participation in the Summits. Approximately 21,000 personnel were utilized to ensure safe and secure Summits.Footnote 2 Royal Canadian Mounted Police resources were complemented by support from 17 other police forces as well as private security in order to fulfill policing activities for the Summits.

This evaluation focused specifically on the role of federal partners in providing safe and secure G8 and G20 Summits. In order to provide a full overview of the events, links to additional sources of information, reports and investigations are available in Appendix G.

2 Background and Context

2.1 Events Profile

In June 2008, the Prime Minister announced that Canada would host a G8 Summit in June 2010. On September 25, 2009, the Prime Minister's Office announced the addition of the G20 Summit. The hosting of two world summits consecutively from June 25 27, 2010 was unprecedented.

The Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) was identified as the operational lead agency to ensure safety and security for the Summits. Achieving a 'safe and secure G8 and G20 Summits' for participants, visitors, protestors and residents included balancing the fundamental rights of Canadians, including the right to peacefully demonstrate with the need to maintain public safety, peace and good order. This was important to support the Government's vision of ensuring global confidence in Canada's ability to safely host large public events.

This evaluation assesses the performance of nine federal partners involved in hosting 'safe and secure Summits':

  • Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA)
  • Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS)
  • Department of National Defence/Canadian Armed Forces (DND/CAF)
  • Health Canada
  • Industry Canada
  • Public Health Agency of Canada (PHAC)
  • Public Safety Canada (PS) excluding contribution agreements managed in accordance with the Security Cost Framework Policy (SCFP) with seven provincial and municipal security partners such as the Ontario Provincial Police (OPP), Toronto Police Service (TPS) and Peel Regional Police etc.
  • Royal Canadian Mounted Police
  • Transport Canada

The federal partners worked together using a three-phased approach which included:

  • design, planning, and operational readiness;
  • summit operations; and
  • demobilization/debrief.

2.2 Purpose and Scope

To address information requirements of senior management and Treasury Board (TB), the objective of the evaluation was to examine the safety and security of the G8 and G20 Summits. As the Summits were one time major events in 2010 that have both since ended, the evaluation presents findings and lessons learned rather than providing specific recommendations for improvement.

The evaluation was conducted in accordance with the TB Policy on Evaluation for the Government of Canada and was led by the RCMP's National Program Evaluation Services in collaboration with federal safety and security partners.Footnote 3

Prior to launching the evaluation, a Performance Measurement and Evaluation Strategy (PMES) was developed by the nine federal partners to outline the major components required to provide 'safe and secure Summits'. The scope of the evaluation was to examine the activities and outcomes that contributed to 'safe and secure G8 and G20 Summits' through the phases of design and planning, operational readiness and sharing of information and knowledge. Ten questions were developed to address the TB Policy on Evaluation (2009) core issues for relevance and performance (Appendix A).

This evaluation did not assess the contribution agreements managed by Public Safety Canada in accordance with the SCFP by Public Safety Canada with provincial and municipal security partners involved in assisting the RCMP. Also the evaluation did not assess the responsibilities of the Summits Police of Jurisdiction (POJ) (such as OPP, TPS and Peel Regional Police).

The following chart identifies the distribution of the $846M approved funding:

Description of chart in tabular format follows.

Approved Funding Chart (description follows)

Approved Funding
Distribution of Funding %
Footnote # Contribution Agreements (PS) 32.67%
CSIS, CBSA, Industry Canada, Health Canada, Transport Canada, PHAC, PS 1.5%
DND/CAF 9%
RCMP 48.8%
Footnote ## Contingency Funds (RCMP) 8.3%

Footnote # Contribution Agreements managed by PS were not assessed in this evaluation.

Footnote ## Contingency funds were held by the RCMP but were not accessed for the Summits.

2.3 Methodology and Approach

The evaluation used multiple lines of evidence including both qualitative and quantitative information.

Document Review

Documents reviewed and analyzed for this evaluation include security plans, working papers, lessons learned reports, press releases, academic papers, post-event reports, expenditure reports and communication files from each federal partner.

Interviews

Between October 2010 and April 2011, over 60 interviews were conducted in Barrie, Toronto, and National Headquarters (Ottawa). Interviewees included senior management and planners for the Summits from all federal partners identified. The majority of interviews were conducted with the RCMP as the lead of operations and the recipient of the majority of funding.

Onsite Visit

Members of the evaluation team attended an onsite training exercise between May 10 and May 14, 2010 to observe how the various federal partners worked together and collaborated within a simulated operational environment. This visit focused on observing communications between agencies, understanding roles and responsibilities, and identifying gaps within the multi-agency approach to planning.

Survey Review

Surveys were not conducted specifically for this evaluation. A questionnaire was conducted by Defence Research and Development Canada. Demographics of the 806 respondents to the G8-G20 Summit June 2010 Overall Assessment Questionnaire are presented in Appendix B. Responses from this questionnaire were used to support evaluation findings.

2.4 Limitations to Conducting the Evaluation

Timeliness of Obtaining Information

A series of reviews, investigations, complaints, civil actions, parliamentary and other related processes took place immediately following the Summits. These processes generated considerable work for partners and as such, information requested for this evaluation could not always be provided in a timely manner.

Lack of available information

The question regarding "resources utilized with more or less efficiency than other major events", to support the demonstration of efficiency and economy of the Summits could not be assessed. It became clear through document analysis that there was a lack of information to compare Canada's 2010 Summits to other host jurisdictions. Appendix C presents a short description of the factors which contributed to this.

Typical for a major event, resources are deployed to the event to implement operational plans. In most cases, resources were deployed to the Summits for approximately 10-15 days, and then redeployed back to their home unit. As a result, the evaluation team was unable to make contact with the majority of these resources. To the extent possible, this has been mitigated with the G8-G20 Summit June 2010 Overall Assessment Questionnaire noted above.

3 Findings and Lessons Learned

3.1 PERFORMANCE

3.1.1 Design and Planning of the Summits

Finding 1: Roles and accountabilities for providing oversight and leadership to federal partners were not always clear.

Oversight for a 'whole-of-government' approach to planning for the Summits was assigned to the following federal organizations:

  • the Office of the Coordinator for Security (OCS) at the Privy Council Office;
  • Public Safety Canada;
  • the RCMP; and
  • the Summit Management Office (SMO) at the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade.

Each of these federal partners were dependent on each other for information and had a leadership role to other partners.

The OCS was created to provide oversight and coordination of safety and security for the 2010 Winter Olympic and Paralympic Games held in Vancouver, British Columbia (Games) and the Summits. Oversight included, but was not limited to:

  • responsibility of overseeing the implementation of the SCFP;Footnote 4
  • coordinating budgets and funding requests;
  • overseeing safety and security operational planning; and
  • coordinating whole-of-government exercises to confirm operational readiness for the Summits.

For the Summits, the OCS assumed a leadership role with support from PS. As an example, while the OCS provided oversight for the SCFP, PS conducted activities with non-federal partners to implement the SCFP and had an integral role in guiding business case development, budget planning and other key tasks necessary to planning for operations of non-federal partners. Given that the OCS was newly created, there were challenges understanding the roles of PS compared to the OCS by other partners.

The RCMP was identified as the operational lead agency to coordinate the Summits' security planning, operations and demobilization activities and fulfilled these duties and responsibilities through an Integrated Security Unit (ISU). The ISU included members from key federal, provincial and municipal security agencies including the RCMP, OPP and DND/CAF. Other partners and key stakeholders saw duplication between the RCMP and OCS and did not differentiate between 'overseeing security and safety planning' by the OCS and the 'operational lead' role assigned to the RCMP.

The SMO was responsible for hosting the Summits and led planning and coordination of all aspects excluding safety and security. The RCMP and safety and security federal partners were reliant on information from the SMO (i.e. venue locations, number of delegates attending) to develop their planning assumptions and to seek funding. This was challenging for all partners who were dependent on the RCMP and on the SMO for providing information.

Finding 2: Development of G20 Summit plans was a challenge due to the complexity of the event and uncertainty of major factors.

When the G8 Summit was announced in 2008, the location was identified as the Deerhurst Resort in Huntsville, Ontario. With this information, planning for safety and security of the G8 Summit commenced through the RCMP-led ISU. After the announcement of the G20 Summit was made in late September 2009, RCMP and partners began planning without knowing the location and exact dates of the G20 Summit. Partners had nine months (September 2009 to June 2010) to plan and secure funding for the G20 Summit.

The following events occurred between 2008 and 2010:

June 2008
Announcement of the G8 Summit in Huntsville, Ontario in June 2010
September 2009
Announcement of Canada Hosting the G20 Summit in June 2010. Location and exact dates not announced
December 2009
Announcement that the G20 will occur in Toronto, Ontario immediately following the G8
January - March 2010
2010 Winter Games occurs in Vancouver - many resources from security partners deployed to B.C.
February 2010
During the Winter Games, announcement of the venues for the G20
June 2010
G8 and G20 Summits
December 2009 - May 2010
Exercises to test and validate plans

The short planning period for the G20 Summit resulted in planning assumptions being developed to support budgets and operational plans. Planners had to develop and adjust operational plans (further discussed under Finding 12) as new information was being provided and without knowing how many resources would be available.

In December 2009, it was announced that the G20 Summit would immediately follow the G8 Summit and be held in Toronto. Key details were not available such as the exact summit sites within Toronto, transportation details, and precise information about Internationally Protected Persons (IPPs) and their delegations. Past experience indicated that delegations could be up to 100 people large. The G8 Summit was expected to have 2,500 people in attendanceFootnote 5 and the G20 Summit was expected to have 7,500 people in attendance. As a result, a number of scenarios had to be created in order for business cases to be submitted for further funding. In February 2010, four months before the event, the Metro Toronto Convention Centre (MTCC) was announced as the venue for the G20 Summit.

The late addition of the G20 Summit, the choice of G20 Summit venues and delays in key planning information posed security challenges for the hosting of two consecutive major events being held in a large geographic area.Footnote 6

3.1.2 Operational Readiness and Interoperability

Finding 3: Varying protocols and procedures for sharing and classifying information made information sharing difficult.

*

One partner department had top secret security clearance that did not meet the security requirements of the RCMP. As a result, some planners, from other partner organizations, working within the ISU needed to complete the process to obtain RCMP security clearances. This caused some delays in obtaining resources especially for the Joint Intelligence Group (JIG). * The resourcefulness of the personnel helped establish approaches to more easily share information. Upgrading security clearances and tailoring information was time consuming and labour-intensive but necessary in order to support secure operations.

Finding 4: Collection and dissemination of intelligence through one central team supported the partners in working together.

The Summits JIG was established in December 2008. Its mandate was to collect and disseminate information and intelligence in a timely manner to assist in the decision making process in both planning and implementation phases of the Summits.

The JIG comprised approximately 500 personnel from key stakeholders such as the RCMP, OPP, TPS and Peel Regional Police, CSIS, CBSA, the CAF and Transport Canada. The JIG identified criminal activity and other threats to the Summits and relayed those risks to the appropriate partners. Threats were detected and communicated to decision makers in a timely manner.

The function and operations of the JIG was a best practice from the Vancouver Winter Games. Based on the knowledge gained from the Games, new and revised procedures were implemented at the Summits which improved communication of intelligence.

Finding 5: The exercise program was successful in testing operational readiness for the Summits.

The OCS, PS, CAF and ISU coordinated three series of exercises in order to test operations between December 2009 and May 2010. The exercises consisted of the following:

  • All levels of government and communities;
  • ISU Command Centre security capabilities; and
  • CAF's support role.

The first all-government exercise, Trillium Sentry, was conducted in December 2009. The objective of this exercise was to assess the level of collaboration that would be required from an operational security standpoint. Additionally, it gave departments the opportunity to test their concept of operations and revise accordingly. Gaps highlighted during this exercise were identified in after-action reports.

Five months later in May 2010, the second all-government functional exercise, Trillium Guardian, was held to assess government departments' and agencies' operational readiness. Trillium Guardian was considered a critical requirement to ensure the success of the Summits as it focused on live scenarios. * Gaps highlighted during this exercise were identified in debrief reports. However, because mobilization began only two weeks after the exercise, few lessons learned were actually implemented.

Overall, interviewees had mixed views of the exercises. Several interviewees who came directly from the Games did not feel the need for the exercises. Despite the mixed perspectives, activities tested during the exercises helped to identify and address risk areas.

Finding 6: RCMP, DND/CAF, CBSA, Transport Canada and other stakeholders were operationally ready to detect, respond to and mitigate marine and air based threats.

There were no marine incidents during the Summits. Federal partners worked closely with the OPP for the G8 Summit and with TPS for the G20 Summit to utilize the marine knowledge and expertise of these partners and to customize security plans to the marine environments of Muskoka region and the Greater Toronto Area.

Air security incidents were responded to according to plans. The majority of incidents were of aircrafts nearing or entering secure zones. All aircrafts were compliant with authorities and did not pose a threat to the Summits. *

The dedicated operations centres for air security and marine security consisted of all key partners and were critical to operational readiness given the ability to share information in a timely manner.

Finding 7: Operational plans were in place to prevent and respond to Border Integrity incidents. Operational roles and responsibilities between the RCMP and CBSA were unclear.

Border integrity related incidents were prevented and responded as operational plans were in place. CBSA facilitated entry to Canada of all accredited Summits participants and non-delegate visitors. CBSA was also responsible for the entry of persons through air, land and marine ports of entry.

For border integrity operations, authorities for the RCMP and CBSA were defined in Memorandums of Understanding. * Interviewees explained that normally when passengers arrive in Canada, CBSA would determine if a search should occur. However, for the Summits, the RCMP had search authorities. *

The RCMP worked closely with PHAC and Health Canada to conduct Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear and Explosive (CBRNE) searches at various sites of the Summits. To maximize limited resources, CBSA assisted with the security screening of baggage for CBRNE threats at the airport since CBSA had the equipment and skilled resources.

However, CBSA interviewees felt that because they were not a part of the ISU, the Agency was not as integrated in planning with the RCMP as they could have been. CBSA did participate in the exercises and once the Agency became more involved in preparing for the Summits, the relationship with the RCMP and other federal partners was strengthened.

Finding 8: The RCMP provided effective Policing Operations within its areas of responsibility and for IPPs. The RCMP also provided support to OPP, Peel Regional Police and TPS activities.

In regards to Policing Operations, the RCMP was responsible for protecting IPPs and their delegations, providing security operations within its designated areas of responsibility and aiding policing partners outside of its areas of responsibility.

The RCMP designated areas of responsibility surrounded the immediate area of specific Summits sites, including controlled and restricted access zones such as the Deerhurst Resort, Lester B. Pearson International Airport Infield Terminal, the Fairmont Royal York Hotel and the MTCC. Policing activities within these areas varied and included general duty, emergency response, security for IPPs and delegations, CBRNE searches and traffic control.

The RCMP was also responsible for the transportation of the IPPs. Due to the geographical distances between the sites of the G8 Summit and G20 Summit, IPP movements were extremely complex. Plans were followed and the RCMP took appropriate measures, based on identifying and mitigating risks, to ensure the safety of IPPs.

Policing operations plans allowed for scalability in order to adapt quickly if the threat level changed. This proved to be successful when, just prior to the start of the G20 Summit, an IPP informed the SMO that he would attend the G20 Summit and that he would stay outside of the designated security zones. This required additional security and routes to be planned in a short timeframe to ensure the safety of the IPP.

The RCMP worked closely with other POJFootnote 7 to provide collaborative policing and support as required. As an example, the RCMP provided support for protecting protestors' rights to peaceful demonstration. For the G8 Summit, the primary POJ was the OPP and for the G20 Summit, TPS was responsible for safety and security outside of the designated secure zones. On Saturday June 26, 2010, an increasing number of protests were occurring in Toronto at the G20 Summit. As a result, RCMP and OPP deployed 800 police resources from the G8 Summit and Ottawa to support TPS in Toronto.Footnote 8

Finding 9: Effective Land Security and Operational Support was achieved by federal partners.

The role of the CAF for the G8 Summit in support of land security was to provide aerial surveillance and to conduct perimeter and ground security patrols surrounding the G8 Summit area of responsibility. * Due to the number of security resources required to secure both Summit sites, the CAF was able to augment and support what was required of the RCMP to effectively use available resources.

Transport Canada successfully coordinated rail transportation safety and security. For the G20 Summit, Transport Canada worked closely with stakeholders such as other police forces, the Toronto Transit Commission, GO transit, and VIA Rail. Transport Canada conducted education campaigns with staff at Union Station and provided public notifications about possible rail transportation restrictions. Transport Canada also supported enhanced security measures designed to respond to security restrictions put in place by the RCMP in areas such as venues, corridors and perimeters.

The safety component of the Summits involved PHAC, Health Canada and Public Safety Canada. Each had a crucial role to ensure the safety of IPPs, personnel and the general public. Responsibilities included CBRNE safety preparedness, Emergency Preparedness and Occupational Health. Activities were carried out according to plans to provide safety at the Summits.

Finding 10: Consistent communication of information during the Summits was made easier by the integration of local, regional and federal partnersFootnote 9

Centralized communication to stakeholders provided the ability to monitor information which minimized duplication for individual partner communication teams. PS led the 2010 G8 Government Partners Public Affairs Group Security and Public Safety (GPPAG) and the RCMP led the Public Affairs Communication Team (PACT), with local, regional and federal counterparts.

Fully integrated teams including local and regional stakeholders were able to share resources and skills to provide coordinated responses for public affairs. With the inclusion of stakeholders from the City of Toronto, Public Affairs gained credibility as well as access to Toronto communications tools such as "Our Toronto", the official communication tool for the City of Toronto, which provided communication to various communities in 10 languages.

The integrated teams issued briefings, media monitoring and conducted outreach to key stakeholders. Over the period of June 18 28, 2010, the GPPAG produced key materials such as 24 public communications summary reports, 24 media summaries, 14 official media inquiry responses and 457 email responses. This excludes phone calls and web inquiries made specifically to the PACT. The GPPAG also held up to 30 conference calls during this timeframe with partners to ensure that there was regular communication within the GPPAG for coordinated and consistent media responses.

Finding 11: Best practices and lessons learned from the Summits have been retained for future major events.

Knowledge was transferred from the 2010 Winter Olympic and Paralymic Games to the Summits. For example, CSIS used best practices from the Games and applied it to the JIG for the Summits. For future events, federal partners such as PHAC and Health Canada cited the Summits funding experience and planning assumptions as valuable knowledge for planning the 2015 Pan America Games in Ontario.

To facilitate knowledge transfer, the majority of federal partners participated in a lessons learned process either by creating post event reports or participating in debriefing sessions following the exercises and the Summits. Many identified recommendations will support their organization in planning future major events.

As a direct result of the RCMP's experience from the Games and Summits, it created a Major Events Security Framework (MESF) that has been made available to partners. By formally establishing a standard and comprehensive approach to major event security and safety planning, this will strengthen planning for future planning for RCMP-led major events.

3.1.3 Performance Demonstration of Efficiency and Economy

Finding 12: Total projected cost of $510M for safety and security of the Summits was less than the $846M of funding approved for all federal partnersFootnote 10

With the addition of the G20 Summit in September 2009, federal partners were required to put together business cases to obtain funding based on limited information. This resulted in planning that was done on a "worst-case scenario" basis. The RCMP worked with the information that was available at the time to develop operational plans and informed the participating safety and security departments of the level of contribution that was required on their behalf.

The Auditor General stated that budgets were built around planning assumptions amid changing information that resulted in an overestimated budget to reflect unknown operational requirements. Approved funding for the Summits was $846M and the total projected cost was $510M. Funding was delineated as:Footnote 11

Partner Approved Funding Projected Costs Projected Difference
RCMP $413.3M $314.6M $98.7M
Contingency Funds held by the RCMP $69.9M - $69.9M
PS $2.2M $2.2M $0M
Contribution agreements managed by PS (not assessed in this evaluation)Footnote 12 $276.2M $156.3M $119.9M
DND/CAF $74.8M $28.9M $45.9M
CSIS $2.8M $1.9M $0.9M
Industry Canada $2.8M $2.7M $0.1M
Health Canada $2.0M $1.3M $0.7M
Transport Canada $1.1M $0.4M $0.7M
CBSA $1.0M $1.0M -
PHAC $0.5M $0.6M $(0.1)M

Both the Auditor General and the Parliamentary Budget Office stated and confirmed that the security costs were reasonable.

Finding 13: Sufficient human resources were deployed to support the Summits.

There were approximately 21,000 personnel deployed in order to ensure safe and secure Summits. This included resources from the OPP, the TPS and the Peel Regional Police, 17 other police agencies as well as four municipal security partners for operations within and outside of the RCMP areas of responsibility.

All federal partners agreed that human resources deployed for the Summits were in accordance with operational plans and were sufficient to conduct operations. Partners aimed to minimize the impact of deployment to the Summits on other operations while ensuring that resources were available to support the Summits if the threat level increased.

For example, CBSA teams were flexible to react to changes in operational requirements. Employees were deployable on short notice for screenings and nearby regions were on standby for additional capacity if needed. CBSA conducted weekly conference calls with neighboring regions of Toronto so that all staff were engaged and actively aware of the Summits. With this approach, if the threat level rose, CBSA would be able to deploy resources and those resources would already have an understanding of plans for the Summits.

The RCMP planned for approximately 7,000 members to be deployed to the Summits. The final number needed was greater than the total availability of RCMP resources for deployment. This gap was addressed through private security resources and resources obtained from other police forces. Private Security resources were an effective alternative to using RCMP resources for low-risk activities such as personal screening areas and vehicle screening areas. There were approximately 5,575 RCMP resources, 2,400 private security resources and 650 other police resources used to support RCMP led activities.

Finding 14: RCMP mobilization and transportation of police resources were a challenge.

Mobilization and transportation of police resources were challenged by:

  • Two separate event sites and overlapping operational days;
  • Developing deployment lists including obtaining agreement from RCMP Divisions regarding the availability of resources and to identify resources with the appropriate skill-sets;
  • Mobilizing a large number of resources; and
  • Planning transportation between sites within the constraints of bus contracts.

The mobilization team was responsible for acquiring and deploying members from across the country for Summit Operations. As a result of two separate sites for the Summits and an overlap in operational days, two separate teams of resources were built; one for the G8 Summit and the other for the G20 Summit.

One of the main challenges in obtaining RCMP resources was to obtain agreement from Divisions on the amount of resources that would be released. Divisions were reluctant to release resources to the Summits as they had just finished deploying high numbers of resources to the Games a few months earlier. This caused difficulties in balancing operational needs of the Summits.

Once the RCMP mobilization team was advised of the number of resources that would be released, the team used the RCMP Human Resources System to determine the resources with specialized skill requirements for each operation. Use of this system was critical for identifying and deploying a large number of resources to the Summits. *

In addition to challenges in identifying resources, the mobilization team relied on changing requirements from planners as a result of new information. In many instances, operational plans were not finalized until after the exercises in May 2010. Site commanders indicated that the assignment of resources continued to change even during the Summits. *

During table top exercises it became evident that there was insufficient coordination amongst the various RCMP processes to mobilize, receive, transport, orient and train resources which could have jeopardized the operational readiness of resources for the Summits. To avoid this, a synchronization team was created that was responsible for day-by-day coordination in order to ensure that resources were deployed properly to the Summits.Footnote 13 This team has been identified as a best practice for future major events involving a large number of resources.

The transportation team had the mandate of facilitating secure transportation to move police resources between sites. The transportation team faced a significant challenge of having to plan transportation within the constraint of contracts made with bus companies. Within these contracts, hours for drivers were set and shift lengths and break-time rules were determined along with a schedule of drop-off and pick-ups. * However, buses were one of the only economical options for transporting members from site to site.

During the G20 Summit, RCMP resources needed to be transported from their hotels to their work-site, and return. * Some site commanders stated that they used their own personal vehicles. * Site commanders were also concerned about whether or not resources would arrive on time for their shifts and whether or not alternate transportation arrangements had to be made to get members to their sites.

Lessons learned and operational recommendations regarding mobilization and transportation have been identified internally by the RCMP for future major events.

3.2 RELEVANCE

There was a need for the Government of Canada to ensure that safe and secure G8 and G20 Summit events were hosted for the world leaders. The Summits involved many IPPs as well as their delegations. In addition, summits have served as a target for domestic and global activists to engage in protests. This was the case at the Seattle, Quebec City, Genoa, and London Summits which resulted in violent protests. There was a role and responsibility for the federal government and each partner to respond to safety and security requirements as mandated in applicable legislation. This included balancing security operations and individual rights and freedoms guaranteed under the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The expected result of a "safe and secure Summits" was well aligned with the mandates of each partner, their strategic outcomes and in particular aligns with federal government vision of maintaining global confidence in the Canadian federal government's ability to protect and defend large public events in Canada. Appendices D, E and F provide additional information.Footnote 14

4 Conclusion

This evaluation focused specifically on the role of federal partners in providing safe and secure G8 and G20 Summits. The June 2010 Summits were the first time that a country hosted both the G8 and G20 Summits consecutively. This was a complex task given the minimal time to plan for these high-profile security events. The nine federal partners were successful at responding to incidents without disrupting the Summits, maintaining the safety of the IPPs and delegates, and balancing the fundamental rights and freedoms of Canadians with the need to maintain public safety, peace and good order. Planning was affected by changing information, the late addition of the G20 Summit and subsequent late announcement of the G20 Summit venues. Through collaboration among partners, plans were implemented as intended and were scaled to respond to risks. Best practices, lessons learned and operational recommendations have been identified to be used for future major events. The cooperation and integration of all the departments and agencies involved contributed to the overall final outcome of 'safe and secure Summits'. In order to provide a full overview of the events, links to additional sources of information, reports and investigations are available in Appendix G.

5 Appendices

5.1 Appendix A: Evaluation Questions

RELEVANCE

Need for Safety and Security Partners

1. To what extent does security and policing address a demonstrable need?

Alignment with Government Priorities

2. To what extent was there a linkage between security and policing operations' objectives (a) federal government priorities; (b) departmental strategic outcomes?

Federal Roles and Responsibilities

3. To what extent was the security and policing operations aligned with federal government roles and responsibilities?

PERFORMANCE

Achievement of Expected Outcomes

In order to assess the achievement of the final outcome of 'safe and secure Summits', the following questions were developed:

4. To what extent did design and planning contribute to operational readiness?

5. To what extent were partners interoperable (pre and during the event)?

6. To what extent did the partners achieve effective Summit Operations?

7.To what extent was there effective knowledge transfer as a part of the demobilization/de-brief process?

Demonstration of Efficiency and Economy

8. What, if any, factors limited or enabled success in meeting security goals?

9. Were the resources requested and received adequate for implementing the activities?

10. Were the resources utilized with more or less efficiency than other major events?Footnote 15

5.2 Appendix B: G8-G20 Summit June 2010 Overall Assessment Questionnaire

Total Respondents: 806

Organization of Respondents %
RCMP 62%
Montreal Police 15%
Sûreté du Québec 11%
Ontario Provincial Police 6%
Canadian Armed Forces 1%
Edmonton Police Service 1%
Toronto Police Service 1%
Commissionaires 1%
Other 2%
Command Centre of Venue of Respondent %
Hotel 32%
Metro Toronto Convention Centre 17%
Other (including Airport) 13%
Muskoka Area Command Centre 12%
Toronto Area Command Centre 12%
Unified Command Centre 8%
Direct Energy Centre 5%
Muskoka Incident Command Centre 1%

5.3 Appendix C: Constraints for Comparing the Summits to Other Major Events

In June of 2010, Parliamentary Budget Office wrote a report entitled, "The Assessment of Planned Security Costs for the 2010 G8 and G20 Summits" which annexes a list of 14 cost drivers of Summit security including:

  1. Overall Threat Assessment
  2. Known, Specific, Credible Threats
  3. Number and Types of Venues
  4. Duration
  5. Lockdown Period
  6. Past Use
  7. Transportation
  8. Primary Targets
  9. Secondary Targets
  10. Number and Nature of Delegations
  11. Temporary Overlay (i.e. fencing)
  12. Community Disruption
  13. Security Culture
  14. Security Outcome*Footnote 16

When comparing G8 and G20 countries, these cost drivers are factors that can have different costs and security needs attached and as well have a significant impact on planning due to the diversity of the countries and depending on situational context.

In addition to the aforementioned cost drivers, there is a large lack of disclosure by other jurisdictions. Host countries have varied reporting periods as well as how and what information is reported to the public. Special Advisor, Privy Council Office, Mr. Ward P.D. Elcock stated at the Standing Committee on Public Safety and National Security:

"I have yet to see a complete budget for any other G8 or G20 that's been held anywhere else in the world. The reality is, as far as countries reporting the full costs; we are probably the most transparent jurisdiction in the world It's not a case of other countries hiding costs; in many cases costs are accounted for in very different ways."Footnote 17

Additionally, what is included as regular operations and capital budgets compared to special summit expenses varies from country to country depending on the requirements and what type of assets and the number of people that are readily available for that countryFootnote 18

5.4 Appendix D: Federal Partners' Contribution to "Safe and Secure G8 and G20 Summits"

Partner Role and Responsibility
Canada Border Services Agency

Provided integrated border services that support national security and public safety priorities

Facilitated the free flow of persons and goods that meet all requirements under program legislation

Canadian Security Intelligence Service

Collected, analyzed and disseminated, in a timely manner, information and intelligence to key stakeholders and decision makers.

Supported the RCMP, OPP and other domestic security partners in the prevention or mitigation of threats

Department of National Defence/Canadian Armed Forces

Provided task-tailored support to the RCMP.

Conducted security operations with unique military capabilities assigned

Health Canada

Provided health and safety for federal government employees.

Provided radiological surveillance support.

Industry Canada

Managed the radiofrequency spectrum

Ensured spectrum quality by assigning radiofrequencies and by providing timely response to incidents of radio interference

Public Health Agency of Canada Deployed the Microbiological Emergency Response Team which provides specialized diagnostic reference services for emerging bacterial diseases
Public Safety Canada

Managed and applied the Security Cost Framework Policy.

Produced correspondence and briefings in relation to the designation of the G8 and G20, negotiations with provincial and municipal security partners, audit processes of policing and security costs claimed and reimbursement of eligible expenses.

Provided leadership by contributing to the development of appropriate policies to address evolving security requirements of G8 and G20 Summits.

PS worked closely with PCO Office of the Coordinator in the development and delivery of preparatory event exercises.

Royal Canadian Mounted Police

Sole agency with federal policing jurisdiction

Acted as lead agency for planning and delivering security

Transport Canada Provided legislative and regulatory oversight for the safety and security of the transportation.

5.5 Appendix E: Alignment of Project with Federal Partners' Strategic Outcomes

Partner Program Activity Strategic Outcome
Canada Border Services Agency

Security

Access

Internal Services

Canada's population is safe and secure from border-related risks

Legitimate travelers and goods move freely and lawfully across our borders

Canadian Security Intelligence Service Intelligence Program Intelligence is used to protect the security and safety of Canada and its citizens
Department of National Defence/Canadian Armed Forces Canadian Peace, Stability and Security

Canadian Forces are ready to meet Governments defense expectations

Increase peace, stability, and security

Health Canada Workplace Health Reduced health and environmental risks from products and substances, and healthy, sustainable living and working environments
Industry Canada Marketplace frameworks and regulations for spectrum, telecommunications, and online economy Timely access for Canadian citizens, private industry and public sector organizations to radio frequency spectrum and information on regulations, policy, procedures and standards, to meet their wireless telecommunication standards.
Public Health Agency of Canada Regulatory Enforcement and Emergency Response Healthier Canadians, reduced health disparities, and a stronger public health capacity
Public Safety Canada

National Security

Law Enforcement Leadership

Emergency Management

A safe and resilient Canada
Royal Canadian Mounted Police Protective Policing Criminal activity affecting Canadians is reduced
Transport Canada

Aviation Safety

Marine Safety

Rail Safety

Transportation of Dangerous Goods

Aviation Security

Marine Security

Surface and Intermodal Security

A safe transportation system

5.6 Appendix F: Federal Partner's mandated responsibilities for the Summits

Canada Border Services Agency

Canada Border Services Agency Act Section 5. (1) The Agency is responsible for providing integrated border services that support national security and public safety priorities and facilitate the free flow of persons and goods, including animals and plants that meet all requirements under the program legislation, by

  1. supporting the administration or enforcement, or both, as the case may be, of the program legislation;
  2. implementing agreements between the Government of Canada or the Agency and a foreign state or a public body performing a function of government in a foreign state to carry out an activity, provide a service or administer a tax or program;
  3. implementing agreements between the Government of Canada or the Agency and the government of a province or other public body performing a function of the Government in Canada to carry out an activity, provide a service or administer a tax or program;
  4. implementing agreements or arrangements between the Agency and departments or agencies of the Government of Canada to carry out an activity, provide a service or administer a program; and
  5. providing cooperation and support, including advice and information, to other departments and agencies of the Government of Canada to assist them in developing, evaluating and implementing policies and decisions in relation to program legislation for which they have responsibility.

Canadian Security Intelligence Service of Canada

Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act Section 2: "threats to the security of Canada" as:

  1. Espionage or sabotage that is against Canada or is detrimental to the interests of Canada or activities directed toward or in support of such espionage or sabotage
  2. Foreign influenced activities within or relating to Canada that are detrimental to the interests of Canada and are clandestine or deceptive or involve a threat to any person
  3. Activities within or relating to Canada directed toward or in support of the threat or use of acts of serious violence against persons or property for the purpose of achieving a political, religious or ideological objective within Canada or a foreign state, and
  4. Activities directed toward undermining by covert unlawful acts, or directed toward or intended ultimately to lead to the destruction or overthrow by violence of, the constitutionally established system of government in Canada,

but does not include lawful advocacy, protest or dissent, unless carried on in conjunction with any of the activities referred to in paragraphs (a) to (d).

Department of National Defence

National Defence Act Section 273.6 (2): The Governor in Council, or the Minister on the request of the Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness or any other Minister, may issue directions authorizing the Canadian Forces to provide assistance in respect of any law enforcement matter if the Governor in Council or the Minister, as the case may be, considers that

  1. The assistance is in the national interest; and
  2. The matter cannot be effectively dealt with except with the assistance of the Canadian Forces

Health Canada and Public Health Agency of Canada

Department of Health Act Section 4.2: Without restricting the generality of subsection (1), the Minister's powers, duties and functions relating to health include the following matters:

(b) the protection of the people of Canada against risks to health and the spreading of diseases;

(f) the promotion and preservation of the health of the public servants and other employees of the Government of Canada;

Emergency Management Act, Section 3: The Minister is responsible for exercising leadership relating to emergency management in Canada by coordinating, among government institutions and in cooperation with the provinces and other entities, emergency management activities. Emergency Management Act Section 4: Responsibilities Canada

(1) The Minister's responsibilities

(e) coordinating the Government of Canada's response to an emergency;

(f) coordinating the activities of government institutions relating to emergency management with those of the provinces and supporting the emergency management activities of the provinces and through the provinces, those of local authorities;

g) establishing arrangements with each province whereby any consultation with its lieutenant governor in council with respect to a declaration of an emergency under an Act of Parliament may be carried out effectively.

Industry Canada

Department of Industry Act Section 4: (1) The powers, duties and functions of the Minister extend to and include all matters over which Parliament has jurisdiction, not by law assigned to any other department, board or agency of the Government of Canada, relating to

a) industry and technology in Canada;

b) trade and commerce in Canada;

c) science in Canada;

d) consumer affairs;

e) corporations and corporate securities;

f) competition and restraint of trade, including mergers and monopolies;

g) bankruptcy and insolvency;

h) patents, copyrights, trade-marks, industrial designs and integrated circuit topographies;

i) standards of identity, packaging and performance in relation to consumer products and services, except in relation to the safety of consumer goods;

j) legal metrology;

k) telecommunications, except in relation to

  1. the planning and coordination of telecommunication services for departments, boards and agencies of the Government of Canada, and
  2. broadcasting, other than in relation to spectrum management and the technical aspects of broadcasting;

l) the development and utilization generally of communication undertakings, facilities, systems and services for Canada;

m) investment;

n) small businesses; and

o) tourism.

Public Safety Canada

Department of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness Act, 2005, c.10 Functions:

6. (1) In exercising his or her powers and in performing his or her duties and functions and with due regard to the powers conferred on the provinces and territories, the Minister may

  1. initiate, recommend, coordinate, implement or promote policies, programs or projects relating to public safety and emergency preparedness;
  2. cooperate with any province, foreign state, international organization or any other entity;
  3. make grants or contributions; and
  4. facilitate the sharing of information, where authorized, to promote public safety objectives.

Public Safety Canada worked closely with PCO Office of the Coordinator in the development and delivery of preparatory event exercises.

Royal Canadian Mounted Police

In general, as per the common law and section 18 of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police Act, members of the RCMP who are peace officers have the duty to preserve the peace, prevent crime, protect life and property and enforce the law in accordance with the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

Pursuant to subsection 10.1(1) of the Foreign Missions and International Organizations Act (FMIOA), the RCMP has the primary responsibility to ensure the security for the proper functioning of any intergovernmental conference in which two or more states participate, that is attended by persons granted privileges and immunities under the FMIOA and to which an order made under the FMIOA applies. Explicit powers are granted to the RCMP by subsection 10.1(2) of the FMIOA which provides that the Force "may take appropriate measures, including controlling, limiting or prohibiting access to any area to the extent and in a manner that is reasonable in the circumstances" to ensure the security of the event.

Pursuant to subparagraph 17(1)(f)(i) of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police Regulations, 1988, RCMP members who are peace officers have a duty to protect, from real or potential harm, IPPs defined in section 2 of the Criminal Code and, pursuant to paragraph 17(1)(e), a duty to protect within or outside Canada a number of individuals, including the Governor General, Prime Minister and ministers of the Crown.

Pursuant to subsection 6(1) of the Security Offences Act, RCMP members who are peace officers have primary responsibility to deal with offences which constitute a threat to the security of Canada as defined in section 2 of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act or offences where an IPP is the victim or where there exists an apprehension of such offences taking place.

Transport Canada

The Minister of Transport is responsible or shares responsibility for a number of acts and regulations that were used during the Summits. The following are examples of legislation pertaining to Transport Canada and relating to transportation safety and security: Aeronautics Act; Marine Transportation Security Act, Railway Safety Act and Transportation of Dangerous Goods Act.

5.7 Appendix G: Reviews, Investigations, After-Action Reports

The policing of the G20 Summit was the subject of eleven (11) reviews and investigations, the majority of which have resulted in lengthy reports. The Government of Canada, and the RCMP in particular, participated in the following hearings, reviews and investigations regarding G20 Summit policing:

  1. IACHR Hearing: The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights of the Organization of American States ("IACHR") held a special hearing at the request of three civil liberties organizations to review the policing of protests at the G20 Summit.
  2. SECU Hearings: The House of Commons Standing Committee on Public Safety and National Security (SECU) held five hearings to consider issues surrounding security at the G8 and G20 Summits.
  3. CPC Public Interest Investigation: The Commission for Public Complaints against the RCMP (CPC) conducted a public interest investigation into RCMP member conduct relating to the 2010 G8 and G20 Summits following complaints summarized by Nathalie Des Rosiers, General Counsel of the Canadian Civil Liberties Association.
  4. Independent Civilian Review into Matters Relating to the G20 Summit (Morden Review): Former Associate Chief Justice John Morden conducted an independent civilian review at the request of the Toronto Police Services Board ("TPSB") of the role played by the TPSB in developing and implementing strategies for policing the G20 Summit.
  5. OIPRD Systemic Review: The Office of the Independent Police Review Director (OIPRD) initiated a systemic review of issues underlying complaints received regarding policing during the G20 Summit.
  6. RCMP After-Action Review: The RCMP conducted a review of security at the G8 and G20 Summits for the purpose of identifying best practices and lessons learned that may be applied to future major events.
  7. SIU Investigations: The Special Investigations Unit of the Ministry of the Solicitor General, Province of Ontario, investigated allegations by certain individuals that police officers caused injury to them during the G20 Summit.

There were four additional reviews and investigations, in which the RCMP was not asked to participate, regarding the policing of the G20 Summit:

  1. Ontario Ombudsman's Investigation: The Ontario Ombudsman conducted an investigation into the origin and subsequent communication of a security regulation passed under the Public Works Protection Act ("PWPA").
  2. Review of the PWPA (McMurtry Review): Former Chief Justice of Ontario Roy McMurtry conducted a review of the PWPA at the request of the Ontario Ministry of Community Safety and Correctional Services asked
  3. Toronto Police Service (TPS) After-Action Review: TPS conducted an after action review of its role in policing the G20 Summit.
  4. Ontario Provincial Police (OPP) After-Action Review: The OPP conducted an after action review of its role in policing the G8 and G20 Summits.

Footnotes

Footnote 1Canada. Office of the Auditor General of Canada. Report of the Auditor General of Canada to the House of Commons. Ottawa, April 2011.

Footnote 2The 21,000 personnel include resources from the Ontario Provincial Police, the Toronto Police Service, the Peel Regional Police, and 17 other police agencies as well as four municipal security partners including the Municipality of Huntsville, the District of Muskoka, the Township of Lake of Bays and the City of North Bay. Only RCMP and Federal Partners were assessed in this evaluation.

Footnote 3Partners for this evaluation include CBSA, CSIS, DND/CAF, Health Canada, Industry Canada, PHAC, PS (excluding contribution agreements managed in accordance with the SCFP), RCMP and Transport Canada.

Footnote 4The SCFP was the mechanism used to collaborate with other police agencies by the Government of Canada. It provided the basis for funding of provincial and municipal police officers participating in the security efforts of the Summits.

Footnote 5Canada. Office of the Auditor General of Canada. Report of the Auditor General of Canada to the House of Commons. Ottawa, April 2011

Footnote 6The area of operations spanned several sites stretching 350 kilometres along the corridor from Muskoka to the Greater Toronto Area.

Footnote 7Police of Jurisdiction included Ontario Provincial Police, Peel Regional Police, and Toronto Police Service.

Footnote 8As a part of planning, there was an Emergency Mobilization plan. This included a contingency plan for both accommodations and transportation from the G8 Summit to the G20 Summit. OPP and RCMP resources travelled by bus and air from Muskoka to Toronto, while RCMP and Ottawa Police resources travelled from Ottawa to Toronto. Peel Regional Police also deployed more resources on an emergency basis in Toronto.

Footnote 9Finding related to Intermediate Outcome Effective Operational Support

Footnote 10Canada. Office of the Auditor General of Canada. Report of the Auditor General of Canada to the House of Commons. Ottawa, April 2011

Footnote 11For funding related to all partners excluding the approved funding of the RCMP and Public Safety Canada: Canada. Office of the Auditor General of Canada. Report of the Auditor General of Canada to the House of Commons. Ottawa, April 2011

Footnote 12$1 million of the approved funding was held in frozen allotment.

Footnote 13Canada. Royal Canadian Mounted Police. G8 and G20 Integrated Security Unit After Action Report, page 62. June 2011

Footnote 14Appendix E displays how each partner contributed to 'safe and secure Summits' to maintain global confidence in the Canadian federal government's ability to protect and defend large public events in Canada. Appendix F demonstrates how participation in the Summits were linked to each partners' strategic outcomes. Appendix G articulates the mandated responsibilities of each partner for the Summits.

Footnote 15As described in Section 2.4 Limitations to Conducting the Evaluation, there was insufficient information to assess this question.

Footnote 16See explanations of cost drivers in full report available at: www.parl.gc.ca/pbo-dpb

Footnote 17Canada. Parliament. House of Commons. Standing Committee on Public Safety and National Security. 40th Parliament, 3rd Session. 25 October 2010, Ottawa, 2010.

Footnote 18Canada. Office of the Parliamentary Budget Officer. Assessment of Planned Security Costs for the 2010 G8 and G20 Summits. Ottawa: Office of the Parliamentary Budget Officer, 2010.